




A Bond that will Permanently Endure: The Eisenhower 



























Submitted in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 









































A Bond that will Permanently Endure: The Eisenhower administration, the Bolivian revolution 
and Latin American leftist nationalism 
Oliver Murphey 
 
This dissertation examines how Latin American diplomacy helped shape U.S. officials’ response 
to revolutionary movements at the height of the Cold War. It explains the striking contrast 
between U.S. patronage of the Bolivian revolution and the profound antagonism with similar 
leftist nationalist movements in Cuba and Guatemala. Although U.S. policymakers worried that 
“Communists” were infiltrating the Bolivian Government, Bolivian diplomats convinced the 
Eisenhower administration to support their revolution. The dissertation demonstrates that even 
during the peak of McCarthyism, U.S. policymakers' vision extended far beyond Cold War 
dogmatism. This vision incorporated a subtle, if ultimately contradictory, appreciation of the 
power of nationalism, a wish to promote developmental liberalism, and a desire for hemispheric 
hegemony regardless of strategic and ideological competition with the Soviet Union. U.S. 
officials were eager to exploit the emerging force of third world nationalism and employ it to 
strengthen the “inter-American system.” The Bolivian revolutionaries presented their political 
project as copacetic to Washington’s wider regional goals, and thus managed to secure 
considerable freedom of movement to continue to pursue a radical revolutionary agenda and 
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The Bolivian revolution of April 1952 saw pitched battle between Marxist miners’ unions and 
the armed forces of Bolivia on the streets of the capital La Paz, during which hundreds died. 
Time magazine initially reported 3,000 dead and 6,000 injured, under a headline: “Bolivia: 
Blood-drenched comeback” for the “fanatical members of the totalitarian Movement of National 
Revolution (M.N.R.).”1 The Bolivian army was roundly defeated and the triumphant miners and 
peasants welcomed exiled Victor Paz Estensorro back from Argentina to assume the presidency. 
Having transformed an abortive coup into a successful popular revolution, the MNR’s armed 
allies amongst the unions and peasantry moved to the center of Bolivian political, economic and 
military power.2  
Observers in Washington seemed primed to react badly. According to Embassy, State 
Department, CIA and NSC reports, “Communists” were “infiltrating into the Bolivian 
Government.”3 Its President and Foreign Minister, supposed moderates within the government, 
were both Marxists, and there was “little doubt” of their “totalitarian orientation.”4 In the months 
                                                 
1 Time, 21 April 1952, p. 42. Most estimates now put the toll of the dead at around one thousand or less. 
2 Radical miners’ unions had joined the MNR’s attempted coup and transformed it into a revolution, routing the 
army with their own armed militias, and exercising significant influence on the MNR through the politically 
powerful Central Obrero Boliviano (COB), an umbrella labor organization.  The virtual monopoly on military power 
wielded by the victorious militias proved crucial in cementing their influence on the ruling government and Bolivian 
politics in the 1950s. 
3 Telegraph from the Embassy in La Paz to the Department of State, 2 February, 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, 
724.001/2-253. 
4 Telegraph from Maleady (chargé d’Affaires) to Department of State, April 14, 1952 NARA, CDF, RG 59, RG 59, 
Box 3307, 724.00/4-1452. See also NIE 92-54, “Probable Developments in Bolivia,” Created: 3/16/1954, CIA 
electronic reading room, p. 4. ONLINE RESOURCE: http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs.asp, accessed 08/04/08; 





immediately following the revolution, the new regime nationalized tin companies owned by U.S. 
interests and enacted sweeping land reform at the behest of armed peasant groups, drawing 
inspiration from the Guatemalan agrarian reform.5  
The Eisenhower administration, like most American presidencies during the Cold War, has 
been castigated for its “obsess[ive],” “overzealous,” “virulent” and “hardline” anticommunist 
ideology and stubborn determination to interpret global events “solely within the context of the 
Soviet-American confrontation.”6 Yet Eisenhower and his administration continued to recognize 
the MNR regime after an abortive falangist counter-coup in January 1953 swung the nation’s 
politics further leftwards. Even more surprisingly, six months later Eisenhower decided to 
provide the revolutionary government with large aid packages. Aid to Bolivia totalled $192.5 
million in the Eisenhower years, the vast majority of it in the form of grants. This is almost half 
of the 400 million dollars of military aid that the whole of Latin America received during the 
Eisenhower administration. 7 Bolivia was the second highest per capita recipient of U.S. aid in 
                                                 
1955, p. 4. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: 
Papers, 1948-1961. OCB Central File Series, Box 24, OCB 091.Bolivia (2) June 1955-December 1956. 
5 Paz claimed explicit inspiration from Guatemala’s reforms. Telegraph from Sparks to the Department of State, 23 
January, 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3309 724.00 (W)/1-2353. Guatemalan government and press, reporting 
the success of the MNR revolution and its subsequent reforms, also cheerfully proclaimed “we are no longer alone 
in the hemisphere.” Telegraph Rowell to the Department of State, 8 May, 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3309, 
724.00(W)/5-853. 
6 Quotes on the Eisenhower administration’s anticommunism are from, respectively, Rabe, Eisenhower in Latin 
America, p. 69; Ira Chernus, General Eisenhower, p. 304; Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign 
Economic Policy, 1953-1961, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 9; Shawn Parry-Giles, The 
Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), p. 161. 
Quote on the Soviet Union in Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, p. 32. See also Stephen Rabe, “Dulles, Latin 
America and Cold War Anticommunism” in Richard H. Immerman (ed.), John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of 
the Cold War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 162.  





Latin America (behind Haiti).8 By 1957 the United States was providing 34 percent of Bolivia’s 
budget.9  
Why did the administration evince such commitment to the leftist government? What were 
U.S. policymakers and officials at various levels of the bureaucracy trying to achieve in Bolivia 
and the wider region? How can many of the same people have presided over the U.S.-engineered 
coup in Guatemala in 1954 and the collapse of U.S.-Cuban relations in 1960 (or, for that matter, 
Iran in 1953)?  Jacobo Arbenz’ government and the July 26th movement led by Fidel Castro, like 
the MNR, had Marxist ideological inspiration and enjoyed the backing of radical leftist political 
groups, including local Communist Parties. All three advocated nationalizing their countries’ 
national resources in defiance of U.S.-owned companies. Each enacted sweeping land reforms. 
They invoked anti-American rhetoric in the framing of their nationalist search for greater 
autonomy. And all these movements overthrew governments and traditional ruling oligarchies 
that had been allies of the United States up until their last moments in power (if not beyond). 
Policies towards Bolivia, Cuba and Guatemala in the 1950s have their own histories, but 
also fit within a broader historiography on Eisenhower, the Cold War and U.S. policy in Latin 
America. Scholarship on the Eisenhower presidency has largely moved on from debating 
whether Eisenhower was directly involved in foreign policy formulation and implementation, 
after the publication of Fred Greenstein’s benchmark revisionist history: The Hidden Hand 
Presidency.10 Some revisionist scholars not only recognized Eisenhower’s significant input, but 
                                                 
8 Blasier, “The United States and the Revolution” in Malloy and Thorn (eds.), Beyond the Revolution, pp. 88-89; 
Richard Patch, “Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting,” in Richard N. Adams et al., Social Change in 
Latin America Today: Its Implications for United States Policy, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 152. 
9 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, p. 77. 





also praised his restraint and foresight in crafting “the basic elements of a viable cold war 
strategy.”11 
Though Eisenhower’s central role in policy formulation came to attract broad scholarly 
acceptance, the latent (and sometimes forthright) triumphalism of some revisionist accounts 
seemed out of place to many scholars writing in the 1980s and 90s on the administration’s 
policies in the Third World. Robert McMahon’s 1986 critique of the revisionists sets forth a key 
claim of what became known as “post-revisionism.” McMahon wrote that the revisionists’ 
failure “to appreciate the centrality of Third World nationalism [in international affairs and U.S. 
foreign policy interests] has led them to present a distorted and oversimplified view of American 
foreign relations during a critical eight-year period.”12 In the Third World post-revisionist 
scholars saw little sagacious restraint, and more damaging interventionism based on profound 
misunderstanding of the political projects of Third World nationalists and their role in the 
international system.13 As Richard Immerman put it, “in the Third World… Dulles floundered in 
an alien sea.”14 Odd Arne Westad, following the analysis of many regional specialists, also 
depicted Eisenhower as rather bemused by the Third World, “wondering aloud” in an NSC 
                                                 
11 Andrew J. Goodpaster (U.S. army general), quoted in Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, pp. v, viii. John 
Lewis Gaddis wrote that Dulles was also a key partner in developing a “sophisticated, long term strategy” for 
contesting the Cold War. John Lewis Gaddis, “The Unexpected John Foster Dulles,” in Immerman, (ed.), John 
Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, p. 67. Aaron Friedberg Bowie and Immerman go further by 
claiming that Eisenhower’s was also the first “coherent” Cold War strategy, one that was a key dynamic in securing 
the eventual downfall of the Soviet Union. Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, p. 3. See also Friedberg, In the 
Shadow of the Garrison State, p. 341.  
12 Robert McMahon, “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists,” Political Science 
Quarterly Vol. 101, No.3 (1986), pp. 457. 
13 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During 
the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 182. 





meeting why it was not possible to “get some of the people in these down-trodden countries to 
like us instead of hating us.”15 
The Cold War, either as a strategic or an ideological concern, provided an explanation of 
U.S. policy that Eisenhower post-revisionists, as well as Latin Americanists and Cold War 
scholars, have all seized upon.16 A common claim is that U.S. policymakers’ anticommunism 
and preoccupation with containment bred a harmful misunderstanding of Latin American and 
Third World political movements that flourished in Washington during the 1950s.17 According to 
this narrative, which spans Cold War revisionism and Eisenhower post-revisionism as well as 
scholarship on Bolivia, U.S. officials’ misunderstanding was rooted in Cold War ideology and 
geostrategy. These intellectual failings bred a toxic combination of support for “stable” 
dictatorships and an accompanying neglect of socio-economic reform and foreign aid when U.S. 
policymakers did not see any direct Cold War threat to that “stability,” real or imagined. 18 
Because U.S. officials could not interpret these challenges outside of a Cold War context they 
responded with reactionary interventionism to movements they did not understand in Indonesia, 
                                                 
15 Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 122. For further criticism of misunderstanding in Bolivia, Cuba and Guatemala, 
see Kenneth Lehman, Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership, (Athens, GA: University of Georgia 
Press, 1999), p. 114. According to Richard Welch, Eisenhower seemed ‘honestly puzzled at the animus shown by 
Fidel Castro”’ Richard E. Welch, Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), p.  41. 
16 The Cold War as a strategic concept for policymakers in Washington would fit loosely under the rubric of 
“containment,” or more broadly geostrategic competition with the Soviet Union. As an ideological construct, the 
Cold War might be construed from the U.S. perspective as “anticommunism,” which had influence both on political 
and economic policy. Both provide the explanation for the intervention in Guatemala for the foremost historical 
account of the decision to intervene: Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United 
States, 1944-1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 
17 Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America (Princeton, N.J: Princeton 
University Press, 1987); Schoultz Beneath the United States; Rabe Eisenhower and Latin America. 
18 See Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America; Robert A. Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward 





Iran, the Congo, Vietnam, Lebanon, Guatemala, Cuba and beyond.19 These interventions helped 
fuel and inspire anti-American nationalist movements across the Third World, whose challenges 
to American allies and American values created conflicts and political discourses that had 
important consequences outside of a Cold War framework.20  
The above narrative gathered increasing explanatory power in the United States after 
American intervention in the Vietnam War and the collapse of the Cold War consensus over 
containment. U.S. policy in the early Cold War seemed to be defined by Washington’s 
monolithic construction of a global communist threat, which led to the “confusion of nationalism 
with communism.”21 
Yet in Bolivia that confusion seems never to have materialized. Many historians have 
sought to explain this puzzle. Some see U.S. policymakers’ acceptance of the Bolivian revolution 
as a result of a lack of coherence, a “shotgun approach,” or “simplified attributions” of 
anticommunist intent to the MNR whilst seeing nothing but communist encroachment in 
                                                 
19 Westad, Global Cold War; Robert McMahon, “Eisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the 
Revisionists,” Political Science Quarterly Vol. 101, No.3 (1986), pp. 453-473; Blanche Wisen Cook, The 
Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981).For more recent iterations of this 
approach, see David F. Schmitz, Thank God They’re on our Side: The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 
1921-1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man in 
Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia. (Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2004); Stephen Streeter, Managing the Counterrevolution: The United States & Guatemala, 1954-1961 
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2000), p. 4; Lehman "revolutions and attributions," p. 189. 
20 Matthew Connelly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for 
Independence,” American Historical Review, Vol. 105, No. 3. (June, 2000), pp. 739-769. 
21 Immerman, “Conclusion” in Immerman (ed.), John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, p. 280. See 
also John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy 
During the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 182; David L. Anderson, Trapped by Success: 
The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 22. 
 For a notable exception, see Vanni Pettinà, “The Shadows of Cold War over Latin America: The U.S. 





Guatemala.22 Some insist on the importance of unusually sympathetic or enlightened personnel 
on the ground in La Paz, who were given more responsibility in a backwater like Bolivia.23 
Others emphasize the manipulative reactionary intent at the heart of Washington’s approach, 
using Bolivia’s economic dependence to cynically undermine the promise of the MNR’s 
revolution. In doing to, many historians minimize the leftist or revolutionary credentials of the 
MNR “moderates” who acquiesced to U.S. empire.24  
These characterizations miss the broader rationales and purposeful support for Bolivia that 
ran throughout the administration, from the Embassy and mid-level State Department desk 
officers to Eisenhower himself. Moreover, close analysis of the Bolivian example has much to 
contribute to the wider literature of U.S.-Latin American relations and histories of the Cold War 
and the Eisenhower administration. Previous works either overemphasize the extent and nature 
of U.S. distrust and antipathy towards regional nationalism, discount the radicalism and agency 
of the Bolivian revolution and its leaders25, or mischaracterize the nature of U.S. foreign policy 
                                                 
22 Rabe, Foreign Policy of Anticommunism; Lehman. “Revolutions and Attributions” 
23 G. Earl Sanders, “The Quiet Experiment in American Diplomacy,” Americas 33.1, (July, 1976), pp. 25-49; Robert 
J. Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958); Lehman, Bolivia 
and the United States, p. 103. 
24 Siekmeier, The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, p. 43; Klein, Bolivia, p. 232; Lehman, Bolivia and the 
United States, p. 92. 
25 Eric Selbin, Modern Latin American Revolutions (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); James M. Malloy, 
Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970); Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower 
and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); 





as overly dominated by economic interests26, the dogmatic need to contain hostile ideologies27, 
or infantilizing, racist and gendered assumptions.28 
Despite some impressive recent efforts in moving beyond Soviet-U.S. bipolarity, general 
Cold War historiography has also still not fully delineated the place of Latin American 
nationalist movements in U.S. policymakers’ minds. Many influential accounts, whilst 
recognizing the importance of Third World nationalism and decolonization as alternative 
organizing concepts for post-1945 diplomatic and international history, still emphasize the 
hostile, if not ignorant, desire of North American officials to “contain” or “fight” nationalism in 
Latin America and beyond.29 Westad, for example, argues that the intervention against 
                                                 
26 Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America. 
27 Be they economic nationalism or communism. James Siekmeier, Aid, Nationalism and Inter-American Relations: 
Guatemala, Bolivia and the United States, 1945-1961 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999); Stephen Streeter, 
Managing the Counterrevolution. 
28 Louis A. Pérez, Jr., Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2008); Frederick Pike, The United States and Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes of 
civilization and nature. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992). Thomas G. Patterson, Contesting Castro: The 
United States and the Cuban Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 254, 257; Amy Kaplan and 
Donald Pease, Cultures of United States Imperialism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993); Pérez, Cuba in the 
American Imagination. for accounts emphasizing racist assumptions driving U.S. policy see also, George White, 
Holding the Line: Race, Racism and American Foreign Policy toward Africa, 1953-1961 (Rowman and Littlefield: 
Lanham, MD, 2005). Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the 
Global Arena (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001), pp. 129-131; Borstelmann, Apartheid's 
Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), p. 199. 
29 Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004); James Siekmeier, Aid, Nationalism and Inter-American Relations, p. 207. 
See also Herbert Klein, A Concise History of Bolivia, Second Edition (New York, Columbia University Press, 
2011), p. 218; Siekmeier, The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1952 to the Present (University Park: 
Pennsylvania University Press 2011), p. 23. Klein, an authoritative historian of Bolivia, repeats the characterization 
of the "very conservative and Cold War regime of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and president Dwight D. 





Mossadegh represented the death of the idea that the United States should co-opt radical Third 
World nationalism.30  
James Siekmeier is another scholar who focuses on the antinationalist enterprise at the 
heart of U.S. policy. Siekmeier has done some excellent work to stress the transformative 
potential of the Bolivian revolution, although he ultimately places greater emphasis on the U.S.-
imposed constraints that frustrated this potential. In Latin America, Siekmeier sees the United 
States as motivated not by Cold War concerns, but by its relationship to Third World 
nationalism. In his numerous works, Siekmeier consistently argues that the Eisenhower 
administration was essentially hostile to the Bolivian revolution and saw its economic 
nationalism as a threat to U.S. interests. U.S. policy therefore forced "Bolivia's powerful left" 
into "a partial retreat from the revolution," using tin contracts and aid programs to foster and 
encourage Bolivian dependency and further the interests of U.S. private capital.31   
Siekmeier is one of many scholars who have focused on the economic leverage the U.S. 
was able to wield over the nascent revolution, given that it was the only realistic destination for 
Bolivian tin ores. Some accounts argue for the radicalism of the Bolivian revolution32, though 
                                                 
30 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 119. 
31 Siekmeier also emphasizes the dominance of the moderate faction within the MNR from 1952 onwards, and 
harmful impact of the Eder plan and US military aid to Bolivia (at the Bolivian government's request) later in the 
decade which ultimately destroyed the revolution. Siekmeier also emphasizes the dominance of the moderate faction 
within the MNR from 1952 onwards, and harmful impact of the Eder plan and US military aid to Bolivia (at the 
Bolivian government's request) later in the decade which ultimately destroyed the revolution. Siekmeier, The 
Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1952 to the Present (University Park: Pennsylvania University Press 
2011), pp. 2-3, 8. See also Kenneth Lehman, “Braked but not broken: Mexico and Bolivia- Factoring the United 
States into the Revolutionary Equation” in Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo (eds.), Proclaiming Revolution: 
Bolivia in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 91-113. 
32
 Alan Knight argued that there were only four genuine and successful twentieth century social revolutions in Latin 
America: Mexico in 1910, Bolivia in 1952, Cuba in 1959 and Nicaragua in 1979. All of these revolutions, excepting 
Bolivia, provoked U.S. serious and sustained military intervention. Alan Knight, “Democratic and Revolutionary 
Traditions in Latin America,” Bulletin of Latin American Research, Volume 20, Issue 2, (April 2001), pp. 147-186, 





many doubt the revolutionary commitments of its leadership33, but the overwhelming historical 
consensus holds that the effect of the U.S. on this revolution was to stymie, “brake,” 34 “diffuse,” 
35 “moderate”36 and “fight”37 the revolution’s radical economic nationalism, or render it 
“unfinished” and incomplete.38 Scholarship written after the 1964 military coup that deposed 
President Paz has emphasized both the coercive and the counterproductive nature of U.S. aid 
there, and many scholars see U.S. aid as having merely served to reinforce Bolivian dependency 
whilst stifling economic nationalism and lasting socio-economic reform.39 The fact that the U.S. 
was willing to accept the nationalization of the tin mines and land reform was the result of the 
‘prompt, adequate and effective compensation’ the Bolivians were forced to pay to former mine 
owners, and the fact that U.S. companies were less directly harmed by the nationalization and 
land reform.40 
                                                 
American Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (July, 1959), p. 342; Lawrence Whitehead, “The Bolivian Revolution: A 
Comparison” in Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo (eds.), Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative 
Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 25-53. 
33 Herbert Klein, Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 
232; Siekmeier, The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, p. 43; Lehman, Bolivia and the United States, p. 92 
[citing numerous others, including James Malloy and Christopher Mitchell].  
34 Kenneth Lehman, “Braked but not broken: Mexico and Bolivia- Factoring the United States into the 
Revolutionary Equation” in Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo (eds.), Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in 
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), pp. 91-113. 
35 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, p. 126. 
36 Blasier, Hovering Giant, p. 238. 
37 Siekmeier, Aid, Nationalism and Inter-American Relations, p. 83.  
38 James M. Malloy, Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970); 
Christopher Mitchell, Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From the MNR to Military Rule (New York: Praeger, 1977). 
39 Richard Gordon Frederick “United States Aid to Bolivia, 1952-1972” (Unpublished PhD, University of Maryland, 
1977); Siekmeier, Aid, nationalism and Inter-American Relations and The Bolivian Revolution and the United 
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Others go further. Kenneth Lehman has argued that there was no considered, strategic 
rationale for the decision to embrace the MNR whilst simultaneously preparing to overthrow 
Arbenz. Lehman’s line of reasoning shares much with accounts that argue pragmatism and short 
term mitigation of crisis situations led the U.S. towards an embrace of the Bolivian revolution.41 
Though he does incorporate a combination of “Cold War blinders,” a “McCarthyite mood” and 
hegemonic concerns into his analysis of the wider stakes for U.S. policymakers, he sees little 
serious reflection on the broader incoherency between Bolivia and Guatemala policy, especially 
at higher levels of the administration.42 Lehman ultimately argues that early assumptions 
surrounding the personalities of the MNR leadership, aided by MNR contacts with 
administration officials and key supporters such as Milton Eisenhower, U.S. labor leaders 
Gardener Jackson, Ernesto Galarza and Serfino Romualdi and sympathetic embassy staff, meant 
that the administration concluded the Bolivians were trustworthy whereas the Guatemalans were 
not.43 These calculations were, according to Lehman, made early, and based on limited 
information and “simplified attributions” of intent, as to the character of the leftist nationalist 
governments in Guatemala and Bolivia.44 
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It seems historians are reluctant to acknowledge willing and purposeful U.S. support for 
the revolution, support that gave the MNR real breathing space to pursue its substantial reforms. 
U.S. behavior is explained either by pragmatism or the extension of coercive economic 
imperialism by other means. Perhaps an undue significance is given to the “prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation” required by the United States, which despite public assertions to the 
contrary from both parties, did not occur.45 And the MNR’s turn away from expansive social 
spending in 1956 mandated by the Eder Plan, whilst only partially effective, has nonetheless 
colored analysis of the revolution’s earlier years where U.S. aid was directly subsidizing 
nationalized industries, the arming of miners and peasant militias, and expanded social spending 
without any guarantees as to the direction the revolution was headed.46 
Siekmeier was, however, right to insist that in Bolivia and Guatemala the Soviet Union and 
the Cold War played only an indirect role in defining the administration’s response to leftist 
nationalism in Bolivia and Guatemala.47 This goes against the grain of scholarly consensus on 
the reasons for the intervention in Guatemala and Cuba. Piero Gleijeses’ influential account has 
argued for Cold War anticommunism as providing a rationale for U.S. policy. For him, by the 
Eisenhower administration’s accession to power, U.S. policymakers were very well informed as 
to the communist sympathies of Arbenz, even if their wider fear of Soviet intrusion was 
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misplaced and the Cold War rationale for the June 1954 intervention was a disaster for 
Guatemala and for U.S. interests.48 Similarly, U.S. conclusions that Castro had committed 
himself to communism forms the central explanation for his fall from grace in U.S. eyes.49 In 
Bolivia too, the granting of U.S. aid is explained by Stephen Zunes as a result of policymakers’ 
ability to force Paz into making a clearer anticommunist stance.50 
Latin America has a long history of popular interaction and contestation with the power of 
the United States and traditional elites, and this broader perspective has led some scholars to 
challenge the centrality of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War conflict over ideology and geostrategy in 
the region’s history.51 To deal with this broader history some studies have tried to expand 
outward the meaning of the “Cold War” concept. These scholars seek to use the term to describe 
a conflict that predates the rise of the Soviet as global superpower, or even the foundation of the 
Soviet Union itself. For them, the Cold War was the clash of revolutionary (Marxist) and 
counterrevolutionary (anti-Marxist) social forces, whose violent struggle in Latin America was 
catalyzed by the onset of the Mexican revolution in 1910.52 
Rather than changing definitions of the Cold War, some studies of U.S. international 
relations and the Eisenhower administration have sought to position international relations, the 
Third World and nationalist movements in contexts outside of “the Cold War.” Salim Yaqub’s 
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Containing Arab Nationalism is a notable example, which noted some subtlety in policymakers’ 
attitudes towards Arab nationalism.53 Matthew Connelly also noted sophistication in U.S. 
analyses of Algerian nationalism, and advocated “taking off the Cold War lens” in the process.54  
But what lens should replace it? If zero-sum Cold War point scoring was not the only 
calculus in the minds of U.S. policymakers, how did Washington identify its priorities, recognize 
potential threats and seize possible opportunities? I wish to examine two conceptual approaches: 
treating U.S. policy towards Latin American revolutions as dominated by a desire for empire 
which predated and outlived confrontation with the Soviet Union, and influenced by an analysis 
of Third World nationalisms that transcended the Cold War. 
Emphasis on Third World nationalism as an alternative framework for understanding U.S. 
policies in the twentieth century is not perhaps as new to diplomatic history, nor to historians of 
U.S.-Latin American relations, as the framing and reception of Westad’s influential Global Cold 
War might suggest.55 Cold War revisionist and New Left scholars such as Gabriel Kolko and 
Noam Chomsky have long argued that U.S. Cold War ideology acted as a cipher for the real 
purpose of U.S. policy. In this narrative, the real purpose of Washington’s engagement with the 
world was a Wallerstinian quest for empire in the global periphery that emphasized economic 
exploitation and the suppression of Third World nationalisms seeking autonomy from the global 
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capitalist system policed by U.S. power.56 The primacy of hegemony or imperialism as a 
motivation for and explanation of U.S. policy is an assessment that fits particularly well with 
Latin America (or at least the Caribbean), where the roots of U.S. imperialism are obvious and 
deep.57 
The nature and primary purpose of this empire or hegemony is up for debate, and the 
literature debating it is vast. Perhaps the most productive definition of empire would be the 
ability for a state to exercise effective control of another nation’s sovereignty, whether through 
formal or informal structures.58 Hegemony, a term I prefer in the case of U.S. policy toward 
Latin America in the Cold War era, represents a desire for dominance, influence and leadership 
on behalf of policymakers (and non-state actors), but implies not only a significant degree of 
cooperation on behalf of the dominated, but also negotiation, adaptation and appropriation of 
dominating ideologies and policy goals for separate and distinct ends.59 
For those who characterize U.S. policy in Latin America and in the Cold War as empire, 
the desire for economic domination drove U.S. policy and interventionism more than anything.60 
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These analyses draw epistemologically from Lenin and Hobson, Charles Beard and the later New 
Left reformulations of American foreign policy as Empire from scholars such as William 
Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber.61 As Major General Smedley Butler, a highly 
decorated Marine who had served in the Philippines, China and all around the Caribbean Basin, 
later remarked on his career: 
I spent thirty-three years and four months in active military service… And, during 
that period, I spent most of my time as a high-class muscle man for big business, for Wall 
Street and the bankers.  In short, I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. Thus, I helped 
make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914.  I helped 
make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues 
in.  I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall 
Street.62 
 
But despite the long lasting appeal of the idea that U.S. empire was principally driven by 
the quest for markets and economic exploitation, many historians have moved beyond defining 
U.S. foreign policy as driven by economic interests. Even during the era of high imperialism in 
the Caribbean, when U.S. marines repeatedly intervened in Cuba, Nicaragua and Santo Domingo 
to enforce debt payments, take control of customs houses and foreign monetary policy, U.S. 
policymakers also contended with a plethora of strategic and ideological interests, from 
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excluding foreign powers63 or securing the Panama Canal64 to promoting stability and the 
“values of Main Street not Wall Street.”65 
The focus on ideology and hegemony as a more comprehensive explanation of U.S. 
policy in the region has fed a growing body of scholarship sometimes described as the ‘cultural 
turn.’ Recent works focus on cultural hegemony, and the best scholarship in this varied field 
conceive of it as a process of exchange and contestation, rather than all-powerful amorphous 
steamroller that sees any individual tied to the United States by birth, occupation or language to 
be part of a process of vast and impersonal subjugation from without.66 These studies have 
helped demonstrate that U.S. hegemony also gave room to Latin American political movements 
to negotiate, adapt and appropriate U.S. ideologies and policy goals for separate and distinct 
ends.67 More subtle and successful works in this tradition also tend to work best when culture is 
not the sole object of study, but is linked to important parallel economic or political processes.68 
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All these analyses of the driving forces behind U.S. policy, interventionism or 
“hegemony” rely on essentially antinationalist frameworks for understanding U.S. hegemonic 
designs. It is this antinationalist portrayal that needs to be challenged. Whilst the characterization 
of animosity between Latin American nationalists and the United States is an accurate 
description of the outcome of the deeper North American involvement in the region, its analysis 
of the motivation and rationale for U.S. policy is insufficient.  
References to the “inter-American system” and “regional” or “hemispheric solidarity” 
certainly pervade U.S. policymakers’ analyses of Latin America, a vital region for the United 
States’ interests.69 U.S. Trade with Latin America was second only to Canada in the 1950s, 
imports from Latin America were valued at $3.5 billion per annum, $0.8 billion less than U.S. 
exports to the region and over $33 billion in 2016 dollars.70 It had proved a vital source of 
material and diplomatic support for the United States during the Second World War, and 
remained strategically important to the United States, if only for reasons of proximity. 
In the Eisenhower administration’s first major policy document on Latin America, NSC 
144/1, the administration’s top policymakers set out their goals for the region, including 
                                                 
69 For more rhetoric on the inter-American system and “hemispheric solidarity,” see NSC 5432/1, April 6, 1956, p.3, 
White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961, OCB Central File Series, Box 24, OCB 
091.Latin America (File#6) (7); “Outline of Plan of Operations against Communism in Latin America,” April 18, 
1956 (referencing NSC 5432/1 of November 16, 1954), FRUS, 1955-57, vol. 6, pp. 66-67, 75; “Statement of U.S. 
Policy Toward Latin America,” NSC 5902/1, February 16, 1959, Annex B, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. 5, American 
Republics, p. 121; “Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy toward Latin America,” (NSC 5631/1), September 25, 1956, 
FRUS, 1955-57, vol. 6, p. 122; “A Study of U.S. Problems and Policy Toward Latin America,” 14 October, 1953, 
Section II, Part I, p. 8. DDEL, Commission on Foreign Economic Policy: Records, 1953-1954 (Randall 
Commission), Dr. Mikesell’s Work [Foreign Investments], Box 59, Studies- Study of U.S. Problems and Policy 
Toward Latin America. For “ultra-nationalism,” see Report on the 369th meeting of the NSC, June 19, 1958, p. 12. 
DDEL, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), NSC Series, Box 10, 369th 
Meeting of NSC, June 19, 1958. 
70 “A Study of U.S. Problems and Policy Toward Latin America,” 14 October, 1953, Section II, Part III, pp. 6-7. 
DDEL, Commission on Foreign Economic Policy: Records, 1953-1954 (Randall Commission), Dr. Mikesell’s Work 





“hemisphere solidarity” supporting U.S. foreign policy. This unity was to be achieved by 
fostering Latin American political and economic development.71 The goal of strengthening the 
inter-American system along these lines was useful within a Cold War context, but one that also 
transcended that context. As Eisenhower himself declared, in South America he wanted “to 
establish a healthy relationship that will be characterized by mutual cooperation and which will 
permanently endure. This will apply whether or not the Communist menace seems to increase or 
decrease in intensity.”72 Latin America was a special preserve for the United States’ foreign 
policy before, during, and after the Cold War. 
This dissertation will analyze U.S. officials’ agenda of “hemisphere solidarity.” It will 
argue that such an agenda was hegemonic in nature.73 This hegemonic project relied ultimately 
not upon the rigid structures of economic and military coercion, but a subtler dynamic that relied 
upon Latin American’s symbolic cooperation with U.S. power. Recognizing U.S. policymakers’ 
conception of their hemispheric system and “pan-Americanism” as cooperative, benevolent, and 
mutually beneficial- however hollow such ideas may seem from the perspective of Arbenz or 
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Castro- is crucial to understanding how U.S. policy developed in the region as a whole, as well 
as in Bolivia, Guatemala and Cuba specifically. 
Ultimately it proved impossible for Latin American leftists to maintain nationalist appeal 
to domestic political constituencies or achieve autonomy within the framework of U.S. influence 
and dominance.74 U.S. policy, even given the most generous interpretation of its avowedly 
benign intentions, provoked animosity from Latin American leftists and nationalists. North 
American meddling in the region had a long history, and one that regional nationalist sentiment 
could not easily ignore, especially given events in Guatemala.  
Yet despite its numerous failures, the United States proved capable of accepting both 
radical nationalism and divergent versions of modernization within Latin America, and in 
Bolivia they even attempted to subsidize them. The lengths to which the administration went to 
exploit these powerful new political movements in Bolivia demonstrate that the administration 
was willing and able to play a long-term game from its first moments in power. The 
administration’s commitments to Bolivia followed along similar lines advocated by Walt Rostow 
and Max Millikan, the very modernization theorists who criticized the administration’s lack of 
long-term thinking.75 This long-term perspective and the commitments it engendered went far 
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beyond ad hoc quick fixes or crisis management, or reactionary impulses that favored anti-
communist containment over long-term aid and development.76  
This was a critique that not only contemporaries, but also scholars saw as a central failing 
of the administration as well as broader U.S. foreign policy both during the Cold War and with 
respect to Latin America.77 Robert Pastor’s “whirlpool” model is one such critique. Pastor, a 
diplomat with decades of experience in public service, holds that the United States, whilst acting 
as regional hegemon, has remained basically neglectful of Latin America and its economic and 
social problems, unless crisis situations, usually framed as presaging greater regional influence 
for hostile powers, spur policymakers into drastic action.78 Scholars of the Bolivian revolution 
also support this general model of U.S.-Latin American and U.S.-Third World relations.79 Cold 
War preoccupations and hegemonic interests combined to "distort" US perceptions and led them 
to make simplified attributions of intent to Latin American revolutions. Such “simplified” 
reactions amounted to “quick fix crisis management,” and “stop-gap emergency aid.”80 
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In addition to addressing mischaracterizations of the nature and purpose of U.S. foreign 
policy, this dissertation seeks to examine the crucially important role of Latin American 
diplomacy in shaping U.S. policy. Taking seriously U.S. policymakers’ fantasies of a closer 
relationship with Latin American nationalists, even the nationalistic left, gave valuable insights 
that could bring important rewards for Latin American diplomats. These diplomats showed a 
common understanding of the ideological assumptions lying beneath U.S. policy, and were 
willing and able to exploit them for their own purposes. 
Despite Max Paul Friedman’s exhortations for scholars of U.S.- Latin American relations 
to “retire the puppets;” to move beyond narratives that assume Latin America’s passive 
victimhood at the hands of an all-powerful United States, such narratives remain alive and well 
in the field today.81 There are notable exceptions, particularly the work of Ariel Armony and 
Tanya Harmer examining the inter-American Cold War waged independently of U.S. influence 
or, at times, knowledge.82 James Siekmeier’s more recent work puts emphasis on Bolivian 
diplomacy’s success in securing U.S. support for the MNR government, though largely focuses 
on the influence of one man. He singles out the Bolivian ambassador in Washington, the 
“charming” Victor Andrade, who golfed with President Eisenhower, befriended many U.S. 
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officials, and did much to appeal to the administration’s conservative and anticommunist 
tendencies.83  
Generally speaking, however, and particularly when it comes to Bolivia scholarship, 
Latin America is often seen as a helpless victim of its powerful northern neighbor.84 Bolivia 
seems a particularly apt case: one of the region’s poorest countries, in need of foreign capital, 
largely dependent on one commodity export for revenue, whose military weakness and abundant 
resources have been exploited by powerful outsiders for centuries. One might think that Bolivian 
leaders had little choice other than to placate the United States to secure their revolution, and 
were therefore forced to sell out their revolution’s basic principles in the search of U.S. financial 
support. The Guatemalans, labelled as communist from the outset and less susceptible to U.S. 
economic pressure, were not even given the chance, and suffered the more violent end of 
coercive U.S. power in the region.85 
Such a bleak picture of Latin American vulnerability to the careless, “simplified… 
attributions” of U.S. diplomats gives short shrift to Bolivian diplomacy and the revolutionary 
achievements of the MNR government.86 MNR diplomats managed to sell their North American 
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counterparts on the righteousness of their task, the nature of the problems they faced, and their 
willingness to align themselves with the United States despite little substantive action on issues 
supposedly important to Washington. Though the revolution faced many obstacles, and 
cooperation with Washington did lead to some problems, the MNR was still able to have a 
lasting and transformative impact on Bolivian society. 
It seemed to some observers that, if anything, Bolivian foreign policy had sold out the 
interests of the revolution in the service of U.S. hegemony.87 To the leaders of the revolution 
itself, it seemed otherwise. Preoccupied with their “gigantic undertaking” at home, foreign policy 
had “opened [the revolutionaries’] horizons” and completely transformed the diplomatic corps’ 
sense of what was possible.88 For the Foreign Ministry, their securing of U.S. support had been 
of “transcendental significance” for the new government and its revolutionary agenda of an 
expanded social safety net and a diversified and more autonomous economy.89 
In order to explain how this was done, this dissertation is one of the few scholarly works 
on the Bolivian-U.S. relationship in the 1950s to make use of Bolivian Foreign Ministry 
archives. It also looks beyond ambassador Andrade to make significant use of the papers of 
Walter Guevara Arze. Guevara was a founding member of the MNR and the Bolivian Foreign 
Minister during the critical years that the party secured support from Washington. These papers 
were released to the public in 2005, and have not been examined by historians of the Bolivian 
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revolution or of U.S. policy towards Bolivia. The Archivo General de Centro América, the 
Centro de Investigaciones Regionales Mesoamericano, and historical newspapers held at the 
Guatemalan National Library also provide important evidence concerning Guatemalan 
approaches to U.S. power. 
In telling the story of Bolivian diplomacy’s success in identifying and exploiting potential 
support for ambitious revolutionary movements on the left, the contingent nature of the collapse 
of U.S. relations with Cuba and Guatemala becomes clearer, and refocuses the attention of 
historians on the diplomatic approaches of other revolutions. When assessing both Arbenz and 
Castro, U.S. policymakers were initially highly ambivalent, if not positively hopeful, on the 
prospects for good relations with these leaders when they first gained power.90 Arbenz and 
Castro did not seem to be communist ideologues or Soviet stooges in the estimation of many 
administration officials.91 In fact, U.S. officials in the policymaking bureaucracy were initially 
much more enthusiastic about the prospect of Arbenz taking power in Guatemala than they were 
of Paz and the MNR’s revolution. Arbenz was an admirer of FDR, and his tolerable, pragmatic 
non-communist leftism seemed to be a welcome development to the State Department, which 
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had become increasingly frustrated with what they saw as the intransigent independence and the 
support for destabilizing regional interventions of Arbenz’s predecessor, Juan José Arévalo.92  
In Bolivia, by contrast, Paz’ regime initially seemed much more alarming than Arbenz, 
violently seizing power with the help of Marxist miners’ militias, and then proceeding to give 
them considerable influence on Bolivian politics and economic policy whilst appearing not to 
take anticommunism, or the Soviet Union, seriously. According to the CIA and the U.S. embassy 
“The MNR lacks a true understanding of the subversive nature of Communism,” fostered a 
“general political and intellectual climate…favorable to Marxist economic theories” and dealt 
with local communists “sporadically” whilst pursuing the “anti-communist” Falangist party with 
“Gestapo tactics.”93 
By looking closely at the anticommunist agenda in U.S.-Bolivian relations it is possible 
to see that, rather than unthinking knee-jerk reactions or merely pragmatic (if begrudging) 
“toleration,” the Eisenhower administration offered the Bolivian revolution a firm embrace in 
spite of, not because of, the anticommunist agenda.94 U.S. officials from the Eisenhower brothers 
to Bolivia desk officers and the embassy team in La Paz sought to perpetuate regional hegemony 
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and control over leftist nationalist movements in a manner that did represent an ideologically 
consistent response.95 Its implementation depended heavily on its reception in Latin America and 
the ability of U.S. policymakers to get policy approval from Congress, other branches of the 
policymaking apparatus, and public opinion.96  
Despite these institutional obstacles, Eisenhower’s hegemonic ideal was ultimately 
undermined less by external limits and more by the contradictions inherent in policymakers’ 
efforts to co-opt leftist nationalist movements, especially those in Latin America. These 
movements often defined their worldview and their political appeal in direct opposition to U.S. 
power. As we shall see, it was therefore not Washington’s attitude toward Latin Americans’ 
domestic reforms or their ideological proclivities, but the attitudes of Paz, Arbenz and Castro 
towards U.S. hegemony that were decisive in determining whether relations would be 




In the Eisenhower years Thomas Mann, a rising star and noted State Department expert 
on Latin American and economic affairs, was immediately sent to Guatemala following the 
success of the Castillo Armas coup. Mann would go on to serve as Kennedy’s Undersecretary of 
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State for Inter-American Affairs. Remembering his time at the State Department, he spoke of the 
“illusion of omnipotence” amongst the foreign policymaking bureaucracy.97 After the Second 
World War had transformed U.S. policymakers’ horizons and the power of the United States to 
act around the world, U.S. officials in the foreign policymaking bureaucracy felt  they “were on 
the crest of a wave… literally nobody on the hill or anywhere else ever questioned our ability to 
do anything if we wanted to do it, if we were willing to spend the money and the effort to do it.” 
Policy received criticism not based on “whether it would work or not, but whether it would cost 
the taxpayer too much.”98 
Mann ruefully reflected that this “euphoria was what carried us into Korea, Vietnam and 
other things,” even domestic welfare spending. Though Mann’s memory might have exaggerated 
the lack of constraints on U.S. policy, he had tapped into a spirit that permeated the corridors of 
the State Department and beyond: the sense that “the limits of US foreign policy are on a distant 
and receding horizon.”99 Mann invoked the spirit of Camelot, but claimed that, despite the fears 
evident in the rise of McCarthyism and the humiliation of Sputnik, that it extended to encompass 
the entire postwar period. Notably, Mann was of the opinion that Kennedy’s Alliance for 
Progress had its roots in the Eisenhower years, which represented a “new and more vigorous 
approach to economic and social development in Latin America.”100 Here, the Eisenhower 
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administration sought to promote grand ideological ambitions, articulated through sweeping, 
catch-all terms that held broad appeal, in theory, across the foreign policymaking establishment. 
One part of that new approach was land reform, an agenda of critical importance to the 
Kennedy administration anticipated by Eisenhower. This was an important concept that, in no 
small part because of the MNR’s advocacy, won support from figures like the Eisenhower 
brothers for the MNR’s revolutionary nationalism. Land reform, like revolution, nationalism, or 
democracy, could encompass a rather broad range of ideas. To Mann it meant  
everything you need to do to enable a small farmer to make a living on his land, to be 
self-sufficient, to raise his own family. Essentially I think that was the proper definition 
of land reform, and I would imagine that was what people would have defined it [as] in 
those days, was essentially what we’ve done for the American farmer here in the U.S.101 
 
Land reform meant a more equitable distribution of land and land ownership that, to U.S. 
observers such as Mann, invoked a Jeffersonian logic of citizenship and economic development. 
However, during the Kennedy years, Mann came to see more radical divisions in opinion 
between officials and their understanding of terms such as “land reform.”  
to say you’re in favor of land reform- and one has one’s own definition of land 
reform- is one thing. To have somebody define it in revolutionary terms... [to] set one 
class against another and… promote political revolution and alteration of the structure of 
society in the world in which we live today, I think that is an entirely different thing. I 
guess if, in the light of hindsight, if I would do anything different back in those days, I 
would have insisted on definitions of words. Now that’s always the hardest part of 
anything to get- the definition of a word. Everybody will agree on a phrase, its more 
attractive if it means all things to all people, politically attractive. But in terms of 
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administrating a program, it’s the worst thing you can do, and I think misleading, too, to a 
lot of people.102 
This problem of vagueness seems to apply to many key concepts that continually crop up in 
policymakers’ language about its goals for Bolivia and Latin America policy. During 1952-54 
land redistribution in Guatemala and Bolivia looked very similar: both governments clearly 
invoked Marxist ideological justification and the notion of class conflict in explaining their 
programs. In Bolivia it could be imagined as a necessary part of empowering peasants who had 
previously endured a ‘semifeudal’ existence. In Guatemala, observers in Washington could 
construe the cooperation of Guatemalan communists in shaping land redistribution as indicative 
that Soviet domination of the Guatemalan government was a possibility.103 The plasticity of the 
term “communism” to incorporate a range of attitudes and practices perceived as hostile to U.S. 
interests has been explored in great detail by many historians, and one that opponents of both the 
Bolivian and Guatemalan revolutions tried to employ.104  
Communism, perhaps the most radical political philosophy imaginable in the midst of a 
Cold War setting, was used by traditional elites to castigate both reformism and radicalism. 
Though skeptics and opponents used the two words to describe similar territory on the political 
left, reform implies a tendency towards compromise, a desire to use democratic or existing legal 
and constitutional mechanisms to enact changes. These changes, given their emphasis on 
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legalism, often implied a more gradual pace of change, but could also encompass rapid and 
profound change pursued through constitutional and democratic means. ‘Radical’ implies a 
position which comes from the political extremes, focused on profound and rapid change, which 
could and perhaps ought to mean a negation of exiting power structures and interest groups. In 
Cold War lexicon was often attached to Marxist movements.  
Though the difference in tone and underlying attitudes in Washington surrounding these 
two terms might seem apparent, the lines between reformism and radicalism were often blurred. 
U.S. officials described both Arbenz’ political coalition and the MNR government as being both 
“radical” and “reformist.” The Arbenz government’s moderate and reformist tendencies could be 
seen to mask a deeper affinity and toleration for communist infiltration it did not understand or 
acknowledge, whilst the MNR’s desire for radical solutions to Bolivia’s structural problems 
could be praised alongside their gestures towards moderation.   
The sense of nationalism as a powerful world-historical force was palpable to many, and 
Eisenhower himself felt it strongly. Nationalism understood as a positive force by Eisenhower 
and other policymakers was removed from any notion of resistance to U.S. power beyond 
pandering to domestic political audiences, and meant the desire to build strong, cohesive national 
identities and economies that might well destabilize old elites and old (European) empires, but 
should not flirt with the abolition of private property or diplomatic alignment with the Soviet 
Union. Nationalism was important within a Cold War context for U.S. policymakers, that could 
be seen either as a handmaiden to creeping Soviet influence and identification with Leninist 





could try to foster as an effective means of combatting communist ideology and Soviet 
influence.105 
“Democracy” too was a rather fungible concept in Cold War discourse. In Guatemala the 
United States, apparently with a straight face, could invoke its defense of “democracy” and 
continue to promote land reform in Guatemala after it helped Castillo Armas overthrow the 
democratically elected President Arbenz.106 Neither Castillo Armas’ government nor the U.S. 
hegemonic project that lay behind it had much to do with popular will, legality, independently 
monitored elections, or the functioning of a free press and independent judiciary. 
U.S. officials’ justifications of Bolivia policy did not invoke democracy, though they did 
insist on the popular legitimacy of the MNR. The Bolivian revolution serves as an excellent 
example of how U.S. notions surrounding land reform, revolution, nationalism and the inter-
American system could be invoked and interpreted to serve the needs of the MNR’s political 
project. These were vague and broad concepts that could mean different things to different 
people. To focus on nationalism without taking seriously the deep-rooted resentment throughout 
Latin America at the deleterious influence of the United States on its politics and economic 
prospects was to underestimate a fundamental contradiction at the heart of the North American 
hegemonic project that the Arbenz coup, Castroism and policy failures in Bolivia would 
demonstrate as the decade wore on. Nevertheless, Bolivia was a country whose leaders 
demonstrated sophisticated understanding of these ideological assumptions and grey areas. They 
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would use this understanding to sell their revolution to Washington and garner sympathy and 
support, whilst at the same time testing the limits of acceptable behavior pursued using these 
concepts as justification. 
Many of the key words and concepts used to bolster or undermine Latin American 
governments and political movements by officials in Washington, rather than allowing for knee-
jerk and simplified categorizations, were vague and open enough to interpretation to be 
contested. This dissertation seeks to understand how the words were used by the historical actors 
themselves in the service of their own ideas and agendas. These actors also struggled with their 




Chapter 1 explores the apparently wild fluctuation in political rhetoric and ideological 
affiliation of the MNR. Despite the diverse ideological heritage of the MNR, the chapter explores 
how nationalism and a desire to strengthen the Bolivian state and its control of the country’s 
mineral resources were at the front and center of its political project. Its leaders’ borrowing of 
ideas from the far left and right of the political spectrum might have confused and alarmed 
observers in the United States, but were only useful to the MNR insofar as they helped further 
that nationalistic development project. The chapter also emphasizes that land reform, far from an 
afterthought to the party elite, was a crucial element of their plans for Bolivia’s economic 
development. Land reform was not pushed on a reluctant leadership by the actions of peasants on 
the ground, but was a central part of MNR philosophy of empowerment, enfranchisement and 
incorporation of Bolivian peasants into the national economy and the political base of the MNR. 
Beyond these central goals the party sought to maintain broad appeal, and as a result remained 





which it blamed for poverty and exploitation in Bolivia. Finally, the chapter examines the broad 
narrative of Bolivian-U.S. relations and explains why the Truman administration, though it 
eventually recognized the MNR regime, essentially stuck to a ‘wait and see’ policy over the new 
Bolivian government that left Eisenhower ample room to take the relationship in either direction. 
Many historians cite the cool, level headed pragmatism and subtle understanding of 
politics in Bolivia. Chapter 2 explores the mounting evidence accumulated by U.S. observers on 
the ground of communist influence, pro-Guatemala sympathies, a leftward political shift and 
anti-American rhetoric in the MNR government, even its supposedly moderate leadership, during 
the first months of the Eisenhower administration’s time in office. Such evidence was often 
presented in alarming and blunt language that more senior officials could easily have seized upon 
if viewing Bolivia policy with a dogmatically anticommunist mindset. The MNR government’s 
enemies in Bolivia’s neighboring countries, the United States, tin mining companies and recently 
deposed former U.S. allies who had been U.S. allies in power in Bolivia strenuously tried to take 
advantage of such a discourse, and many proved willing to replace the revolutionary 
government. Yet their narratives did not convince an administration that supposedly had an 
inherent reflex towards anti-revolutionary, anti-communist policies.  
Chapter 3 explores the role of communism, the Soviet Union and the Cold War in U.S. 
officials’ minds. Despite some symbolic and rather tardy efforts from the MNR to demonstrate 
goodwill on the anticommunist front, the chapter notes the wealth of evidence of continued 
communist infiltration and political victories for communism and the radical left, for which the 
MNR bore significant responsibility according to analyses from the CIA, NSC and State 
Department. This all took place as U.S. aid continued to flow into the country, suggesting that 





anticommunism. This suggests they prioritized agendas other than anticommunism in Bolivia, 
agendas which Chapter 4 lays out in detail. 
Chapter 4 explores the decision to ignore or deemphasize the Cold War and instead posit 
the primacy of the inter-American system in Washington’s view of its policies in Bolivia. Such a 
mindset explains the administration’s embrace of the Bolivian government and their hostility 
towards the Arbenz government. Bolivian diplomats were able to get U.S. policymakers to 
replicate their narratives about the revolution’s causes and goals for other American officials, 
suggesting effective diplomacy that often deemphasized anticommunism whilst foregrounding 
their ambitious plans for economic and social progress in Bolivia. Bolivian diplomats 
demonstrated keen insight that administration officials were excited by this agenda, and the 
prospect of yoking ambitious reform, even revolutionary nationalism to the inter-American 
system. Such desires proved crucial in the Bolivians’ bid to gain U.S. sympathy and financial 
support.  
Chapter 5 explores the collapse of relations with Guatemala, using the tenth inter-
American conference in Caracas to highlight the importance of the inter-American system to 
U.S. hegemony. Bolivia and Guatemala took very different understandings of the nature of this 
hegemonic enterprise with them to Caracas. Armed with these different understandings, they 
adopted very different diplomatic approaches that help to explain how and why the 
administration came to view the two movements so differently. 
Chapter 6 examines U.S. aid policy in Bolivia, and how enacting the vision of inter-
American cooperation with leftist nationalism was hampered by competing bureaucratic 
interests, political pressures, fiscal conservatism and diplomatic contingencies. However, the 





policymakers, should not be mistaken for a cynical attempt to enforce Bolivian dependency or 
U.S. economic empire in Bolivia, nor should they mask the long-range ambition of U.S. policy 
and the money that was used to serve it. 
U.S. policy in Latin America has many critics, and rightfully so: the administration did 
use anticommunism to justify its hegemonic agenda for the region. Washington brazenly 
undermined Latin American sovereignty through support for the Guatemalan coup whilst putting 
the U.S. on a collision course with the Cuban revolution. The path of U.S.-Bolivian relations 
helps make clear the reasoning that led to these broader failings, reasoning that went beyond 
doctrinaire Cold War anticommunism. It instead focused on maintaining U.S. hegemony. The 
MNR’s achievement in attracting U.S. support for its revolutionary aims by accepting the 
symbolic needs of that hegemonic project certainly did not solve Bolivia’s structural economic 
problems, and also created new political headaches and policy pressures for president Paz and 
his successor, Hernán Siles Zuazo.  
But the what the MNR did in Bolivia remains a remarkable achievement that helped 
secure substantial changes to Bolivian social, political and economic life: changes that U.S. 
officials were excited to be a part of supporting and shaping. The very notion that the United 
States might be willing and able to support their revolution was hard for many to swallow, no 
more so than the Bolivian allies of the Truman administration and the tin mining companies. 
This was especially true given the MNR’s rocky relationship with the United States in its first 
decade as a political movement. Despite this seemingly hostile environment, the MNR proved 
adept at framing their revolution for their North American counterparts, and officials in 
Washington proved eager to align themselves with the revolution in service of their broader 










Chapter 1  
The Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, the building of a revolution, 





From its first moments as a political movement, Bolivia’s MNR had attracted enmity from the 
United States. The party seemed radically nationalistic and disparaging of American 
imperialism. The party leadership vehemently opposed governments that the United States 
favored as allies. Prior to the Cold War, observers in Washington saw the MNR as pro-fascist 
and Peronist, and Washington refused to recognize the government of Gualberto Villarroel 
(1943-46), whose cabinet contained four MNR members. By the 1950s the MNR had shifted its 
political rhetoric away from references to corporatist or fascistic visions of modernity and 
towards a more Marxist-socialist lexicon, just as U.S. strategic concerns were shifting from the 
defeat of fascism to the containment of communism. This ideological shift, it seems, should have 
been most troubling to observers in the United States during some of the coldest years of the 
Cold War. 
 When the April 1952 revolution catapulted the MNR to power, the initially reticent 
Truman administration eventually did take important steps that led towards greater acceptance of 
the MNR. Seeing no clear alternative, Truman approved recognition for the regime in June. The 
following January, his State Department made a spot purchase of Bolivian tin to relieve some of 
the economic pressure on the new government. However, despite these positive steps, the 
Truman administration was ultimately unable to resolve the ambiguous and volatile political and 





Eisenhower came to power. It was Eisenhower, not Truman, who decided to fully embrace the 
new revolutionary government in La Paz.  
This chapter serves three purposes. Firstly, it explains the MNR’s ideological fluctuations 
from right to left, and how it must be viewed as primarily a nationalist party. This perception 
would become an important point in its favor when the Eisenhower administration confronted a 
deteriorating economic situation and increasingly strained relations with in Bolivia in the first 
months of 1953. Secondly, the chapter explains that whilst the Truman administration made 
important steps towards conciliation with the MNR during Truman's final months in office, 
critical issues in the U.S.-Bolivian relationship remained unresolved. Securing a tin contract, 
growing leftist influence in government, and Bolivian need for aid amidst economic turmoil were 
all left unresolved, leaving Eisenhower scope to push Bolivia policy in either direction. 
Truman’s failure to tie down Bolivia policy imparts great significance to Eisenhower’s decision 
to make the U.S.-Bolivian relationship much closer than ever before. Thirdly, the chapter traces 
the U.S. relationship with the MNR from pre-revolutionary antagonism to post-revolutionary 




The MNR and Ideology: Searching for models of autonomy 
 
Confusingly for some American observers, the MNR underwent a significant ideological 
shift during its first decade. From an identification with European fascism and Argentinean 
Peronism in the early 1940s the rhetoric of party officials moved towards a much more leftist, 
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often explicitly Marxist approach by 1950.2 To one American journalist writing in the New York 
Times the MNR seemed “a little confused about its politics, and the extent of its allegiance to 
communism.”3 But despite this journalist's confusion, the MNR leadership did retain a coherent 
sense of purpose centered on economic modernization and autonomy, freeing Bolivia from 
reliance on mineral exports for precious foreign exchange. The party leadership also sought to 
develop and extend the power of Bolivian state, and in the process dismantle the power of 
political and economic “imperialism” that the MNR defined its nationalism against.4 It was the 
economic exploitation and wealth extracted from Bolivia by the large mining companies without 
investment in Bolivian society that was responsible for Bolivia’s impoverishment and 
backwardness, something that a strengthened Bolivian state and diversified Bolivian economy 
might be able to overcome. 
It is this nationalistic and developmental emphasis that explains the party’s attraction to 
radically different visions of modernity during an era in which the very concept was hotly 
contested, and in a country where the vast majority of Bolivians felt the old liberal capitalistic 
order had not provided many economic or political benefits. MNR leaders were ambitious for 
Bolivia’s future, and sought inspiration from revolutionary ideas across the political spectrum, 
particularly those that seemed to be achieving results. It is therefore helpful to understand the 
MNR as “essentially a nationalist party,” something that the U.S. State Department would 
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eventually come to appreciate.5 This appreciation, combined with a desire to shape the 
modernization process in Bolivia, would gain the revolutionaries a sympathetic ear in 
Washington during the Eisenhower administration and form the basis of U.S. support for the 
MNR.6 
The MNR was a Bolivian political movement that formed in 1941 around intellectuals who 
had become radicalized and disaffected by the disastrous Chaco War of 1932-35.7 The war had 
been started by Bolivia’s elite to secure national prestige in a time of worldwide economic 
collapse, and to gain access to the oil supplies supposedly hidden beneath the scrubland of the 
Chaco. Bolivia’s defeat in the conflict triggered renewed economic depression and exposed the 
old political and social order to great criticism.8  It was the Bolivian elite who had instigated and 
encouraged war on patriotic and nationalistic grounds, so when Bolivia’s fortunes in the war 
turned sour its leaders incurred the wrath of nationalist sentiment. Bolivian’s discontent led to 
successive coups by the “military-socialist” regimes of David Toro Ruilova (1936-37) and 
Germán Busch Becerra (1937-39).9 These governments were progenitors of the MNR’s 
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nationalism, pushing for a stronger, state-led economy and for greater control of Bolivia’s 
resources by the Bolivian government.10 Building on resentment of foreign economic 
exploitation as the source of Bolivia’s impoverishment, Busch nationalized Standard Oil’s 
Bolivian wells in 1937.  
Oil nationalization gave rise to calls for the Bolivian state to nationalize the country’s large 
tin mining companies as well: unsurprising in a country whose economy was dominated by the 
mining industry. By the twentieth century Bolivia’s economy was focused almost exclusively on 
subsistence agriculture at home and selling mineral ores abroad. In 1952, 95 percent of Bolivian 
exports were ores from Bolivian mines, 70 percent of which were tin ores.11 Three companies, 
known collectively as the ‘Big Three’ or La Rosca, controlled over 80 percent of the mining 
industry, and used their economic resources to wield great political power.12 These three 
conglomerates-Aramayo, Hochschild, and Patiño-used their significant political influence to 
oppose successive nationalist governments that attempted to wrest political and economic control 
of Bolivia from La Rosca.13 All three owned or had significant financial interests in their own 
newspapers, and all three had revenues that exceeded the annual budget of Bolivia during the 
                                                 
10 Constitutional reforms were contradicted and contravened by the authoritarian tendencies of the Army, in 
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in Bolivia, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1968), p. 48. 
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1940s.14 The Big Three had all started life as Bolivian companies, but by mid-century had 
expanded their operations across the globe. Bolivian exchange control regulations treated the Big 
Three as foreign owned, and many in the general public also thought of them as instruments of 
foreign capitalistic exploitation or “imperialism.”15 
Despite the increasingly global interests of the companies, including moving their 
headquarters to the United States and Western Europe, their influence on Western governments 
seems to have been slight.16 Even the extent of U.S. ownership of the companies was fairly 
unclear to the State Department in 1952. However, as the pressure for nationalization rose in the 
twentieth century Patiño made efforts to attract more U.S. investors in the hope of dragging the 
United States into any potential expropriation fight.17 At one point the State Department 
estimated that 20-25 percent of Patiño was owned by U.S. citizens, though by 1952 the figure 
most often cited by U.S. policymakers and analysts was 52 percent (the figure emphasized by 
Patiño).18 
Though individual companies may have lacked clout in Washington, Bolivian tin had also 
been important to the United States, especially during the Second World War, as the only 
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Western Hemisphere supply of a strategic material used by a host of U.S. industries.19 In this 
wartime period of scare supply and high demand, the United States was able to keep tin prices 
relatively low because it had built up a tin stockpile. In December 1940, Washington signed a 
five-year tin contract with the Government of General Enrique Peñaranda, promising to buy 
18,000 tons of tin per annum at 48.5 cents per pound, well below world market prices.20 
Though it was central to the Bolivian economy and provided the government with the only 
significant source of foreign currency, by mid-century the tin industry was in a long, drawn-out 
decline. As mining continued over the decades the quality of ores increasingly diminished: tin 
concentrations in extracted ores averaged 6.65 percent in 1925, but by 1970 had plummeted to 
0.9 percent.21 The ores contained more impurities, which made the refining process more 
expensive, and as older mines were exhausted newer veins proved more difficult and expensive 
to access.22  
The MNR sought a radical solution for this problem: nationalization. For the party, 
nationalization of the mines was a central policy aim that remained constant during the MNR’s 
ideological fluctuations during the 1940s. Nationalization more than any other issue defined the 
party’s agenda, and remained front and center of the political project articulated by the MNR’s 
founding father and leader, economist Victor Paz Estenssoro. Paz and the MNR leadership saw 
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greater state control over economic resources and the distribution of land as being of primary 
importance to achieving greater economic autonomy and Bolivian prosperity. Instead of enabling 
mining companies to expatriate profits from mineral exports, nationalization of the country’s 
only significant economic resource and source of foreign exchange would provide the Bolivian 
revolution with money to redistribute to the population and provide wider social benefits.23  
Nationalization would also symbolically demonstrate that the revolution could run the 
mines profitably and equitably for the benefit of all Bolivian people. Revenue from the 
nationalized mines would also, in theory, be made available for developing other industries, 
particularly agriculture in the relatively unpopulated East. The government, blaming La Rosca 
for expatriating the country’s wealth and failing to invest in Bolivia, sought to use the country’s 
mineral wealth to wean the Bolivian economy off tin dependence and render it less susceptible to 
the fluctuations of the world tin market.  
Although the desire to nationalize the tin mines had a developed (if optimistic) economic 
rationale, it was also borne out of necessity. Bolivian public opinion, and the miners’ unions 
which were an integral support base for the MNR, focused their resentment on the exploitation 
and suppression of La Rosca. Some of the MNR’s strongest political support came from miners’ 
unions, particularly the Federacíon Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia (FSTMB), an 
organization which the MNR had been instrumental in founding.24  The miners advocated 
improved working conditions, an end to inflation, and nationalization of the tin mines. They had 
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suffered at the hands of Big Three strikebreakers, often backed by government troops, which had 
further pushed workers across the country away from the government’s leftist allies in 
government, the PIR.25 Many Bolivians also resented the fact that Bolivian tin companies had 
moved their profits and operations overseas to foreign tax havens, including in the United States. 
They felt the mineral wealth of the country was being sent abroad to enrich La Rosca and foreign 
capitalists, whilst the majority of Bolivians remained disenfranchised, illiterate and desperately 
poor. This growing political pressure was successfully articulated by MNR nationalists, who 
argued that nationalization of the mines could bring their wealth to the wider population.  
The MNR was also strongly pro-campesino, seeking to grant maligned and ostracized 
indigenous Americans full Bolivian citizenship.26 The MNR promised to educate, enfranchise 
and endow them with land, in a hope that greater economic and political engagement would 
strengthen the Bolivian economy and promote a healthier, more equitable society. This would 
aid Bolivia’s transition to a more modern nation, whilst simultaneously providing the MNR with 
a political base.  
This pro-campesino stance was another product of the profound social changes catalyzed 
by the Chaco War. Thousands of indigenous peoples had served in the war, exposing them to a 
different world outside of subsistence agriculture, giving them a greater sense of belonging to a 
Bolivian nation, and imbuing in many a sense that this nation now owed them better prospects 
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after their national service. They were increasingly dissatisfied with what many Bolivians and 
Westerners described as “feudal” servitude on Altiplano latifundas, in a system expressly 
designed to keep them from education or political participation.27 Indigenous Bolivians, who 
made up the vast majority of the population, were becoming increasingly politicized and 
attracted to the MNR’s inclusive nationalist ideology, which in turn placed further pressure on 
the party to move towards more strident land reform.28 
Whilst it is true that mine nationalization more than any other issue defined Paz and the 
party’s agenda, land reform also came to represent an increasingly important part of its program 
by the end of the 1940s.29 In fact, land reform was a central concern of Paz and the MNR 
leadership from the beginning of their political careers. Paz and Guevara had, as members of 
Congress in the 1940s, submitted a “Proposal for Constitutional Reforms of the Agrarian and 
Campesino Legal System,” calling for the provision of healthcare and benefits to rural workers 
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and enforcing squatters’ rights. Their last weeks in government saw president Villarroel pass 
decrees banning debt peonage. Though Villarroel would be removed from power and hung in La 
Paz’ main square, his government’s vision of rural reform lived on in the MNR.30 
As president Paz insisted from the outset that land reform was Bolivia’s “other great 
problem,” “inseparable” from mine nationalization.31 Paz, echoing the thoughts of fellow 
‘moderate’ MNR leaders, promised that land reform would help integrate campesinos into 
Bolivian political and economic life on a more equal footing, and thereby make the State 
stronger. As with their rationale for mine nationalization, MNR leaders saw the ending of debt 
peonage and the distribution of land titles to the peasants as more than an opportunity for 
symbolic political opportunism: these were important structural transformations to the economy 
of the nation, and indeed its very social fabric. 
Such emphasis on land reform from the revolution’s first moments in power suggests a 
markedly different image of the MNR leadership than others have suggested.32 Rather than being 
reluctantly forced to embrace land reform after peasants started seizing land without government 
approval, the MNR leadership seems to have embraced the idea as central to both the economic 
progress of Bolivia and the centralization of the Bolivian state from its first moments in power. If 
the MNR could claim responsibility for achieving them, pursuing land reform and mine 
                                                 
30 Heath, Charles J. Erasmus and Hans C. Buechler, Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia (New York: 
Praeger, 1969), pp. 39, 42. 
31 Victor Paz Estensorro, “Discurso Que Pronuncio S.E. El Señor Presidente de la Republica en Ocasión de Realizar 
una Visita al Centro Minero de Huanuni,” Libro Blanco de la Independencia Económica de Bolivia (La Paz: 
Ministerio de Prensa, Informacion y Cultura, 1952), p. 90. 
32 Herbert Klein, Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 





nationalization would provide the government with substantial political support at home by 
striking a blow against the Bolivia’s economic elite and foreign economic ‘imperialists.’ 
Beyond its central focus on nationalism and promises of economic development, education, 
social welfare and popular enfranchisement, the MNR’s political rhetoric was in many ways 
designed to appeal to all. In the process it lost a degree of specificity. The movement sought 
political support from left and right, working class and middle class elements, illiterate peasants 
and nationalist intellectuals.33  
The MNR initially borrowed some of its rhetoric, tinged with xenophobic nationalism, 
from political movements of the right, including Nazi Germany and Peronist Argentina. These 
were associations not destined to garner the approval of the United States on the eve of American 
entry into World War II. However, though the MNR’s rightist ideology attracted much criticism 
from the United States, most scholars of Bolivian political history de-emphasize the intensity and 
significance of rightist influence in the MNR.34 Certainly, the MNR’s ideological association 
with fascism was not uncommon for Latin American nationalists in the 30s and 40s. At the time 
national socialism seemed to offer a dynamic route to economic development, industrialization 
and autonomy. The MNR’s pro-fascist outlook in the 1940s is undeniable, particularly with 
regards to anti-Semitism.35 However, too close an association with the Nazis was unrealistic on 
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practical and ideological grounds given Bolivia’s lack of accessibility to Germany and the 
racially accepting attitudes of the MNR who desired to empower Bolivia’s indigenous 
Americans.36 
With fascism discredited by the mid-1940s, and the appeal of Marxism very much on the 
rise across the world, the MNR shifted its rhetoric to reflect global trends. Days before 
Eisenhower took office the new MNR Foreign Minister and prominent party intellectual Walter 
Guevara Arze proclaimed that “the revolution is nationalist, and we are deciding if it should 
continue on to be socialist too.”37 This was in stark contrast to what Paz had said two days earlier 
about the toxicity of the term “socialism.” Paz had said that the revolution was targeted against 
la Rosca to be sure, “but we cannot speak of socialism…Those who propagate and sustain this 
idea are traitors, just as much as the reactionaries of the right.” His comments appear to have 
been designed to calm the political passions of his enemies after a failed rightist coup on January 
6th. On numerous other occasions Paz was more than willing to employ explicitly Marxist 
analysis to explain Bolivian economic problems, as the State Department pointed out.38  
Later in January, Guevara would go even further in an attempt to clarify his party’s 
position on socialism in the pro-government newspaper La Nación. The Foreign Minister and 
leading MNR ‘moderate’ claimed his baseline philosophical approach was “socialism,” which in 
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practice meant using this theoretical approach to analyses “colonial and semi-colonial countries 
such as Bolivia.”39 Guevara explained that, in countries such as these, a “socialist,” or as the U.S. 
embassy would editorialize, “Marxist” perspective would “lead one necessarily to a nationalist 
conclusion.”40 By this Guevara meant that a strong state and strong economy, built in part with 
private capital, would first be required before Bolivia could embark on a more orthodox socialist 
project. To the MNR, nationalism meant “social justice,” a “harmonious adjustment between 
politics and economics.”41 But at the heart of the MNR’s political message was, as President Paz 
would tell the sixth MNR convention, the building of a “revolutionary economy for only 
Bolivian interests.”42  
Similar to its somewhat flexible rhetoric surrounding socialism, MNR leaders could mean 
very different things when describing “imperialism,” a force that the MNR so often set itself 
against. MNR stalwart, land reform advocate and famous historian Luis Antezana Ergueta 
posited that anti-colonial third world nationalism was front and center of the MNR’s political 
ambitions, and as such represented a sizeable contribution to anti-imperialist nationalist 
movements that would dominate international politics in the decades following the Second 
World War. 43 Criticism of imperialism could be directed at the economic exploitation of Bolivia 
by the Big Three, the continued legacy of Spanish colonialism on Bolivian racial divisions and 
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economic structures or the lingering presence of European colonial projects in Latin America 
and the rest of the world.44 It could and eventually would be used to castigate the ambitions of 
the Soviet Union in Latin America, in a discourse perpetuated by the United States at the 
founding of the OAS and the tenth inter-American conference in 1954. MNR party members 
took note. When Juan Lechín and fellow MNR labor leaders drafted speeches denouncing 
foreign imperialist influence, his colleagues amended their speeches to clarify that “imperialism” 
referred to the influence of “Communism and the Stalinist PIR.”45  
But despite the flexibility of the term “imperialism,” the readiest association for most Latin 
American observers was the harmful influence of different actors from ‘the U.S.’ on the region, 
whether it be the U.S. government’s use of gunboat diplomacy and non-recognition to influence 
Latin American politics, or the exploitative and corrupt behavior of companies associated with 
the United States, such as United Fruit. Or, as Juan Lechín would put it, the Bolivian people’s 
hatred for “Yankees and their imperialistic capitalism” came easily.46 This easy dovetailing of 
anti-imperial rhetoric with anti-Americanism was an issue that American policymakers were 
certainly aware of, and one that MNR leaders were more than willing to exploit, as U.S. 
observers would make plain to Eisenhower’s State Department.47   
Different interpretations and emphasis on concepts such as imperialism and communism 
within the party demonstrate the broad, if ambiguous, appeal of the MNR. The party’s 
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intellectual flexibility and broad appeal were important assets for the MNR in their years out of 
power, allowing different factions to agree on an anti-imperialist stance. When a coup against the 
MNR failed in 1953, Lechín would blame “imperialists” without offering further clarification.48 
The idea that “imperialism” was a vast and powerful enemy that had kept Bolivia exploited and 
weak for centuries was one that held broad appeal in Bolivia and beyond. But the question of 
who or what was responsible for that imperialism would also expose divisions between the more 
moderate intellectuals within the leadership, and the radical wing of the party largely centered 
around the miners’ unions. These divisions would come to play an important role in the 
unfolding of the revolution and U.S. analyses of the MNR. At the forefront of the radical wing 
was charismatic union leader Juan Lechín, who sought to put miners’ unions front and center of 
political and economic power within Bolivia and immediate nationalization of the mines without 
compensation for the owners. At the other end of the spectrum, leading MNR moderate Hernan 
Siles Zuazo, Paz’s vice president in 1952 and eventual successor as president in 1956, would 
warn his more radical colleagues in the immediate aftermath of the MNR’s seizure of power that 
nationalization and land reform were not inevitable.49 
Yet amidst all of this ambiguity, ideological fluctuation and perhaps even intellectual 
faddism, the MNR leadership retained an underlying purpose around which its membership was 
able to coalesce. Despite some contemporary observers in the United States, the MNR retained a 
coherent set of principles that should be understood with reference to their nationalist desire to 
transform Bolivia into a modern, prosperous and independent nation state with an educated and 
economically secure workforce. Central to this mission was the narrative of wresting economic 
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and political power from the mining companies who the MNR viewed as agents of imperialist 
exploitation taking capital out of the country and failing to reinvest in the nation and its people. 
Such anti-imperialist rhetoric was largely targeted at the la Rosca, but also had scope to be 
directed at the United States, the ultimate reference point for anti-imperialists in Latin America. 
This antipathy towards the imperialism of the United States began to intensify as U.S. concerns 





U.S. attitudes towards the MNR 
 
The party endured a series of political misfortunes during its tempestuous rise to power. 
The MNR was first rocketed to prominence in 1942 for its support of striking miners at Catavi, 
where Government troops killed and wounded hundreds of protesters.51 The party came to power 
in alliance with Major Gualberto Villarroel in a 1943 coup only to be removed from government 
as a result of U.S. pressure and non-recognition. The party’s return to prominence and coalition 
government in 1944 on the back of electoral gains was also short-lived, as Villarroel was 
overthrown by an alliance of the Stalinist PIR and rightist forces in 1946, and killed by a mob 
outside the presidential palace.52 The MNR regrouped over the next six years (known popularly 
as the sexenio), dropped its rightist ideology, and began to base its appeal on being the inheritor 
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of the martyred Villarroel’s legacy.53 Meanwhile, the PIR’s complicity with growing government 
repression fatally damaged its credibility with the Bolivian left, causing the PIR membership to 
split between the MNR and the newly formed Partido Comunista Boliviano (PCB) in 1950.54 
The MNR was able to take advantage of the political and economic failings of the ruling 
government to win a plurality in the 1951 elections, supported by the Trotskyist Partido Obrero 
Revolucionario (POR) and Communist PCB. Popular backing, especially from armed miners’ 
militias, was crucial in winning the battles with the Army in the streets of La Paz.  
Up until this point, policymakers in the United States had been happy to see the MNR out 
of power. Washington was quite pleased to see the Villarroel government replaced in 1946, and 
supported subsequent anti-MNR governments.55 To the United States in the 1940s, the MNR had 
seemed a radical totalitarian movement with unacceptably close links to fascism and Perónism. 
The Roosevelt administration had publically charged the MNR with “anti-Semitism, hostility to 
democracy, fascist orientated programs, connections with Nazi groups in Germany and 
Argentina, and Axis financial support.”56 This contributed to lasting tensions between the MNR 
and the U.S. According to John J. Topping of the State Department’s Office of South American 
Affairs (OSA), “Many remarks, both official and private, by leaders of the present Bolivian 
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Government, have clearly shown that they deeply resent[ed]” the U.S. position regarding the 
Villarroel regime.57 
Up until the 1952 revolution, the United States continued to fund governments that 
opposed the MNR as reliably pro-U.S. and anticommunist. Though a State Department policy 
statement issued in August 1950 found that democracy had “failed” in Bolivia, Embassy chargé 
d'Affaires James Espy was willing to rationalize in January that Mamerto Urriolagoitía 
Harriague’s regime was “probably one of the most democratic administrations ever enjoyed by 
Bolivia.” He therefore advocated U.S. technical assistance and World Bank and IMF support for 
Bolivia to combat the “spread of communism.”58 
U.S. backing for anti-MNR governments continued even when the Bolivian military denied 
the MNR the opportunity to form a government after the party’s electoral victory in 1951. It had 
won a plurality of the popular vote, with support from both the Trotskyite Partido Obrero 
Revolucionario (POR) and the PCB. Rather than allow the Congress to vote in a new 
government (as mandated in the Bolivian constitution), army officers seized power for 
themselves. In February 1952 the OSA’s William Hudson set out the State Department’s position 
to Edward Sparks, the U.S. Ambassador in La Paz, that even the junta was “preferable to…the 
MNR,” for its more reliable pro-business attitudes, “firmly anti-communist” position, and 
friendly attitude to the United States.59 
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Though the United States continued to provide aid and support for the junta, successive 
U.S. administrations did not display deep affinity for these pre-revolutionary regimes. The 
protestations of Bolivian government officials over the insidious and imminently threatening 
nature of communism in their country were taken with a pinch of salt by observers in 
Washington. When Urriolagoitía told Washington that the MNR was a “recognized cell for 
Communist Party” and stressed that having these “known communists” in government would 
have an “adverse” affect on U.S. interests, Acheson commented that his charges were 
“inaccurate or exaggerated.”60 Policymakers also remained unwilling to buy Bolivian tin in a 
long-term contract because the Bolivian government demanded a price of 1.50 dollars per pound, 
well above market prices. Lyndon Johnson, Chairman of the Senate Preparedness Investigating 
Subcommittee, felt that accepting this “unreasonably high price” would be “extremely 
detrimental for the United States.”61 This came before the additional problems that the MNR 
revolution’s nationalization would raise in 1952. In fact, the Embassy saw the failure to negotiate 
a contract as “a running sore” in U.S.-Bolivian relations and later concluded that it had been a 
significant contributory factor to the fall of the junta in 1952.62 
On the eve of the 1952 revolution, Bolivia’s economy continued to suffer. Its GDP of 
$118.60 was the second-lowest in all of Latin America, 3 in 10 Bolivian infants died in their first 
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year of life, and the Bolivian literacy rate was 31 percent.63 The country imported 25 percent of 
its food due to its unproductive agrarian system.64 The added expense of these imports in a 
desperately poor country helped contribute to an alarming national statistic: average daily calorie 
intake was 1,612 per capita, compared to the UN recommended allowance of 3,000.65La Rosca 
continued to control 70 percent of the tin industry, whilst the economy’s main source of revenue 
declined further due to the rising extraction costs of increasingly poor quality tin.66 Bolivian tin 
was also becoming more expensive compared to the growing production in other countries with 
lower asking prices.67 Inflation continued to undermine government investment schemes and pay 
rises, and a multiple-exchange rate system fostered the illegal export of vital goods, speculation 
and a widespread black market that seriously hampered government policies and tax revenues.68 
Matters came to a head in early April 1952. Interior Minister Antonio Seleme instigated a 
coup with the help of Bolivian policemen on April 9, but lost his nerve and sought refuge in the 
Chilean Embassy. However, his allies in the MNR did not give up. Backed by armed militias in 
La Paz, revolutionary forces defeated Bolivia’s regular army by April 12. A triumphant Paz 
returned from exile in Argentina to take up the mantle of President, on the basis of the 1951 
election results. He promised a radical transformation of Bolivia’s society and economy through 
implementing universal suffrage, land reform, and the nationalization of the Big Three’s 
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holdings. Nationalization represented a profound shift in power away from the Big Three and 
towards the Bolivian state, and a step that might also have important ramifications for the region, 
as U.S. officials observed. Latin American leaders who might wish to nationalize their nation’s 
strategic resources would follow events in Bolivia closely.69 
 
The Truman Administration’s reaction 
 
Truman initially subscribed to a “wait and see” policy with regards to the Bolivian 
revolutionaries, and continued to worry about the nature of the MNR.70 A 1951 analysis of the 
MNR noted that it had “accepted Communist support and might collaborate with the 
Communists or even fall under their domination if it came to power.” They were “dangerous,” 
“intensely nationalistic” and “could not be counted on to refrain from selling to Curtain 
countries.”71 Nationalization of the tin companies looked almost certain, and the Embassy noted 
that the MNR leadership and party faithful were prone to using inflammatory anti-U.S. rhetoric, 
in a country described as “fertile ground” for communism.72 These pessimistic analyses 
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reinforced Acheson’s and Sparks’ concerns that Bolivia “might develop into another Iran,” 
following the path towards radical anti-Americanism and expropriation without compensation.73 
The administration remained unwilling to recognize the new government in La Paz, 
preferring to let events unfold until it was clear that the MNR was in fact in control and worthy 
of recognition. The former quickly became apparent, but U.S. policymakers were slow to be 
convinced of the latter. In fact, Acheson initially recommended the suspension of bilateral 
technical assistance and military assistance to Bolivia, though some limited economic aid 
continued to reach La Paz.74 Despite rhetoric over the importance of technical assistance and 
international aid, overall U.S. investment in Bolivia and aid programs fell during the Truman 
presidency.75 
Other nations were quicker to recognize and indeed embrace the fledgling regime, none 
more so than Guatemala.76 This did not seem to bode well for the MNR, as the Guatemalan 
government was experiencing serious problems in its relations with the United States over a 
controversial land reform program that would empower Communists within the government to 
nationalize lands owned by a U.S. corporation, the United Fruit Company. Guatemala’s 
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statement recognizing the new Bolivian government expressed ideological affinity with the 
MNR and proclaimed “we are no longer alone in the hemisphere.”77 The signatory to this 
document Jaimie Diaz Rozzotto, was described by the State Department as a “Communist 
sympathizer.”78  
Miguel Angel Velasquez, a Guatemalan poet who would go on to win the Guatemalan 
National Prize for Literature, wrote a series of articles in Diario de Centro America on the 
revolutionary ferment in Bolivia. Reporting on the Guatemalan decision to appoint the former 
Foreign Minister Manuel Galich as ambassador to Bolivia, Angel noted that Galich became 
“emotional” over the triumph of “authentic, true democracy” in Bolivia.79 The U.S. Ambassador 
in Guatemala City noticed the clear “sympathy” for the Bolivian revolution amongst the 
Guatemalan political establishment and press.80 According to his counterpart in La Paz, the 
Bolivian press was attempting to “show that Bolivia and Guatemala are united in their 
‘revolutionary’ efforts to restore the rights of the people and establish an ‘authentic democratic’ 
regime.”81  
Whilst the Guatemalan press and government were reacting favorably to the MNR 
revolution, commentators in the United States remained more cautious, and were occasionally 
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quite condemnatory. The New York Times’ report on Bolivian Vice President Hernán Siles 
Zuazo’s speech on the triumph of the revolution in 1952 left out his more conciliatory phrases 
directed at the United States, and quoted his insistence that the “Bolivian economy should be 
Bolivian and not that of the exploiters who live abroad.”82 The Washington Post described the 
MNR as “the new totalitarian government in Bolivia.”83 Time magazine editorialized that 
“fanatical members of the totalitarian” and “blood-drenched” MNR had “clawed their way back” 
into power and charged Paz with being a “communist of the right.”84 
The U.S. Embassy in La Paz, headed by Sparks, was crucial in arguing for recognition 
despite the revolution’s worrying elements. The influence of communism on the MNR was 
underplayed: “tolerance” of the Communist Party and other far left organizations was, in the 
Embassy’s eyes, “due to tacit acceptance by MNR of [the] commies [sic] support of its 
objectives rather than [a] ‘liberalistic’ attitude.”85 The Embassy also concluded that there was no 
evidence connecting any party in Bolivia with the Soviet Union or any “foreign power,” and 
Sparks found Paz to be “intelligently aware of the problem” of nationalization.86 
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The Truman administration brought out a qualified, even “terse,” recognition of the new 
government in June, whilst retaining its reservations.87 Acheson told Truman that the MNR 
government was there to stay, and further delay “might augment [the] disadvantages of 
nonrecognition and start [to] operate against our own interest.”88 Acheson felt “continued 
withholding of recognition is not going to prevent nationalization and may, in fact, have the 
opposite effect, namely, that of strengthening the radical elements in the government and 
pushing the government more in the direction of Peron.”89  If the administration held back on 
recognition, the United States would also be accused of opposing a popular revolution on behalf 
of private business interests. The desire to avoid being tarred as reactionary was hardly a ringing 
endorsement of the MNR, and represented more of a calculation that it was in America’s best 
interest to recognize the new regime.90 Though Truman told Acheson that he “had been 
following the [Bolivia situation] closely… had expected this recommendation…and thought it 
was probably the right course of action” he also felt it merited further thought.91 
The United States also made things easier for the new regime by signing a short-term 
contract to buy 6,000 tons of tin. This purchase was designed to keep the Bolivian economy 
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afloat temporarily. It did not represent an endorsement of the MNR, as the tin it bought had been 
produced before the revolution, and had already accumulated on Chilean docks.92 The 
administration remained unwilling to grant its full support to Bolivia by providing the stability 
that a long-term contract would ensure, an issue that would continue to animate Bolivian 
diplomacy well into the 1950s. Further negotiations around the long-term contract remained 
stalled, and made no further progress for the rest of 1952. The short-term contract was 
nevertheless significant for the Bolivian economy, and at 1.21 dollars per pound was worth 14.52 
million dollars of precious foreign exchange to the Bolivian government.93 
 The nationalization of the tin mines in October provided further cause for alarm and 
prevented a wider embrace of the MNR. Dean Acheson was “extremely concerned” about the 
prospect of nationalization without compensation led by the popular leftist Juan Lechín 
Oquendo, the Minister of Mines and Petroleum.94 During the early revolutionary period, officials 
widely regarded Lechín as a dangerous and powerful radical.95  
Acheson’s concerns were shared by members of the press, lobbyists and politicians. 
Former Senator Millard Tydings was at the forefront of the anti-MNR lobbyists who opposed its 
apparently communistic reform agenda, and decried those who argued against compensating the 
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private investors with shares in Bolivian tin.96 Expropriation without compensation appeared to 
be a distinct possibility in mid-1952, and as we shall see, the MNR proved more than willing to 
threaten this during the Eisenhower years over the continued lack of a long-term tin contract with 
the United States.97 The growing power of the left in Bolivia and the prospect of nationalization 
were a challenge to the security of private property and private investment in Bolivia and 
beyond. These worrying leftist trends could have led to greater anti-Americanism and possibly 
pro-Sovietism if left unchecked by the United States. 
Organized labor had formed into an influential political and military force in the aftermath 
of the revolution. The FSTMB played a major role in the expanded and politically powerful 
Central Obrero Boliviano (COB), an umbrella labor organization. The COB wielded strong 
political influence on the MNR and veto power over policy in the newly nationalized mines, 
backed by military strength. Having defeated the armed forces in the 1952 revolution, leftists 
sought to permanently replace the traditional army with citizens’ militias. The army had 
participated in the suppression of labor unrest, and provided muscle for anti-labor and anti-MNR 
governments during the sexenio. 
By the end of 1952, the dissolution of the army looked like a distinct possibility, but 
President Paz resisted pressure from the COB to dissolve the army altogether. Paz did deem the 
purge of forty generals necessary, and cut funding for the army by fifty percent, but stopped 
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short of abolishing the armed forces altogether in favor of workers’ militias.98 This stance was an 
early indication of the MNR leadership’s relatively moderate nature and its independence from 
more radical MNR leftists, but at the time it was not enough to overcome the uncertainties 
surrounding the U.S.-Bolivia relationship. 
Despite the strain on the U.S.-Bolivian relationship caused by the nationalization, there 
were more positive developments for the United States. U.S. businessman Glen McCarthy 
successfully negotiated a contract with the MNR government that gave him permission to 
construct a match factory in Bolivia and granted him sulfur mining rights. McCarthy also 
continued to seek a petroleum exploration contract with the Bolivians. These examples of faith in 
the stability of Bolivia under the MNR, and the profitability of investing there, helped assuage 
fears over the consequences of the MNR’s mine nationalization.99 Personal relationships with 
State Department officials had also built up: Edward Miller personally wrote to the MNR’s 
ambassador in Washington, Victor Andrade, to tell the Bolivian of his “appreciation for our work 
together and our personal friendship.100 These indicators demonstrate that the U.S. relationship 
with the MNR had progressed from the first days of the revolution and was far removed from the 
attitudes of the early 1940s. This shift had been backed by concrete measures: recognition came 
in June, and another small spot purchase of tin was agreed in January of 1953.101 Though this 
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contract had no long-term impact, it could be seen as significant because it was the first 
agreement signed by the U.S. that purchased tin produced in nationalized mines, and hence 
implicitly endorsed the move’s legitimacy. There was, however, little mention of the wider 
symbolic importance of this step on either side. 
Some historians have argued that “by the time Truman left office, the key simplifications 
had been made” in the minds of U.S. officials.102 Lehman emphasizes that the MNR’s essential 
pragmatism was their defining feature for State Department officials, who concluded that the 
MNR, particularly Paz, Siles, and Guevara, were moderates and non-communist, and certainly 
better than any viable alternative governing coalition. As long as the MNR moderate leadership 
pragmatically accepted their “dependency” on the United States they would remain within the 
bounds of acceptability.103  
Whilst there was analysis emphasising the MNR the most likely to be able to forestall a 
swing further leftwards in Bolivian politics, by the spring of 1953 it seemed that the MNR was 
failing to do so. Its leaders’ use of anti-American, even pro-Soviet rhetoric intensified as a long 
term U.S. tin contract failed to materialize. The key assumption of MNR moderation and non-
communist status, though having been voiced in the Embassy and State Department before 
Eisenhower took office, were still by no means widely accepted or consistently substantiated in 
Washington. To credit Truman-era policymakers and analysts with essentially placing the U.S.-
Bolivian relationship on a friendly footing would be an overstatement, and discount the 
substantial problems the relationship would face in 1953. 
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Despite the positive steps of a short term tin contract and a somewhat begrudging 
recognition of the revolutionary government, there was still much left unresolved in the U.S.-
Bolivian relationship. A long-term tin contract was desperately needed to give any semblance of 
economic and political stability to the MNR government. Despite rhetoric over the importance of 
technical assistance and international aid, investment in Bolivia and aid programs declined under 
Truman.104 Hudson’s summary of U.S.-Bolivian relations humbly claimed the United States had 
prevented a “serious deterioration in relations” with “greatest patience, firmness, and tact.” 
However, he still believed that serious problems continued to surround nationalization, the tin 
contract, “the rise of anti-American sentiment and Communist influence,” debt settlement, and 
the closing of the anti-MNR, anti-nationalization newspaper La Rázon.105 
Opponents of the MNR sought to capitalize on concerns in Washington over the nature of 
the regime. These concerns were voiced particularly over the MNR’s plans for the newly 
confiscated mines and the compensation claims of their foreign owners, as well as rising 
communist influence in Bolivian society and government. As Eisenhower prepared to enter 
office these crucial concerns had not been assuaged, and the MNR government was under 
renewed pressure from the powerful far-left. Vice President-elect Richard Nixon, along with 
incoming Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, seem to have taken these concerns to heart. 
                                                 
104 Gustavo A. Prado Robles, Ensayos de historia económica (Santa Cruz, Bolivia: Instituto de Investigaciones 
Económicas y Sociales Jose Ortiz Mercado, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas Administrativas y Financieras 
Universidad Autónoma Gabriel René Moreno, 2008), p. 108. See also Analysis and Projections of Development: IV 
The Economic Development of Bolivia (Mexico, UN, February 1958); UN, Bolivian economic development book 21, 
p. 23. 
105Hudson also pointed out that the securing loans for the Bolivian government agencies responsible for mineral and 
petrochemical extraction had yet to be resolved. Memorandum from Hudson to Atwood, January 14, 1953, NARA, 
Central Decimal File, RG 59, Box 3308, 724.00/1-1453. La Rázon was a daily La Paz newspaper owned by the 
Aramayo group. Blasier, “The United States and the Revolution” in Malloy and Thorn (eds.), Beyond the 





Nixon wrote to then assistant Secretary of State Jack McFall that he had “recently had some very 
disturbing reports, from sources I consider to be reliable, concerning the situation in Bolivia.”106 
A long term tin contract remained unsigned. It appeared that the limited gains of the Truman era 
had the potential to crumble away.  
 
Major developments under Eisenhower 
 
Despite this seemingly bleak picture, President Eisenhower chose to support the MNR. 
After months of uncertainty, Eisenhower personally approved a one-year tin contract and an aid 
package for the MNR during the summer of 1953.107 The aid, formally announced in October, 
amounted to a five million dollar allocation of U.S. agricultural surpluses under Public Law (PL) 
480, four million dollars of aid under the Mutual Security Act, and a doubling of funding for 
Point IV technical assistance programs.108 At “a time when our country has no immediate need 
for additional tin,” Eisenhower also authorized a substantial increase of the tin contract, which, 
though it would only last for one year, would pump 17.9 million dollars directly into the Bolivian 
government’s coffers.109 This large contract would not be the last, and neither would the increase 
in aid payments to Bolivia. By the end of Eisenhower’s presidency aid to Bolivia would total 
                                                 
106 Nixon to McFall, 20 May 1952, NARA, Central Decimal File, RG 59, Box 3307 724.00/5-2052. 
107 For details of the increase in U.S.-MNR tensions under Eisenhower, see Chapter Two. For Eisenhower’s 
decision, see memorandum from Robert Murphy to Harold Stassen, November 23, 1954. FRUS, 1952-54, Vol.4, The 
Americas, p. 567.  
108 The Point IV program had been initiated by Truman in 1949, but had seen little use in the developing world 
during his presidency. President Eisenhower, in fact, expanded the program, especially in Bolivia. Blasier, The 
Hovering Giant, p. 135. 
109 “U.S. Aid to Bolivia” in Department of State Bulletin, 2 November 1953, Volume 29, p. 585; Telegraph from 





$192.5 million.110 On top of this, the United States agreed to buy increasingly large amounts of 
tin direct from the Bolivian government in yearly contracts, from 10, 000 tons of tin in June 
1953, to 23, 000 tons the following year.111 This level of support for Bolivia was extensive and 
unusual for U.S. policy in Latin America, and represented “a great investment of economic aid 
and norteamericano interest.”112 By 1957, the United States was providing over 24 million 
dollars in aid and 34 percent of Bolivia’s budget.113 178.8 million of U.S. aid was in the form of 
grants direct from the government, through the International Cooperation Agency, Point IV 
assistance, donation of food surpluses under the Mutual Security Act, and various technical 
assistance programs.114 U.S. government assistance was accompanied by contributions from the 
United Nations, International Monetary Fund, Export-Import Bank and International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development.115 
The substantial amounts of aid offered by the Eisenhower administration were not without 
conditions, but for the first two years of Eisenhower’s presidency this aid allowed the MNR to 
carry out the aims of its revolution. The tin contract helped keep the nationalized mines running, 
                                                 
110 This is almost half of the 400 million dollars of military aid that Latin America received during the Eisenhower 
administration. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, p. 77. 
111 Telegraph from Rowell to the Department of State, 10 July, 1953, NARA, Central Decimal File, RG 59, Box 
4607, 824.00/7-1053; Telegraph from Sparks to the Department of State, 15 July, 1954, NARA, Central Decimal 
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although the expense of extraction in poor quality, high altitude veins combined with subsidies 
for workers meant that COMIBOL (the government-run mining company) ran at a loss. The 
MNR was also given free-reign to enact universal suffrage and sweeping land reform in August 
1953, led by organized campesino groups. Technical assistance and PL 480 aid were designed 
specifically to help the Bolivian government diversify its tin-dependent economy.116 U.S. aid 
helped maintain the revolutionary project of greater wages and benefits for Bolivian workers, 
and more spending on health, education, social security and welfare. 
However, U.S. hegemony also circumscribed the Bolivian revolution. The MNR’s room to 
maneuver was already restricted given its need for aid and a tin contract. Bolivian autonomy had 
been chipped away by pressure to adopt a more “actively anti-communist policy” in late 1953.117 
The MNR agreed on the amount of compensation for former mine owners in June 1953 in order 
to smooth the procurement of U.S. aid. The revolutionary government also voted with the U.S. at 
Caracas against its Guatemalan friends and partners in spreading the gospel of land reform 
through Latin America.  
Yet, as we will see, these concessions to U.S. hegemony were largely symbolic.  The 
superficiality of these concessions to Washington’s ideas about compensation and effective 




                                                 
116 Though Siekmeier argues that PL 480 also acted to harm the Bolivian economy by undercutting Bolivian 
farmers, reducing Bolivia’s ability to provide enough food to meet domestic demand and breeding dependency. 
Ibid., p. 203. See Chapter 6 for a further discussion. 
117Memorandum from William Bennett to John Foster Dulles, 7 December, 1953, NARA, RG 59, Box 3308, 





Despite some confusion amongst contemporaries in the United States over the MNR’s 
attitudes towards Nazism and Marxism, it makes sense to understand the party primarily in terms 
of its nationalism. Throughout the ideological fluctuations of the 1940s, the MNR consistently 
adhered to nationalist goals of achieving greater autonomy for all of the Bolivian population and 
their proxy: the Bolivian state. Using state-led economic development, a desire for foreign 
capital, the integration of the indigenous population into the political economy, and a more 
equitable redistribution of wealth thorough social reform and education, the MNR leadership 
hoped to provide political stability and attract political loyalty. U.S. analysts’ and their superiors' 
appreciation of the MNR’s moderate nationalism and their ambitious, transformatory program 
would be a key factor in determining the nature of the U.S. response to the MNR government 
under Eisenhower. 
Whilst broadly accepting of the revolution, the Truman administration retained significant 
doubts over the nature of the MNR, and thus its relations with Bolivia were restrained. This led 
to a rather non-committal recognition of the new government and a slight reduction in aid.118 
With the onset of nationalization in October 1952, and the apparent drift leftwards of Bolivian 
political power, the U.S. was given further cause to pause and reconsider its relationship with the 
MNR. This meant that, though a limited tin purchase had been negotiated in January 1953, by 
the time Eisenhower entered office, Bolivia was still in desperate need of aid and a long-term tin 
contract to provide financial security in the face of grave economic problems. These problems 
would only be exacerbated by a precipitous fall in world tin prices in the spring of 1953, placing 
the MNR leadership under increasing pressure to placate their far-left political base. Despite 
important strides in normalizing relations with Bolivia and dampening the immediacy of the 
                                                 





revolution’s impact for Eisenhower, Truman ultimately left his successor an ambivalent legacy. 
The first months of 1953 witnessed growing economic and political instability which led to more 
radical and anti-American rhetoric from La Paz. Given new administration’s attitudes towards 
state enterprise, its fiscally conservative agenda, rhetorically rampant anticommunism, and the 
continued adverse reaction of sections of business, press and political interests to the Bolivian 








Communism, emotionalism and irresponsibility: the potential for conflict 





On the eve of Eisenhower taking the oath of office, Guatemalan Vice President Julio Estrada de 
la Hoz stepped forward to address the Bolivian Congress on the subject of land reform. He gave 
the assembled legislators, journalists and intelligentsia details of Guatemala's recent agrarian 
reform, “the most modern and notable experience in the continent.” He explained how his 
government, like its Bolivian counterpart, sought “the liquidation of the feudal” in a country with 
a predominately indigenous population and a history of “imperialist oppression.” Using popular 
front tactics, Estrada advised that land reform could be achieved within a democratic framework. 
Echoing the rhetoric of the apparently “Marxist” Bolivian Foreign Minister Walter Guevara 
Arze, he also advised Bolivians to be wary of “revolutionary extremism” and an immediate rush 
to socialism given its economy's backwardness.1 Estrada counseled the Bolivians to rely instead 
on the bourgeoisie to create the “conditions of capitalist production” before progressing towards 
a socialist future.2 
                                                 
1 “Marxist” taken from a US embassy analysis of Guevara’s ideological predilections. Telegraph from Rowell to the 
Department of State, January 26, 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3308, 724.00/1-2653, p. 2. 
2 La Nación, 21 January 1953, p. 4. All translations by the author. According to the Bolivian Foreign Ministry, the 
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 President Paz, a man the U.S. Embassy also believed used Marxist theories “as 
intellectual tools in an attempt to grapple with problems related to the development of Bolivia,” 
remarked that the “land reform program of Guatemala is a step of great importance in achieving 
the economic liberation of the country” and added that “Bolivia was greatly interested in the 
Guatemalan revolutionary movement.”3 
 In the midst of Estrada's tour, the MNR government issued a decree establishing a 
commission to study land reform in an effort to end “feudal oppression” for two million 
peasants.4 The decree explicitly blamed Bolivia's “unequal economic development” on 
“imperialist penetration” throughout the century, which had spawned a “capitalist mining 
industry” that grew fat on Bolivia's natural resources whilst strengthening “feudal forms of 
property and landholding” and impoverishing its citizens.5 Six months later President Paz would 
sign Bolivia's Agrarian Reform Act into law, leading Time magazine to observe the following 
year that Bolivia's program “had moved unquestionably well beyond the more publicized land 
reform of Guatemala.”6 
 Time magazine and other U.S. publications had already done much to chronicle the 
collapse in U.S.-Guatemalan relations, strained since the 1940s, that had been catalyzed by 
                                                 
3 “President Paz’s Ideological Position,” memorandum from Rowell to the Department of State, 12 January, 1953, 
National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Central Decimal File (hereafter CDF), Record 
Group (hereafter RG) 59, Box 3310, 724.11/1-1253.Telegraph from Sparks to the Department of State, 23 January, 
1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3309 724.00 (W)/1-2353. See also Ministerio de Prensa, Informacion y Cultura, 
Libro Blanco de la Independencia Económica de Bolivia (La Paz: Ministerio de Prensa, Informacion y Cultura, 
1952), p. 150; Diario de Centro America, 15 January 1953. 
4 Decreto Supremo 3301, 20 January1953, Anales de Legislación de Bolivia vol. 16, enero-marzo1953 (La Paz: 
Universidad  Mayor de San Andreas), p. 42.  
5 The decree also blamed colonial encomiendas for originating the “feudal system of private property.” Ibid. 
6 Time, 30 August 1954, Centro de Investigaciones Regionales Mesoamericanos, colección álbum de la 





President Arbenz' Decree 900: a program of land reform conceived and implemented with the 
help of Guatemalan communists in the Partido Guatemalteco de los Trabajadores (PGT). 
Arbenz refused to distance himself from the communist PGT and eventually legalized the 
organization and welcomed it into his governing coalition, withdrew from the Organization of 
Central American States, and became increasingly vocal in their criticism of U.S. pressure on 
Guatemala to alter course. Less than six months after Estrada's speech, the Eisenhower 
administration would task the CIA with removing the elected Arbenz government from power.7 
 In Bolivia, where the radical left continued to gain momentum, the stage seemed set for a 
similar showdown. U.S. officials and journalists, already alarmed by the MNR's overthrow of a 
reliable anticommunist government, were noting a worrying “rise of anti-American sentiment 
and Communist influence” in Bolivia.8 The embassy, often credited for its positive and 
enlightened response to the Bolivian revolutionaries, continued to report alarming evidence of 
MNR toleration of communist activities, sympathy for Marxist ideology, and vulnerability to 
communist “infiltration.”9 Whilst certainly more tempered than the partisan , some of the 
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Embassy’s language when describing the situation in Bolivia might have given the State 
Department ample ammunition to recommend a more combative approach to La Paz. 
 Counselor to the Embassy (and later Chargé d’affairs) Rowell noted that “a parallel 
to...the expropriation of the United Fruit properties in Guatemala...  might also have been found 
in Bolivia's nationalization of the Big Three Mines and the attending problems of compensation 
for American shareholders.”10 The former mine owners remained out of pocket and distraught at 
the leftist nationalist political ascendency in Bolivia.11 And as trade talks with the U.S. remained 
stalled support in Bolivia for the sale of mineral ores to the Eastern bloc increased.  
 The U.S. embassy observed darkly that Estrada and his entourage of military advisors 
were engaged in a “campaign of political indoctrination.” Not only were they showing “MNR 
militants revolutionary techniques and concepts of land reform” that seemed even more radical 
than Guatemala's Decree 900, the Guatemalan visitors were claiming common cause against 
“'colonialism' and 'imperialism'“ in an attempt to “unite [nationalistic revolutionary] forces into a 
regional bloc.”12 
 In submitting his report to the Department of State, Counselor of the Embassy Edward 
Rowell ignored the Guatemalan diplomats' more temperate remarks about the dangers of 
                                                 
10 The “Big Three” of Patiño, Hochschild and Aramayo were the three international mining companies that had 
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beyond the next few months. The availability of U.S. aid for a revolution that had barely begun its sweeping 
program of reform was also very much in doubt, especially given Eisenhower's stated intent for a policy of “trade 
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authoritarianism and extremism.13 His report appears to have relied heavily on the accounts of 
Bolivian landowners, who described the MNR's proposals as even less moderate, democratic and 
sensitive to the need for compensation in comparison to Guatemala's reforms.  
 The U.S. embassy's negative take on leftist revolutionary ferment in Bolivia and their 
sympathy towards members of a pro-U.S., anti-communist oligarchy seems reminiscent of 
disquiet over leftist revolutionary leaders in countries such as Iran, Guatemala, Vietnam, Cuba, 
the Congo, (the list goes on). Given Eisenhower’s historical reputation for blinkered and 
dogmatic anticommunism in 'the third world,' and his enthusiasm for covert intervention against 
similarly inclined governments, his administration’s reaction to the Bolivian revolution is 
striking. After a few months of uncertainty, the administration announced a substantial tin 
purchase and doubling of Bolivian food aid and technical assistance. The massive increase in 
U.S. aid went ahead despite continued Congressional and State Department concerns about the 
MNR's economic agenda and its radical leftist, nationalist and possibly pro-Soviet sources of 
political and diplomatic support. 
Historians of the U.S.-Bolivian relationship seeking to explain why hostilities failed to 
materialize between the two countries have emphasized the administration’s anticommunism as a 
key determinant of policy. Scholars see “simplified” calculations as to the character and intent of 
Latin American political movements determining U.S. policy. Such simplifications and 
“attributions” of intent were made all the more opaque by the “McCarthyite mood of the 
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times.”14 In this line of reasoning, emphasized by scholars of the Eisenhower administration and 
of US foreign relations, it was the Cold War “blinders” and a “foreign policy of anticommunism” 
that drove US policy and that caused the misunderstanding and hasty overreaction that doomed 
the moderate, reformist Arbenz regime.15 
Other historians reject a Cold War framework for interpreting U.S. motivations, preferring 
to focus on the economic nationalism of movements like the MNR, but ultimately see a similarly 
reactionary impulse behind US policy that sought to quash any efforts towards economic 
autonomy or any challenge to U.S. hegemony.16 Third World Nationalism, in some historians' 
version of events, was another enemy for U.S. power to “contain” or to “fight.”17 Such 
“intellectual prejudice crippled American policymakers from understanding nationalism, social 
democracy, and other progressive ideas.”18 
According to existing scholarship, the Paz government was spared from Arbenz' fate, 
because U.S. officials and policymakers deemed the MNR government sufficiently 
anticommunist and “moderate.” Whether through their flirtation with fascism in the 1940s19, 
                                                 
14 Lehman, Bolivia and the United States, pp. 105-106. See also Schoultz, National Security and US policy toward 
Latin America; Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America. 
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their close personal relationships with US officials20, their commitments to protecting foreign 
capital21, rhetorical and substantive support for US anticommunism or even their curtailing the 
power of the left within Bolivia and the radicalism of the revolution itself, the MNR did enough 
to convince U.S. observers of their moderation, and even their status as “reluctant 
revolutionaries.”22 The lack of obvious counterweights to leftist parties in Bolivia, made all the 
more obvious by the failure of the FSB coup in January and the routing of the Bolivian army in 
April 1952, limited U.S. officials' room for maneuver, and underlined their status as the most 
effective anticommunist force for the foreseeable future. Fearing economic collapse in Bolivia, 
recognizing MNR moderation and seeing no alternative, the administration made the hasty 
calculation that the MNR top leadership's “moderate” faction were “sincere” anticommunists and 
the best available vehicle to further U.S. “neo-colonial” and anti-leftist interests in Bolivia and 
the wider world.23 
The following two chapters seek to challenge these representations. Though 
anticommunism did form an important rhetorical touchstone of U.S. policy and the Cold War 
                                                 
20 G. Earl Sanders “The Quiet Experiment in American Diplomacy,” Americas 33.1, (July, 1976), p. 35. See also 
Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution; Lehman, “Revolutions and Attributions.” 
21 Stephen Zunes, “The United States and Bolivia: The Taming of a Revolution, 1952-1957,” Latin American 
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22 Siekmeier, The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, p. 43; Klein, Bolivia, p. 232; Lehman, Bolivia and the 
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argues that U.S. officials saw the MNR as “counterweight to radicalism,” that the administration helped the Paz and 
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remained an important strategic context in which the Bolivian revolution played out, U.S. 
officials remained less than convinced of the MNR's effectiveness in promoting anti-radicalism 
and anticommunism. Those officials who were ultimately sympathetic to the MNR leadership 
faced opposition from within the Eisenhower administration and without. State Department and 
Embassy officials were much less sanguine or “enlightened” about the MNR's political 
orientation and its commitment to anticommunism than some scholars have suggested, even 
when it came to the 'moderate' leadership.24 These officials gave their superiors ample reason to 
distance themselves from the MNR at the same time they were presenting arguments in favor of 
aid to Bolivia, suggesting an important role for top policymakers as well as Embassy staff and 
State Department desk officers. 
The MNR’s many opponents in Bolivia, the United States and surrounding countries were 
only too eager to augment these concerns amongst officials in the Embassy and in Washington. 
Exiles and lobbyists working on behalf of the previous owners of the now nationalized mines 
railed against the new regime's communistic tendencies in Washington, whilst organizing armed 
rebellion from within and without the borders of Bolivia. The level of opposition to the new 
Bolivian regime and the influence that the political opposition to the MNR sought to wield in the 
U.S., have been underestimated by much of the existing scholarship on Bolivian-U.S. relations, 
which tends to emphasize the limited nature of U.S. economic interests in Bolivia and the lack of 
influence exercised by the tin companies in Washington.25 In the process historians have often 
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ignored both the strenuous effort of the anti-MNR lobby and the ambivalence, skepticism and 
even outright hostility of U.S. officials towards the type of dogmatic anticommunism and the 
“reactionary” Cold War reasoning employed by the MNR’s opponents.26 
 
Tin diplomacy: the free market and the iron curtain 
 
The initial policy of the Eisenhower administration towards Bolivia appeared rather frosty, 
though not as a result of anticommunism or Bolivian identification with Guatemalan land reform. 
The administration, following the advice of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, informed 
Ambassador Andrade on the 12 March 1953 that the U.S. had “no interest” in buying Bolivian 
tin due to the size of the American strategic tin stockpile.27 Treasury Secretary George 
Humphrey, who would be a longtime opponent of aid to Bolivia, argued that the tin stockpile 
was supporting “inefficient” production and cost U.S. tax payers too much.28 The Reconstruction 
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Series, Eisenhower, Milton S., 1954(1).Memcon Andrade, Holland, Atwood, Topping, 7 April, 1954, NARA, CDF, 
RG 59, LOT FILES, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs, Country Files, 1953-56, Box 2, Bolivia 1953-55.  
 The Bolivian government had reason to resent the stockpile. Bolivia had provided the U.S. with cheap tin 





Finance Corporation also announced its intention to close its unprofitable Texas City tin smelter, 
which was the by far best equipped to deal with the declining purity of Bolivian tin ores.29
 These announcements from the United States caused consternation in La Paz. Obtaining a 
secure market for Bolivian tin was central to the new government’s ability to run the newly 
nationalized mines: it would allow them to obtain precious foreign exchange and bolster the 
faltering Bolivian economy in the process. The pro-government newspaper La Nación, already 
skeptical of the Republican Party’s “conservative and imperialist” outlook, had reported on the 
U.S. cessation of tin contract talks under the headline, “The United States Proposes to Starve the 
Bolivian People to Death.”30 Minister Walter Guevara asked Ambassador Edward Sparks, “was 
the U.S. trying [to] force Paz out of office?”31 
President Paz not only complained forcefully to Washington about the administration’s 
seeming desire to distance itself from Bolivia; he also began to explore other avenues. Half of 
Bolivia's tin ore output had already been promised to the William Harvey company, whose 
British smelter was still owned by the Patiño group.32 But 30,000 tons remained to be sold, and it 
                                                 
Guevara charged at the Caracas conference, in the post-war environment the U.S. was able to use its stockpile to 
leverage producing countries into disadvantageous contracts and prevented them from setting up effective producer 
cartels. In his words to the assembled delegates from across Latin America, “there is no free market in tin.” Boletín 
del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores vol. 28 and 29, (enero-diciembre 1954), p. 252. 
29 Laurence Whitehead, The United States and Bolivia: A Case of Neo-colonialism (Oxford: Haslemere Group, 
1969), p. 6. 
30 Memorandum from Rowell to the Department of State, 19 December, 1952, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3309, 
724.00(W)/12-1952. The Embassy, reporting on increased communist activity, also noted that Ultima Hora takes 
“dim view of president elect Eisenhower re improvement of Latin American policy.” La Nación viewed republicans 
as “conservative and imperialist.” Rowell to Department of State, 7 November 1952, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 
3309, 724.00(W)/11-752. 
31 Telegram from Edward Sparks to the Department of State, March 20, 1953. FRU.S., 1952-1954, vol.4, p. 524. 





seemed no buyer was too small, even the Czech government.33 According to the U.S. Embassy 
this move followed the Bolivian “communist party line,” but primarily served as a symbolic 
measure to reveal the seriousness of the situation to the United States. It also demonstrated for 
domestic opinion in Bolivia that Paz was doing something to secure Bolivia’s economic future in 
the face of Washington's inaction.34 
The Embassy's analysis was broadly correct: the moderates in the MNR leadership were 
much more interested in the U.S. than the Soviet Union as a partner and benefactor. However, it 
does appear that Paz made concrete steps to forge closer relations with the Soviet bloc, 
endangering closer relations with the Western world.35 In fact, Bolivia signed a contract with the 
Czechs for silver, lead and antimony (though this was only after seeking approval from the 
Eisenhower administration).36 Furthermore, though the record remains partial, there are some 
enticing hints in the Bolivian archives that the MNR government's strategy could have been 
                                                 
33Memorandum from William Hudson to Department of State, 11 May, 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 2760, 
611.24/5-1153. 
 The revolutionary government did not have formal relations with the Soviets, though the Bolivian Foreign 
Minister and Ambassador Andrade would occasionally meet with Soviet officials. The MNR government had also 
been quick to establish relations with the Soviet Bloc: Czechoslovakia on 5 September 1952, Yugoslavia on 14 
August 1952 and Hungary on 29 September 1952. Boletín del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores vol. 28 and 29, 
(julio-diciembre 1952), p. 257. 
34 Rowell, Weekly Report to the Department of State, 19 June, 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3309, 724.00(W)/ 
6-1953. For “party line” analysis see from Charles Bridgett (U.S. Commercial Attaché in La Paz) to State NARA, 
CDF, RG 59, Box 4606, 824.00/11-553. See also Lehman, Bolivia and the United States 
35 The Czech deal would “destroy the hopes of certain circles in Western Germany over the possibility of conducting 
trade negotiations in the Bolivian market.” Bolivian embassy in Bonn to Bolivian Foreign Ministry, 9 November 
1953, Presidencia 794, 2 (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1953) Archivo y Biblioteca Naciónal de Bolivia. 
36 Guevara to Bolivian Embassy in Washington, 9 June 1953, Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archive, Cables Dirigidos 
y Recibidos Washington y Embolivia 1953, CL-354. The State Department later told Andrade that the sale of lead, 
antimony and silver to Czechoslovakia was acceptable “only if the quantities involved are not too great.” 
[underlined in original]. Andrade to Foreign Ministry 12 June 1953, Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archive, Cables 
Dirigidos y Recibidos Washington y Embolivia 1953, CL-354. In pleading its case the Bolivian Foreign Ministry 
emphasized the metal ores were to be exchanged for agricultural machinery “for the program of diversification” of 





more than a rhetorical bluff designed to pander to its leftist base. The Bolivian government was 
certainly in touch with Soviet officials during its first months in power.37 And there are 
references amongst Bolivian diplomatic dispatches to Andrade's several talks with the Russian 
diplomats and the possibility of negotiating a tin contract with the Soviets.38 Foreign Minister 
Guevara also makes reference to a letter and packet he received that had been brought from (or 
via) Moscow in early 1953, though the letter and packet are not to be found in the Bolivian 
archives today.39 
Despite Paz' courting of the Soviets, in the end the Soviet Union and its allies did not 
represent a realistic replacement for the United States as a tin market, because Soviet demand for 
tin paled in comparison with that of the United States.40 The United States was the world’s 
                                                 
37 Bolivia also signed trade agreements with Yugoslavia on 8 January 1953 (and 8 October 1954), but was unwilling 
to sell them tin. The Banco Minero Boliviano informed Ramon Castrillo (the Bolivian Undersecretary for Foreign 
Affairs) that it was unable to send any tin to Yugoslavia because all its tin was tied up in “pending” tin 
contracts.Banco Minero to Ramon Castrillo (Undersecretary of Foreign Relations), 14 January 1953, Bolivian 
Foreign Ministry Archive, Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archive, Banco Minero- Minisertio de Relaciones Exteriores 
1953-54 ED-1-20, p. 72. 
 The Czechoslovakian government continued to seek mineral purchases from Bolivia, promising to buy 
under one million dollars of low grade tin ore in 1953 and 1.5 million dollars of lead, but the Banco Minero advised 
that the Ministry should be careful given that Bolivia failed to meet its October contract for tin with American 
Smelting and Philipp Brothers Incorporated.  President of Banco Minero to Foreign Ministry, 25 April 1956, 
Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archive, Banco Minero- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 1955-56 ED-1-21, p. 1; 
President of Banco Minero to Foreign Ministry, 30 October 1953, Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archive, Banco 
Minero- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 1953-54 ED-1-20, p. 182. 
38 Guevara to Andrade, 26 February 1953,Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archives, Claves Originales de Cables 
Expedidos enero1953 CL-944, p. 144.In addition to these early instances of diplomatic dalliance, an unnamed 
Russian diplomat also sought on multiple occasions to advise the Bolivians on legislation regarding peasant matters 
and agrarian reform and congratulate them on the mine nationalization.Bolivian Embassy in Washington to Bolivian 
Foreign Ministry, 8 January 1953, Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archives, Cables Dirigidos y Recibidos 1953 CL-354; 
Andrade to Foreign Ministry, 5 March 1953, Ibid. 
39 Guevara to Bolivian Embassy in Lima, 3 February 1953, Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archives, Claves Originales 
de Cables Expedidos enero 1953 CL-944, p. 19. The corresponding packet does not appear in records of 
communications between the Ministry and the Embassy in Lima. 
40 The Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China consumed 17,700 tons of tin in 1951. The Western World 
consumed 140,700 that same year. Bolivia was trying to sell 32,000 tons a year Guevara, [untitled] 3rd draft of 





largest tin consumer, and its government still owned the world’s largest tin smelter.41 After the 
U.S. aid package had been confirmed, the Bolivian government laid its cards on the table. The 
“U.S. and England” were the “only market buyers” for Bolivian tin in 1953 according to the 
Foreign Ministry.42 José Fellman Velarde (Paz' secretary) revealed in the pro-government daily 
La Nación that the Czechs could not pay for minerals with the dollars so precious for Bolivia's 
foreign exchange and that Iron Curtain countries “do not need our tin.”43 He was right. The 
Soviets, suffering from a glut of tin, decided to dump their tin stockpile on the world market in 
1958 causing a sharp decline in world market prices and considerable resentment in Bolivia. The 
Czechs were never a realistic replacement for the U.S. as a market, and were only willing to 
purchase a tenth of what the U.S. would.44 
                                                 
41 The U.S.’ Texas City Smelter was the most suitable for refining Bolivia’s more adulterated tin ores. Memorandum 
from Charles Bridgett (U.S. Commercial Attaché in La Paz) to the Department of State, 5 October, 1953, NARA, 
CDF, RG 59, Box 3308, 724.00/10-553, p. 2. Truman Library, Federal Records Series, RG 220, Box 28, Tin Folder, 
President’s Materials Policy Commission, 1952, p. 2; “Resources for Freedom Vol. II: The Outlook for Key 
Commodities,” President’s Materials Policy Commission, December 11, 1952, p. 51. Truman Library, Federal 
Records, RG 220, President’s Materials Policy Commission, Published Report, Box 8, Tin Folder. British smelters 
owned by the Patiño group were also significant consumers of Bolivian tin. National Intelligence Estimate 92-54, 
March 19, 1954, FRU.S., 1952-54, vol. 4, p. 548. 
42 This was state of affairs that the Bolivian government blamed on “ the [Big Three] companies that were never 
interested in investing in [Bolivian] smelters, preferring to invest their profits in European smelters.” Boletín Del 
Ministerio Relaciones Exteriores enero-diciembre, vol. 26-27 (La Paz,  1953), p. 64. 
43 Paz presumably chose Fellman Velarde to spread this message because it had been his La Nación columns earlier 
in the year that had been most strident in their critique of  Washington's “economic aggression,” and in their calls for  
closer trade ties with the Eastern bloc. Charles Bridgett, U.S. Commercial Attaché in La Paz surmised (correctly) 
that Fellman Velarde’s arguments now reflected government thinking on the issue. Memorandum from Charles 
Bridgett to the Department of State, 5 October, 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3308, 724.00/10-553. 
44For U.S. tin consumption figures, see Telegram from John Foster Dulles to Embassy in La Paz, March 20, 1953, 
FRU.S., 1952-54, vol. 4, p. 526. The Banco Minero had conducted a feasibility study in the summer of 1953 that 
suggested the Bolivians could sell up to2.5 million dollars worth of tin to the Czechs. In fact, the Czech were only 
offering to buy around 1,500 net tons of tin for 1953-54, a tenth of what the Americans ended up buying in the same 
period and less than five percent of Bolivia's annual tin output (the Czechoslovak government also bought 1.5 
million dollars worth of lead from the Bolivians between 1953 and 1954). President Banco Minero to Guevara 22 
July 1953, Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archive, Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archive, Banco Minero- Minisertio de 
Relaciones Exteriores 1953-54 ED-1-20.President of Banco Minero to Guevara, 30 October 1953,Ibid. See also 






Yet Paz’s strategy of public (and private) flirtation with the Soviet bloc in early 1953 was 
risky and could have had disastrous consequences for the budding revolution. There was a 
distinct possibility that a deal with Czechoslovakia could be construed as a violation of the 
United States’ Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, which stipulated that U.S. aid could not 
go to countries who traded strategic materials with Eastern Bloc nations.45Arbenz’s attempt to 
secretly buy arms from the Czechs in May 1954 provided the United States with a final 
justification for approving an exiles invasion led by Castillo Armas. Trading strategic materials 
like weapons with the Czechs was portrayed by the administration as proof of Arbenz’s 
affiliation with international communism and his intent to radically destabilize the region by 
arming local militias, and guerrilla groups across Latin America.46 Had they chosen to, it seems 
the Eisenhower administration could have spun events in Bolivia in a similar fashion by treating 
trade with the Eastern Bloc as Soviet interventionism. 
Other international comparisons and statements of affinity presented the possibility of 
further North American disquiet with the MNR’s trajectory. Celebrating the first anniversary of 
the revolution, Paz openly compared the MNR’s nationalization program with Mossadegh’s state 
takeover of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, arguing that in both countries nationalist leaders 
                                                 
45The act was commonly referred to as the Battle Act. DDEL, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant 
for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-61, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 4, “NSC Progress 
Report by the Undersecretary of State on the Implementation of United States Objectives and Courses of Action 
with Respect to Latin America. (NSC 144/1),” November 20, 1953, p. 7; Memorandum From Undersecretary of 
State Smith to James Lay (Executive Secretary of the NSC), November 20, 1953. FRU.S., 1952-1954, vol.4, pp. 30-
31. 
 The State Department later told Andrade that the sale of lead, antimony and silver to Czechoslovakia was 
acceptable “only if the quantities involved are not too great.” [underlined in original]. Andrade to Foreign Ministry 
12 June 1953, Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archive, Cables Dirigidos y Recibidos Embolivia Washington 1953, CL-
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wanted to prevent the profits derived from natural resources leaving the country.47 Paz had 
already sought to lend his government's support to such economic nationalism by co-sponsoring 
a UN resolution allowing nations to nationalize resources of “vital national interest.” La Nación 
argued that the resolution demonstrated that Bolivia and Latin America were “not an instrument 
nor would they relinquish to anybody.” Furthermore, the paper argued that in making the 
proposal Paz and Siles had “won a battle for Mossadegh.”48 The U.S. vetoed the resolution that 
would otherwise have passed the General Assembly 36-4.49 
 The Embassy also noted Paz’s provocative identification with Chinese communists, 
which the President touted to the COB as a sign of the MNR's moderation: “Paz insists that [the 
MNR] is no more reactionary than the current position of Mao Tse Tung,” who also wanted to 
“encourage private capital activities” until his country was developed enough to sustain “social 
revolution.”50 And of course similarities between the Guatemalan and Bolivian revolutions stood 
                                                 
47New York Times, January 30, 1953, p. 6. 
48La Nación, 1 January 1953, p. 1. 
49Total UN membership at this time was 60. New York Times, December 22, 1952, p. 3. Though La Nación claimed 
in January there had been a “transcendental triumph at the UN” over the joint Uruguayan-Bolivian resolution. La 
Nación9 January 1953. The final resolution (626), which passed the General Assembly on 21 December 1952, 
invoked “the right of peoples freely to use and exploit their natural resources” as “inherent in their sovereignty” and 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. The resolution also recommended all Member States maintain 
due regard for maintaining the flow of capital in conditions of security, mutual confidence and economic co-
operation among nations.” ONLINE RESOURCE: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/7/ares7.htm (last accessed 
4/5/13) 
50 It is important to note that the Embassy provided a wider context to this statement. Rowell explained to 
Washington that the purpose of Paz'scomparison of Communist China and Bolivia was to explain MNR support of 
private capital as a potential agent of growth for Bolivia. Paz sought to assuage the fears of supporters to his left that 
might otherwise have interpreted this as “reactionary” or pandering to La Rosca. He sought to position himself in the 
moderate center, even going so far as to suggest the far left had . Memorandum from Rowell to the Department of 
State, January 12, 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3308, 724.00/1-1253. Nonetheless, the comparison, which MNR 
officials made repeatedly, is striking. It seems especially so when the administration was so concerned at the time 
that conditions in Latin America mirrored those present in China in the 1930s, when Mao employed national front 
tactics to gain greater access to legitimacy and power for the CCP. Ingrid Flory and Alex Roberto Hybel, “To 
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as a source of disquiet with the potential to exacerbate the MNR's worsening relations with 
Washington.  
 Whilst Arbenz and Paz seemed to share many attributes that State Department officials 
could interpret with a degree of sympathy, they also shared many more troubling attributes in the 
eyes of the administration.51 Both governments undertook a clampdown on rightist opponents 
whilst tolerating political activity further to the left, even allowing suspected communists 
governmental positions and following Communist Party prescriptions.52 Both advocated 
redistribution of land through State confiscation, and explicitly sought to use their nationalization 
efforts and redistributive land reform as an inspiration to others across the region.53 
 So, despite Paz and many within the MNR firmly believing that the United States was the 
most able to purchase Bolivian tin and therefore the most realistic prospect for economic 
security, his government’s rhetoric and private diplomacy had made clear overtures towards the 
Soviet Union and, in the eyes of U.S. officials, had provoked unwelcome comparisons to Cold 
                                                 
Ministry, 9May 1955, Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archives, Cables Dirigidos y recibidos Embajada Washington 
1955, CL 359. 
51 The positive appraisals of Arbenz in 1950 are elaborated in detail in chapter 5. 
52Rowell to State, 2 January 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3309, 724.00 (W)/1-253. “Lechín has no doubts about 
the meaning of agrarian reform. His peasant-worker front idea has been for some months a program of the POR and 
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whilst communists operated uninhibited in Guatemala. Thomas Mann to ambassador Nufer, 18 July 1951 NARA, 
CDF, RG 59, 714.001/7-1851 Box 3248.  
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War enemies of the United States, from the Soviet Union and China to Guatemala and 
Mossadegh’s Iran.  
Communism, emotionalism and irresponsibility: the potential for conflict between Bolivia 
and the United States 
 
Although some international comparisons were cause for alarm, there were plenty of 
local sources of concern for U.S. policymakers observing Bolivia. The growth of anti-American 
sentiment had been fuelled by Washington's miserly approach to the tin contract and the 
continuing leftward swing of Bolivian politics. This shift leftward was catalyzed by events that 
took place weeks before Eisnhower was sworn into office. On the morning of January 6, 1953, 
rightist members of the MNR working in conjunction with the Falange Socialista Boliviana 
(FSB) launched a coup in order to purge the revolutionary government of its leftist influence. 
Worried by the prospect of land reform led by radical peasant militias and a nationalized mining 
industry run by powerful unions, the counterrevolutionaries arrested Nuflo Chavez, the Minister 
for Indian and Peasant Affairs, and sought to apprehend Juan Lechín Oquendo. The charismatic 
and powerful Minister of Mines, Lechín, represented the radical, predominantly Troktsyist 
miners unions of the newly formed Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) and the radical left wing of 
the MNR.54 
 Lechín and Chavez, who also worried the U.S. State Department, represented powerful 
and “radical” political interests that were poised to transform Bolivia, and they embodied the 
Bolivian right's fears of growing leftist influence within the new governing party.55 Chavez, a 
                                                 
54Robert Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958), p 53.The 
revolutionary government instituted the COB on 17 April 1952. 
55Telegraph from Rowell to the Department of State, January 26, 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3308, 724.00/1-
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vocal proponent of land reform, provoked fears from the right of an official government embrace 
of the armed peasant militias across the country that jeopardized large landholdings. These 
militias had already started expropriating land without formal government sanction, and 
American analysts in the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) described them as “loosely 
organized, poorly trained, undisciplined” and therefore “particularly vulnerable to Communist 
subversion.”56 
 Lechín supported expropriation of the Big Three mining companies (which his 
government had nationalized just ten weeks previously) without compensation for the former 
owners. He also served as a figurehead for the powerful radical unions in the newly formed 
COB, an umbrella labor organization inspired by the Forth Communist International with 
significant political influence on the MNR government. The COB maintained its own militias, 
and many of their membership had been crucial in defeating the armed forces and wining power 
for the MNR during the revolution the previous April. Lechín and the COB now sought to extend 
their influence by disbanding the Bolivian armed forces entirely and formalizing the unions' 
economic influence in the newly nationalized mines.57  
                                                 
Bennett, Jr., Bernbaum, Barall, 5 May 1952,  NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3307 724.00/5-552. For similar concerns 
over Lechín, see also Memorandum from Acheson to Truman, 22 May, 1952, FRU.S., 1952-54, vol. 4, p. 492; 
Miller to Maleady, 21 April 1952, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3310, 724.02/4-2152; Senator Richard Nixon to Jack 
McFall, Assistant Secretary of State, 20 Ma`y 1952, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3307 724.00/5-2052. 
56 Malloy, Beyond the Revolution, p. 126. OCB quote from “Operations Coordinating Board: Analysis of Internal 
Security Situation in Bolivia and Recommended Action,” Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (hereafter DDEL), White 
House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961. OCB Central File Series, Box 24, OCB 
091.Bolivia (2) June 1955-December 1956. 
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 The coup that tried to halt the rise of Lechin and Chavez was a failure, and within a day it 
was all over and its participants disgraced. The anti-MNR forces had lacked both political 
legitimacy and military muscle since the April 1952 revolution, a revolution that had smashed 
the junta (and the army behind it) that had blocked the MNR's democratic victory in 1951. In its 
nine short months in power the MNR had solidified its support amongst the miners unions and 
newly enfranchised indigenous people, who took to the streets with “speed and discipline” to 
support President Paz and the MNR.58  
Mobilized by the COB, crowds thronged the streets of the capital and the Plaza Murillo, 
cheering on President Paz, Lechín and Vice President Siles.59 “We are going to purge all 
reactionary and unpatriotic elements from the army,” Paz promised them, as he reiterated his 
intention not to retreat from the revolutionary program. He set the MNR in direct opposition to 
the intransigent “Anticommunism and militarism” of the FSB, the oligarchy and “international 
interests, though he also qualified this by stating he was “not pro-Communist.”60 Vice President 
Siles promised action on agrarian reform even if it meant civil war, somewhat misconstruing the 
nature of FSB opposition to his government.61  
                                                 
58 El Diario, 9 January 1953, p. 4. 
59 La Nación claimed that the crowds supporting the government numbered 120,000 people. La Nación, 8 January 
1953, p. 4. The U.S. Embassy put the number at 10,000. Rowell to Department of State, 27 June 1953, NARA, 
CDF, RG 59, Box 3308, 724.00/6-2753. 
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Not only was the path towards more rapid and comprehensive redistribution of land titles 
backed by the legal authority of the government now assured, but the miners’ unions and their 
accompanying militias were in an even stronger position. Far from limiting the influence of the 
COB, the failed coup pushed the MNR government to solidify the unions’ political power. Paz 
announced the COB as an institution of “co-government,” and granted the organization power to 
nominate influential government ministers (Mines and Petroleum, Labor, and Peasant Affairs).62 
Siles’ speech celebrating the defeat of the January coup also noted that the nationalization 
of the tin mines “has not been consolidated on the international level.” 63 This last remark was a 
dig at the U.S. government's unwillingness to sign a long term tin contract and a politically 
popular reminder that other potential markets existed beyond the West.64 In the pages of the New 
York Times things seemed even starker. The paper reported that Paz promised a crowd of 
“thousands” that “we will not compromise nor will we consent to any deals prejudicial to Bolivia 
in order to sell our tin.” The crowd cheered in response, and bayed “Death to Yankee 
imperialism.”65  
 U.S. analysts at the Embassy, like the would-be golpistas, had also noted the growing 
influence of Lechín and radicals within the COB since the nationalization of the tin mines. The 
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Government. 
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intellectual and political climate in Bolivia had long fostered radical leftist ideas, and the MNR 
revolution gave hope to voices on the reformist and radical left: from the Arbenz government in 
Guatemala to Pablo Neruda and Salvadore Allende. Allende, then a Chilean senator attended the 
Bolivian revolution’s anniversary celebrations and gave a talk celebrating its achievements.66 
Following the revolution, Pablo Neruda believed that “Bolivia is the drama of America...we are 
all obliged morally to help Bolivia own her own resources and her destiny.”67 “Overt friendship” 
from such a figure as Neruda, a communist, had proven evidence enough to illustrate 
Guatemalan President Arévalo’s communist sympathies to the American Embassy in 
Guatemala.68 
 Having already noted the supportive climate for leftist discourse in Bolivia, U.S. analysts 
identified a further leftward shift in the Bolivian political climate after the failed January coup. 
Paz, Siles and Lechín's “extreme bitterness” and “polariz[ing]” speeches denouncing the coup 
presaged a shift further leftwards, contributing pressure for Paz to flirt openly with closer ties to 
the Soviet bloc as the prospect of U.S. assistance under Eisenhower seemed dim.69 The MNR 
                                                 
66 Bolivian government pamphlet “8th Anniversary of the National Victory” (9 April 1960), International Institute of 
Social History, Movimiento Naciónalista Revolucionario (Bolivia) Collection, microfiche 63. 
67 El Libro Blanco de la Independencia Económica de Bolivia (La Paz: Undersecretaria de Prensa, Informaciones y 
Cultura, 1952), p. 155. International Institute of Social History, Movimiento Naciónalista Revolucionario (Bolivia) 
Collection, microfiche 23. 
68 Wells to Department of State, 15 November 1950, NARA, CDF, RG 59,Box 3248, 714.001/11-1550. 
69 Rowell to Department of State, 27 June 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3308, 724.00/6-2753. Paz, Siles and 
Lechín's speeches after the coup collapsed had a “general tone of ...extreme bitterness” and promised “to carry the 
revolution through to its ultimate conclusion (i.e. the accomplishment of agricultural reform) even if it involved a 
blood bath and civil war.” The speeches represented a “further polarization of forces in Bolivia.” 
 On pressure from the Bolivian left, see Kenneth Lehman, Boliviaand the United States: A Limited 
Partnership (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1999), p. 104. Paz and Siles both faced much pressure from 
miners unions and the MNR's own youth congress to form closer economic and political relations with the Soviet 
Union, especially after 1956 when the Soviets made their first offer of loans and help building a tin smelter in 
Bolivia. Bulletin from second National Congress of the MNT Youth,Confederacion y Sendicatos MNR 1960, pp. 





government also appeared to the Eisenhower administration to step up police actions against 
rightist anti-government forces, even to the extent of using “Gestapo methods,” as Andrade 
reported to his superiors in La Paz.70 Bolivian police actions left “no question” in American 
officials’ minds that government troops had, “on occasions, been reported to have been rough 
and tough” when “ferreting out conspiracy elements.”71 Some accounts have suggested a note of 
approval here that I do not detect.72 If anything ambassador Sparks’ report felt the comparison 
with the Gestapo might please the MNR for suggesting its efficacy, but there is no language 
suggesting that it was pleasing to the Embassy (the implication perhaps being that the MNR still 
harbored an affinity towards fascism from the Villarroel era). John Foster Dulles would 
congratulate Andrade on the reestablishment of order after the failed subversion of another FSB 
coup, but it is perhaps too much of a stretch to equate this with wild enthusiasm for brutal police 
suppression of political opposition. In fact, the State Department did start raising somewhat 
belated concerns about political prisoners in Bolivia through official channels in late 1953 and 
1954.73   
                                                 
“escape from the pressure of the RFC” and the “economic and political aggression from outside the country.” 
Quoted in Crespo, El Rostro Minero de Bolivia, p. 201.  
70 Andrade to Bolivian Foreign Ministry, 11 November 1953, Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archives, Cables Dirigidos 
y Recibidos Washington y Embolivia, CL-354.The subject of political suppression and internment camps proved to 
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its tactics during and preceding the revolution were heavy-handed. Jerry Knudson, Bolivia, press and revolution, 
1932-1964 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), introduction. 
71 Telegraph from the Embassy in La Paz to Department of State, 17 July, 1953, p. 2, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 
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The MNR's right wing was disgraced as a result of complicity with the coup, and many 
left the party, leaving an environment where “only the Partido Comunista Boliviana, the 
[Trotskyist] Partido Obrero Revolucionario and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario are 
openly engaged in political activities.” The POR and PCB continued to operate unfettered, and 
along with many on the left of the MNR, called for the dissolution of the army, withdrawal from 
compensation negotiations with the Big Three, and the sale of minerals to the Eastern bloc.74 
 Meanwhile the COB and the miners’ militias had solidified their political and military 
power. In June of 1953 the COB voted Lechín as the Commander in Chief of the militia forces, 
and provisioned the growing “proletarian army” with “tanks, artillery and other motorized 
equipment.”75 To many, including the counsellor of the U.S. Embassy in La Paz Edward Rowell, 
it seemed this “proletarian army” was “commie inspired.”76 Further striking parallels with the 
Russian revolution and the Soviet model presented themselves with “control obrero,” a right 
hard-won by the miners, which gave the COB effective veto power over policy in the 
nationalized mines.77 Holding this level of influence in a country so dependent on tin revenues 
                                                 
74 Rowell to State, 2 January 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3309, 724.00 (W)/1-253; Rowell to Embassy, NARA, 
CDF, RG 59, Box 3308, 724.00/5-753. Though some of the disgraced MNR rightists would return to government 
later in the decade. Alexander, The Bolivian National Revolution, p. 53, n.1. 
75 Crespo, El Rostro Minero de Bolivia, p. 198. President Paz became the civilian leader of the militias. 
76 “Proletarian army” taken from a newspaper article cited by Rowell: “La COB Organizará un Ejercito Proletario,” 
La Nación, 11 June 1953; Rowell to Department of State, 26 June 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3308, 724.00/6-
2653. See also Rowell to Embassy in La Paz, 22 January 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3308, 724.00/1-2253. 
77 Control Obrero was not without controversy, and had its opponents in the more moderate wing of the MNR. The 
president of the Mining Bank, Humberto de Villar, complained to Guevara that Andrade and the diplomatic corps 
were taking over negotiations over the tin contract and overriding the interests of COMIBOL. He reminded the 
Foreign Minister that COMIBOL was an equal partner with the government and not “subalterna” as Andrade had 
suggested. Villar to Guevara, 13 April 1953. Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archive, Banco Minero- Ministerio de 
Relaciones Exteriores 1953-54, ED-1-20, p. 37.  
 For reference to the frequent comparisons of Bolivian and Russian revolutions, see Rene Ruiz Gonzalez, La 





gave the COB immense power over the economic fate of Bolivia and the political fortunes of the 
MNR. Despite refusing to completely disband the army and eventually reinstituting the colegio 
militar over violent protest, the Embassy initially noted that “Paz sided with Lechín on Army 
reorganization.” The Embassy suggested, somewhat prematurely as its own staff would later 
recognize, that the “Lechín group may now dominate the government.”78 
Evidence for MNR susceptibility to anti-Americanism and radicalism under this pressure 
from its grassroots and those to its political left continued to crop up during the Eisenhower 
administration’s first months in power.79 A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) found that 
“extremism which poses potential threats to U.S. security interests will probably be strongest 
in…Bolivia.”80 As a tin contract failed to materialize, Undersecretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs John Moors Cabot noticed worrying examples of MNR “emotionalism and agitation of 
public opinion” against private capital and foreign companies.81 Rowell noted that an 
organized campaign is underway, in mine labor circles, at least, to make the United 
States the clearly identified scapegoat for Bolivia’s impending economic ills…as 
the demagoguery against the United States increases, it will become increasingly 
                                                 
78 Rowell to Acheson, 6 January 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3308, 724.00/1-653. The Embassy would later tell 
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Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, pp. 48-50.  
79 Although it is also true that more encouraging signs of moderation in policy and in tone were simultaneously 
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80 Bolivia was listed amongst several other countries. NIE 99, October 23, 1953, FRU.S. 1954-52, vol 2, part I, p. 
562. 
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difficult for the Bolivian Government to engage in acts of conciliation vis-à-vis the 
United States.82 
 
This analysis reached Washington the day before May Day, 1953, which marked the height 
of tension between the United States and Bolivia.83 On this day of workers’ marches and trade 
union rallies, top government officials delivered a round of openly anti-U.S. speeches to 
receptive crowds nationwide. Paz and Lechín charged the United States with aiming to bring the 
revolution down by holding back aid and refusing to grant a new tin contract. In a move very 
popular with the miners' unions, Paz also promised to sell Bolivian tin wherever there was a 
market, “whether to the United States or the popular democracies.”84 
President Paz’s address, in the eyes of Ambassador Sparks, followed a “demagogic, 
dishonest, and malicious tone.” Juan Lechín, gave a speech that was “even worse, both in tone 
and content.” 85It seemed to William Hudson of the OSA that in castigating the United States the 
“Bolivian Government is building up a case, with its own people and other Latinos, for blaming 
on us the consequences of its own incompetence and irresponsibility.”86 Hudson thought it was 
“possible” that the anti-American campaign of labor unions was “entirely communist inspired,” 
but “more probable that certain Bolivian Government officials are behind it.”87 On May 4, 
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83 Kenneth Lehman, Bolivia and the United States: A Limited Partnership (Athens, GA: University of Georgia 
Press, 1999), p. 104. 
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Sparks noted the approval of many Bolivian newspapers of what he described as either 
“deliberately provocative” or unsophisticated rhetoric, and described the very worrying 
consequences of the MNR granting the Soviet Union a “reputableness to which they are not 
entitled.”88 
In such an atmosphere, growing influence of communist ideology as a result of the 
revolution seemed a distinct and concerning possibility to U.S. officials.89 In many instances the 
continued stewardship of the moderate faction did not appear to guarantee against this. The 
Embassy, along with the CIA and cabinet members voiced concern over MNR “toleration” of 
communist activities.90 Ambassador Edward Sparks portrayed the MNR government as the “first 
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89 Memorandum from Hudson to Atwood, January 14, 1953, NA, Box 3308, 724.00/1-1453; “Statement of Policy 
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90 Rowell to the Department of State, 10 November 1952, NARA, CDF, RG 59,Box 3310, 724.001/11-1052.  
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59, Box 3310, 724.001/12-453. “Operations Coordinating Board: Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Bolivia 
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in Bolivia to tolerate this Soviet-inspired 'front.'“91 On the 2nd of February 1953, Rowell relayed 
to Washington information from rightist opposition members. His report outlined forty-four 
pieces of evidence that made it appear that “Communists” were “infiltrating into the Bolivian 
Government,” evidence which was partially corroborated by “other sources.”92 
Though charges of communist infiltration often referred to the COB, Lechín and grassroots 
party membership, even the moderate faction came under scrutiny. Leninist lexicon permeated 
every level of government and how it framed Bolivia's problems politically, it was not just the 
rhetorical touchstone of the left wing and grassroots of the MNR. For Paz, Guevara, Andrade, 
Siles and other moderates land reform and mine nationalization defined the MNR. These reforms 
represented victories for the “vanguard of the proletariat” in its fight against “feudalism” and 
“imperialism,” and stepping stones towards the “economic liberation of the people:” a more 
diversified and productive economy.93 According to the U.S. Embassy, when the MNR 
leadership sought to understand and explain Bolivian problems they relied heavily on “concepts 
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of legislation and social justice” and an “economic determination of history” both infused with 
“Marxist doctrine.”94  
Ideological emphasis on Marxism from the MNR ‘moderate’ leadership was more than a 
rhetorical flourish or intellectual preoccupation. From ideological re-training for the diplomatic 
corps to the content of educational reform, the project to promote greater economic 
independence and “social justice” in Bolivia was more than a rhetorical flourish designed to 
relieve pressure from the MNR's leftist base.95 With the party undergoing a second year of 
“national liberation from imperialist domination,” the Political Committee of the MNR passed 
eight resolutions which aim at “cleansing the Government administration of all non-MNR 
elements” and “convert the Army from a 'military caste' into an instrument of economic 
reconstruction.”96 Bolivian diplomats, meanwhile, were to be thoroughly retrained to view all 
political and economic problems from a nationalist and “revolutionary basis,” in a historically 
“scientific” manner directly inspired by Leninist political doctrine and “the Russian revolution of 
1917.”97   
 U.S. officials took note of this leftist influence in Bolivia. Rowell’s report on “President 
Paz’ Ideological Position” explained the basis for this, arguing that:  
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in terms of economic theory and theory of the course of social development, he is 
influenced by Marxist and neo-Marxist ideologies... It appears to the Embassy that the 
one real danger in the situation from the United States’ point of view is that the 
inclination toward Marxism may make him particularly susceptible to the advice and 
support of communist groups in Bolivia.98 
 
The MNR’s appointment of government officials included many figures to the far left, not just 
Lechín and Chavez. In the first year of the revolution Paz appointed Jorge Ballón Sanjines as his 
press secretary and as the director of the MNR School of Political Instruction. Ballón, according 
to the U.S. Embassy, was “a Communist.”99 Paz' personal secretary and top MNR figure and 
political commentator Jose Fellman Velarde, along with Minister Nuflo Chavez, seemed to the 
U.S. embassy amongst the “most radical elements of the party” and U.S. policymakers were 
highly suspicious of his attitudes towards the U.S.100 U.S. policymakers worried that Paz was 
using Fellman to stoke the radical and anti-American passions of the electorate through his 
column in La Nación, which had excoriated imperialism and the insidious influence of “yankee 
and English” corporations across Latin America.101 Paz was certainly convinced that Fellman 
was of use in positions of power: he promoted him as Undersecretary for Press and Propaganda 
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and interim Secretary General of the MNR party, and also refused his resignation from the 
cabinet in 1953.102 
Foreign Minister Walter Guevara Arze was another MNR moderate whose centrist 
credentials seem clear to observers after his public fallout with Lechín during the first Paz 
administration. At the party conference in 1956 Guevara received censure from the leftist party 
base that dominated proceedings, and resigned as a result, going on to form a splinter group of 
“autenticos,” centrist politicians who aligned themselves with the revolution but not the MNR’s 
Lechín wing. Yet Guevara, like Paz, was also suspect at the early stages of the revolution for his 
ideological predelictions. According to the Embassy, Guevara was once a “theoretical 
communist” and “there [was] little doubt of his totalitarian orientation.”103 Rowell felt Guevara 
“would describe himself as a socialist (Marxist).”104 
No doubt a speech by Guevara two days earlier had aided this analysis. In it the Foreign 
Minister described himself as a proponent of “socialism” and an advocate of greater theoretical 
rigor to combat “revolutionary infantilism.” He decried the “capitalist system,” which “generates 
fascism [in developed nations] and imperialism [in undeveloped nations].” Guevara went on to 
trace Bolivian history back to the Incas. In the party’s official narrative of the nation’s past, the 
indigenous empire presided over “a communist regime,” promoting “efficient organization that 
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contemporary circumstances.” Telegraph from Rowell to the Department of State, January 26, 1953, NARA, CDF, 





assured the wellbeing of millions of inhabitants.”105 This contrasted to foreign-dominated 
governments of later periods: the “feudalism” of Spanish colonialism and over a century of 
governance by a “weak middle class” under liberalism that quickly became “the instrument of 
imperialism.”106 For Guevara and other MNR leaders and ‘moderates’ the nationalist discourse 
was strongly infused with Marxist analysis.107 
During 1953, the MNR developed policy measures that seemed to follow the prescriptions 
of the PCB’s manifesto, issued after the 1952 revolution. The Embassy’s “full analysis” of the 
manifesto concluded that it “follow[ed] almost exactly the line… laid down by the 19th Congress 
of the Communist Party at Moscow.” The Bolivian Communists advocated the “sale of Bolivian 
minerals on the free market,” which was, somewhat ironically, a coded reference “to countries 
behind the Iron Curtain.” Paz had used similar rhetoric, denouncing the “criminal boycott 
American imperialists have imposed against Bolivia,” and made concrete steps towards the sale 
of minerals to the Czechs.108 The PCB called for “[a]grarian reform by means of the liquidation 
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of latifundism via confiscation,” a policy espoused by the MNR from the beginning that came to 
fruition in August 1953. To Rowell it was clear that “Lechín has no doubts about the meaning of 
agrarian reform. His peasant-worker front idea has been for some months a program of the POR 
and also may fit in with PCB’s Front for National Liberation concept.”109 The Communists 
called for a state monopoly on foreign commerce, and though the MNR insisted that it desired a 
strong private sector and that nationalization was a one-off measure, the result of nationalization 
was to give the state a virtual monopoly over the country’s only major export. The MNR had 
also incorporated PCB goals of “effective worker control” in the nationalized mines through the 
Soviet-inspired “control obrero,” as well as “greater participation in the Government by the 
Working Class.”110 
John Foster Dulles focused detailed attention on the possible communist inclinations of the 
MNR, after having received information from pro-FSB sources on communist influences in the 
government. Though he recognized the irrelevance and “polemical nature” of many of the 
charges, “he stressed that several of them, “if verified… would be cause for serious concern.” 
These important examples included “the holding of government posts by ‘known’ communists,” 
“intensified trade with Curtain countries,” Lechín’s attendance at “a course of communist 
indoctrination in Santiago,” Chile, “required reading of ‘communist books’” by MNR party 
members and even the leadership’s studying of the Russian language.111 
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All of this evidence, coming from across the policymaking establishment but often from 
supposed enlightened moderates such as the Embassy staff, is striking. It seems plausible that the 
evidence could have been interpreted by anticommunist-minded policymakers as indicative not 
only of communist influence in the MNR’s rhetoric and ideology, but also of communist 
influence on key government policy measures and infiltration of government. One such 
policymaker was Allen Dulles, CIA head and younger brother of the Secretary of State. He 
seemed to take these alarmist analyses of supposed MNR “moderates” on board. On November 
27, 1953, Dr. Milton Eisenhower suggested to Dulles that the MNR was non-communist and 
relatively moderate, and hence worthy of U.S. support. The CIA director was “frank to say that 
there are different points of view regarding the leadership [of Bolivia].”112 To Dulles, it seemed 
there was a “deteriorating” relationship with Latin America, both in terms of “cordiality” and in 
“the economic and political spheres.” The four major trends in Latin America toward “economic 
nationalism, regionalism, neutralism, and increasing Communist influence... posed a direct 
danger to United States sources of supply for such strategic materials as copper, petroleum and 
tin.”113 
 Within the administration there was substantial evidence pointing towards the MNR 
becoming even more radical and aligning away from the United States. The MNR's domestic 
political opponents and the dispossessed mine companies sought to exploit these developments 
and turn Washington towards a more hostile approach to the MNR. 
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The anti-MNR lobby  
 
Dulles, like his brother and like Vice President Nixon, seems to have been influenced by 
the anti-MNR propaganda circulating in Washington after the revolution. Throughout the 1950s, 
advocates outside of policymaking circles made a substantial effort to get the administration to 
oppose the MNR or at least reduce Bolivian aid. Perhaps their arguments had less effect given 
Bolivia’s low profile in international affairs, the relative lack of influence of La Rosca in the 
United States, and the absence of domestic political pressure regarding Bolivia policy. 
Nonetheless, their persistence and tenacity in arguing their case and their access to top State 
Department and Embassy officials is hard to deny.114 
In April 1953, John Moors Cabot reminded Bolivian officials that “the United States policy 
of assistance to Bolivia had already provoked considerable criticism,” despite its still limited 
nature.115 Cabot also mentioned to the Bolivian Ambassador Victor Andrade that lobbyists were 
still trying “to discredit the Bolivian government as Communist-oriented.”116 One such lobbyist 
was former Senator Millard Tydings, who Aramayo and Hochschild retained for years to 
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spearhead what ambassador Andrade called an “intensive campaign” against the MNR in the 
wake of the mine nationalization.117 Tydings represented Patiño during the first year of the 
revolution, and was retained by Hoschild and Aramayo from April 1953. According to Hanson's 
Latin American Letter, 31 January 1953, the tin barons had set aside 100,000 dollars plus 
expenses to pay for PR in the U.S. Millard Tydings received 24,000 plus fees for his efforts.118  
The Bolivian government, in contrast, hired Selvage Lee and Chase (and later on just 
Selvage when he left the firm) for 25,000 dollars a year including expenses.119 According to the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, this amounts to 219,000 dollars in 2013. Selvage continued to advise 
MNR government officials well into the 1950s, combatting the efforts of Tydings and the anti-
MNR interests he represented.120 
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Tydings promised the Eisenhower administration he was prepared to use his “full influence 
with Congress” to prevent Bolivia receiving aid, loans or a tin contract.121 In repeated letters and 
meetings with administration officials and members of Congress, Tydings and his colleagues 
sought “to expose the true situation:” not only would the MNR not pay just compensation to the 
former mine owners and waste U.S. aid on inefficient nationalized industries and welfare 
programs, but that many Bolivians believed “the MNR government to be Communist dominated 
and to be following Communist policies.”122 
Tydings adoption of anticommunist rhetoric was not without irony: Tydings had been the 
target himself of Joseph McCarthy. The Tydings Committee had clashed with McCarthy and 
dismissed his accusations that communists had infiltrated the United States Congress. McCarthy 
claimed him as a significant scalp in the 1952 elections, helping fuel the Wisconsin senator's 
seemingly burgeoning career. But whatever his personal motivation, Tydings proved to be a 
persistent adversary of the MNR regime, working in conjunction with lawyer and PR man Win 
Nathanson to argue that the MNR were radical leftists who would damage the Bolivian 
economy, U.S. business interests, and provide an example to the wider region that would 
damage the U.S.' desire to maintain stable, U.S.-orientated regimes in the hemisphere. 
Though they enjoyed access to top policymakers and expense accounts backed by large 
corporations, theirs were by no means the only voices from outside policymaking circles 
clamoring for United States policy to shun the MNR. Coverage in the U.S. press was generally 
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less opposed to the new government than it had been in April 1952 and increasingly identified 
the MNR as separate from communists in Moscow and in Bolivia. Reporting was not extensive, 
which is unsurprising given that it concerned an isolated and impoverished South American 
nation.123 Nonetheless, the press in the United States did highlight the dangers of anti-American 
and communist advances in Bolivia. The New York Times documented the MNR’s use of radical 
leftist and anti-imperialist propaganda under the headlines “U.S. Is Denounced At Bolivian 
Rally” and “Bolivian Assails U.S. Policy.”124 The Wall Street Journal warned that “Bolivia will 
bring extremism” to the hemisphere, whilst the American Legion Magazine charged the Bolivian 
government with being “thoroughly infiltrated by Communist subversives” and “going down the 
crimson path of Guatemala.”125 The Chicago Daily Tribune described the “increasing leftist 
domination of that country’s government.”126 As Kenneth Lehman has noted, these were not 
insignificant charges to make in public in 1953, given the continued prominence of Senator 
Joseph McCarthy, whose accusations of communist influence had the ability to destroy the 
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careers of public servants, appeared to swing election results, and sent shockwaves through 
American society that reverberated long after McCarthy’s fall from grace.127 
The Bolivian Catholic Church and some Latin American governments made clear their 
opposition to the MNR for its “domination” by “leftist[s],” its susceptibility to “Communist 
ideology,” and its fostering of “communist sectarianism.”128 Bolivian exiles and other Latin 
American governments decried the purported influence of “Soviet citizens” and “communist” 
ideologues in Bolivia, warning that the MNR were “putting arms in the hands of 
communistically indoctrinated groups with the result that the center of power was now shifting 
toward the extreme left.”129 Former presidents J. Enrique Hertzog Garaizabal and Urriolagoitía, 
as well as other Bolivian opposition figures, wrote repeated letters to Washington and major 
newspapers denouncing the MNR’s anti-American and communistic tendencies, whilst officials 
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like former Foreign Minister Ostria met with U.S. officials in private, distributing anti-MNR 
propaganda.130 Hertzog’s letter to the New York Times set out a polemical case against the MNR: 
“American Imperialism” has been made the favorite target of all members 
of the Government, while the Government wages the most ruthless class 
warfare… The army has been disbanded and armed bands of miners and 
farmers, in true Bolshevik style, have been organized to take its place; 
foreign Communist experts have been engaged to teach the people their 
doctrines… the police forces are instructed to persecute democratic citizens 
and to give all their support to Communists… The Communist program is 
carried out systematically with a view to establishing a Soviet structure in 
the very heart of the Continent.131 
 
Hertzog did not stop at strongly-worded letters to the New York Times or the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee.132 According to the Bolivian Foreign Ministry he and fellow exiles 
were behind continued attempts to “raise the political temperature to white hot” in Bolivia.133 Not 
only were they organizing public protests in Bolivia and lobbying in Washington, they appeared 
to be behind multiple schemes to overthrow the Bolivian government by force. The Ministry 
received warnings of a Falange plot, hatched with the help of the Peruvian government and some 
army officials and infantrymen. The Ministry also received reports that former Bolivian generals 
were acquiring arms and drumming up support for an invasion of Bolivia in neighboring Peru 
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and Chile.134 By 1955 focus had shifted to Venezuela, where Andrade was concerned over 
“subversive elements who conspire inside and outside of Bolivia.” The Bolivian government was 
convinced enough to protest this to both the Venezuelan ambassador and the State Department 
(which asked for more evidence before making a formal complaint).135 Fears over an exiles 
invasion or FSB coup attempts sponsored by the old oligarchy and foreign governments, though 
at times exaggerated or unsubstantiated by corroborated evidence, were rife in the Foreign 
Ministry during the 1950s. The archival record demonstrates numerous coup attempts or plans by 
the FSB throughout the 1950s: 6 January 1953, June 1953, November 1953, 14 May 1958, 21 
October 1958, 19 April 1959, and 18 March 1960.136 Some were perhaps less fully formed than 
others, but all were taken very seriously by the MNR.137 
Such persistent efforts from rightist opposition figures seem potentially very enticing; 
especially for an administration emboldened by covert operations successes in Iran and with 
similar plans for Guatemala. It was certainly true that the armed forces in Bolivia, a common 
vehicle for U.S. counterrevolutionary operations, were virtually non-existent and in no shape to 
provide a counterweight to the power of the armed militias of the COB, unlike the situation in 
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Guatemala.138 Yet in the “golden age” of covert operations, it does not seem implausible that 
foreign policymakers had more than enough inflammatory material and willing Bolivian allies at 
their disposal to justify an embrace of a counterrevolutionary insurgency, even one whose 
chances of success appeared highly improbable to some at the South America Desk. 
Many historians have dismissed these efforts as highly unlikely to succeed given the 
extremely weakened state of the national army, the political weakness of both the FSB and the 
tin oligarchy in the wake of the 1952 revolution, and the failed coup of January 1953 that saw the 
right wing of the MNR purged from government. They are quite correct, but lack of feasibility 
for opposition groups as governing coalitions or the credibility of their accusations seems to have 
done little to stop the US from backing similar efforts in Guatemala and in Cuba (and indeed, 
many other countries). The Bay of Pigs invasion was a well-established failure on almost every 
level. Moreover, the operation to remove Arbenz from power was a rather haphazard affair 
which in retrospect also seems fairly unfeasible. It also seemed so to planners in the CIA in 
1953.139 Arbenz could well have defeated Castillo Armas' exiles invasion had the army's loyalty 
not been swayed by U.S. support for the coup, which was succinctly demonstrated at Caracas in 
March 1954, and by unmarked CIA planes strafing Guatemala city and dropping propaganda 
materials in June.140 Had the United States stayed out of the conflict, it seems probable that 
Armas would never have attempted his invasion in the first place, but if he had, it certainly 
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seems likely that he would have gone down in defeat. The military defeats for the exile army at 
Gualán and Puerto Barrios, and a similar uprising at Salamá in March 1953, seem to indicate the 
real feasibility of Armas' forces' ability to 'liberate' the country and inspire popular revolt and 
loyalty.141 Furthermore, the inability of Armas to govern Guatemala and create a credible 
governing coalition created disastrous consequences for Guatemala, contributing to a political 
polarization that fueled an increasingly violent civil war that killed hundreds of thousands of 
Guatemalans by the end of the century.142 
If the Guatemalan coup of 1954 can be considered feasible, it did not seem so to U.S. 
observers during the first days of the exiles’ invasion, similar to the initial chaos and confusion 
of operation Ajax to remove Mossadegh as Iranian Prime Minister.143 The fact that it finally did 
come off demonstrated the importance of U.S. power in the minds of Guatemalan army officers, 
creating great feelings of confidence and self-satisfaction Washington. It was precisely this 
hubris that contributed to overconfidence in the planning and execution of the Bay of Pigs 
invasion at the end of the decade. 
Dulles and other policymakers were well aware that there were other options available to 
the administration, especially given the power of U.S. aid to promote or frustrate economic and 
political stability in Bolivia. W. Park Armstrong, the special assistant to the Secretary of State, 
sent Dulles a summary of NIE 92-54 on Bolivia. His summary interestingly omitted the report’s 
references to MNR contributions to the consolidation of communists in Bolivia, noting that the 
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current, moderate dominated government was the most stable for the foreseeable future provided 
U.S. aid continued. He did however, emphasise the report left open other options to the US: 
namely the withdrawal of aid. This denial of aid might lead to a more radical leftist government 
taking over in the short term, given the MNR’s successful efforts to weaken the FSB and the 
power wielded by MNR leftists like Lechín and the COB, arguments often seen as crucial to 
securing support for the MNR. However, Armstrong went on to emphasise that, if this 
eventuality should come about, the FSB would probably be able to eventually “amass a sufficient 
backing to bring off a successful coup.” The FSB would still, however, ultimately be in a similar 
position to the current MNR government: dependent on U.S. aid for its survival. It seems that 
backing a rightist alternative to the MNR might not have been so far-fetched a proposal for top 
policymakers to consider.144 Had the MNR’s politics and diplomacy been seen as intolerable, it 




The rhetoric of the MNR and its actions during its first year in power gave U.S. officials 
much cause for alarm. The analyses of officials often credited for their pragmatic or enlightened 
understanding of the MNR repeatedly reproduced these alarming words and events for more 
senior officials in Washington, which could have easily lent themselves to adverse interpretation 
and resultant “hardline anticommunist policies” if they had been viewed through a dogmatically 
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anticommunist lens.145 Policymakers also had potential allies to work with to undermine or 
remove the revolutionary government, and who were demonstrably eager and willing to organize 
and spend money to do so. These enemies of the MNR appear very similar to the anti-
revolutionary groups that the administration embraced in Guatemala and Cuba.  
Should the administration have chosen to take a narrowly anticommunist reading of 
statements from across the foreign policymaking establishment like the “MNR lacks a true 
understanding of the subversive nature of communism,” the “MNR regime has benefited the 
Communists,” or “[Paz] is influenced by Marxist and neo-Marxist ideologies,” it could have 
pursued a course of action along the lines of policy towards Guatemala.146 But dogmatic Cold 
War anticommunism was not the principal motivation for policymakers confronting the complex 
array of political forces in Bolivia. 
 
                                                 
145 Shawn Parry-Giles, The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955, (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), p. 161.  
146 “Operations Coordinating Board: Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Bolivia and Recommended Action,” 
Report from OCB to Staats, p. 1. DDEL, White House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961, 
OCB CDF Series, Box 24, OCB 091.Bolivia (2) June 1955-December 1956; NIE 92-54, “Probable Developments in 
Bolivia,” Created: 3/16/1954, CIA electronic reading room, p. 4. ONLINE RESOURCE: 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs.asp, accessed 08/04/08; Report on “President Paz’ Ideological Position,” 
Rowell to the Department of State, 12 January 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3310 724.11/1-1253. Policy in 
Guatemala was centrally concerned with getting the Guatemalan government to reverse its “tolerant policy toward 
Communist influence.” Draft Policy Paper prepared in the Bureau of inter-American Affairs, August 19, 1953, 





Chapter 3  
Eisenhower and the MNR: Avoiding “overzealous anticommunism” 
 
 
MNR radicalism in both the party rank and file and throughout its leadership provoked much 
“soul searching” from U.S. diplomatic staff, State Department bureaucrats and White House 
officials.1 Yet despite their strenuous efforts, the MNR's opponents were unable to convince the 
Eisenhower administration of their version of events in Bolivia. U.S. policymakers and analysts 
avoided applying McCarthyite methods like the “duck test” to Bolivian leftists in the MNR.2 
Instead they demonstrated a balanced and pragmatic assessment of Bolivian economic and 
political conditions. Analysts also considered the party leadership separate from domestic and 
international communists, even if their government might be furthering the interests of local 
communists and fellow travelers. 
Policymakers' ability to distinguish between the party leadership and communists was 
aided by Bolivian diplomats' appreciation of U.S. concerns, which included anticommunism. 
                                                 
1 Sparks to Holland 17 September 1954, NARA, CDF, RG 59, LOT FILES, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Country Files, 1953-56, Box 2, Bolivia 1953-
55. 
2 Ambassador to Guatemala Richard Patterson argued in 1950 that if Guatemalan politicians sounded like 
communists and acted like communists then they were communists. He described this phenomenon with a self-
assuredly erudite duck metaphor.  If someone were to see a bird that “wears no label,” yet “looks like a duck...swims 
like a duck...and quacks like a duck,” then that person should logically conclude that “the bird is a duck, whether he 
is wearing a label or not.” This rhetorical device seems to have captured the imagination of many Americans at the 
time, and was also employed by U.A.W. Treasury-Secretary Emil Mazey to characterize communism in the labor 
movement. Fifth draft of speech to the Rotary Club, 24 March, 1950, p. 4. Truman Library, Papers of Richard C. 
Patterson, Jr., Ambassador to Guatemala (A-R) Box 5, ‘Crisis’ Folder. See also Richard Immerman, The CIA in 
Guatemala, p. 102. See also John Peurifoy’s analysis of Arbenz, that even “if the President is not a Communist, he 
will certainly do until one comes along.” Ambassador Peurifoy to Department of State, 18 December 1953, quoted 





However, though the MNR leadership recognized the importance of anticommunism and the 
Cold War to U.S. policymakers, their commitment to this agenda was seen in Washington and 
the U.S. Embassy in La Paz as shallow at best. MNR dedication to the cause was so questionable 
that many at the USIA, CIA and State Department felt the communists and the radical left were 
growing in strength under the MNR.  
 Both in public and in private, U.S. policymakers continued to justify aid to Bolivia in 
Cold War terms. The administration's post-facto justifications held that U.S. aid had prevented 
more radical, pro-Soviet anti-U.S. and even pro-Soviet groups within the MNR and to its left 
from taking power. This emphasis on the Cold War as a rhetorical touchstone for American 
officials is hardly surprising given that the Cold War was such a prevalent strategic and political 
preoccupation for American elites.  
Invoking the Cold War as a justification for support of the MNR was a rationalization made 
to appease skeptics and bolster support for policies that had been embraced at a time when 
anticommunism was not the primary focus for U.S. policymakers. Their decision to support the 
Bolivian revolution with a tin contract and a massive increase in aid levels came in months when 
MNR radicalism and flirtation with closer relations with the Soviet bloc seemed undimisnished. 
The MNR's appeal did not lie in its anticommunist credentials. Nor was it their relative 
moderation that attracted aid from a pragmatic hegemon keen to promote stability. Rather it was 
its leaders' radical vision for Bolivia's social and economic development and their willingness to 
submit, if only symbolically, to U.S. policymakers' ideal of their dominant role in the region that 
garnered U.S. support and even enthusiasm for a regime led by intellectual Marxists. If that 





vision to transform and stabilize Bolivia in cooperation with the United States, the MNR might 
secure much needed U.S. aid. 
Some scholars have posited the MNR's brief identification with fascism and Peronism in 
the 1940s made Paz and the moderates' shift towards leftist-nationalist rhetoric in the 1950s seem 
less genuine and therefore less threatening from Washington's perspective.3 Perhaps this did 
encourage U.S. officials to think of the MNR leaders as opportunistic and “plastic” rather than as 
doctrinaire leftists in Moscow's thrall.4 There is certainly no evidence to suggest that U.S. 
policymakers and officials ever thought of Bolivian leftists within the MNR as beholden to 
Moscow. But there is no direct evidence to indicate that U.S. officials were sympathetic towards 
the MNR, or at least confident in its anti-communist credentials, as a result of its flirtation with 
fascism. Such ideas are markedly absent from U.S. diplomatic communiqués. 
 Explanations that emphasize Bolivia’s remoteness, economic insignificance and public 
disinterest as a reason for policymakers’ reluctance for the United States to intervene against the 
MNR also fall flat in an era when it U.S. global interests had expanded rapidly. Certainly the 
mid-1950s were in many ways a time of concern over the limits of U.S. power; that the U.S. was 
falling behind the Soviets, especially in psychological warfare, in appealing to developing 
nations, and the race for predominance in space and nuclear weaponry.5 Whilst a very tangible 
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Luis Fernando Guachalla (former ambassador of Bolivia to OAS), Hudson and Miller, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 
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part of popular and institutional culture, these concerns over weaknesses and limitations 
coexisted with an ebullient spirit of optimism and positive faith in U.S. power, in an era when it 
seemed to many involved in the foreign policymaking process that the spatial and conceptual 
limits on U.S. policy were rapidly receding. One such voice was Joseph M. Jones, who had 
recently retired from the State Department. To Jones, writing in 1955, it seemed “the limits of 
US foreign policy are on a distant and receding horizon; for many practical purposes they are 
what we think we can accomplish.”6 U.S. policymakers were prepared to intervene on Cold War 
grounds across the globe in seeming backwaters, from Guatemala to Laos and the Congo.  
Backing local elites of a more enthusiastic anticommunist and pro-U.S. persuasion had a 
clear risk of creating political instability, but the administration still often elected to intervene in 
support of such groups using an apparently dominant Cold War framework. Remoteness thus 
seems that it would have been an ineffectual defense for nations like Bolivia in the era of global 
Cold War. In fact, U.S. analysts could and did envision a Cold War logic forcing them to 
intervene in Bolivia. A 1959 Summary and Policy Review of Bolivia used just such rhetoric. Its 
analysis invoked the warning example of Guatemala, even as Castro was preparing to unveil his 
Agrarian Reform Act ten days later:  
It is doubtful that the overall security interests of the U.S. could tolerate a Soviet inclined 
government in the heart of South America. The political and economic costs of dealing 
effectively with such a situation, particularly in an atmosphere of Latin American 
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sympathy for Bolivia, would be great.  In effect, we would be faced with another, and 
probably more serious, ‘Guatemala.’7  
 
In Bolivia, administration figures and critics used standard Cold War rhetoric to question and 
justify policy internally and externally, preaching “constant vigilance” against the communist 
threat.8 Eisenhower's first Undersecretary of State for Inter-American affairs John Moors Cabot 
justified cooperation with the Bolivian government in the pages of the Department of State 
Bulletin:  
[because it was] sincere in desiring social progress and in opposing Communist 
imperialism. We are therefore cooperating with it, for history has often described the fate 
of those who have quarreled over nonessentials in the face of mortal peril.9 
 
 Cabot, Eisenhower and Dulles' pronunciations seem to fit into interpretations that frame 
the U.S. reaction to the Bolivian revolution as a product of “pragmatic” or “realistic,” if not 
enlightened, anti-communism.10 These interpretations emphasize U.S. policymakers' belief that 
the MNR was the best of limited options for maintaining stability in Bolivia, which also seemed 
                                                 
7 “Summary and Policy Review of Bolivia”, May 7, 1959 (SNIE-92-59),” NARA, RG 59, General Records of the 
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Folder: Summary and Policy Review of Bolivia (Political) 1959 
8 Telegraph from Sparks to the Department of State, 23 October, 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3308, 724.00/10-
2353; Testimony of Edward Sparks, 16 May 1955, Mutual Security Act of 1955 (Washington DC: U.S. government 
printing office, 1955), p. 292, NARA, RG 287, Y4.F76/2:M98/2/955. See also, Richard Rubottom to Dillon 15 July 
1959, RG 59 LOT FILES Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office Files, 
1956-59, Box 25, Folder: Bolivia 1959. 
  
9 John Moors Cabot, “Inter-American Cooperation,” October 26, 1953, in Department of State Bulletin, volume 29, 
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more remote than the Caribbean basin. Despite the FSB's animus and enthusiasm for 
counterrevolutionary activity, the alternative to the relatively moderate MNR leadership was, 
according to Milton Eisenhower and State Department officials, most likely the “chaos” caused 
by successive governments fighting to maintain control in a rapidly declining economic 
situation. If a stable government were to emerge, it would most likely be a government headed 
by Lechín and the MNR Left, or a perhaps a POR/PCB coalition: all scenarios that might well 
lead to “communism” for Bolivia, and certainly a more hostile stance towards the United 
States.11 
Using fear of the alternatives to MNR rule as a baseline for understanding U.S. policy, it 
would seem that the administration's embrace of the MNR makes sense within a Cold War 
anticommunist framework. This is certainly how it seemed to observers in the British Foreign 
Office: “in view of the just strictures on Dr. Paz’s regime [summarized by British Ambassador 
Lomax] this grant to Bolivia is a good yardstick with which to measure the State Department’s 
fear of communism.”12 According to Lomax, U.S. officials' feared the triumph of a “Lechín-
moscovite alliance [sic],” in Bolivia, and so hastily jumped to support a government that was 
“unconstitutional: oppressive, an avowed destroyer of private enterprise, anti-American, 
Nazi/Fascist in origin, and now Marxist and tolerant of Moscow’s friends.”13 Such a misstep 
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made it seem to Lomax and his colleagues in the Foreign Office that Washington policymakers 
were “ignorant of local conditions.”14 
But this British analysis missed the breadth of motivations at work in U.S. policy toward 
Bolivia, the quality of U.S. intelligence on Bolivia, and the extent to which the line between the 
radical and moderate within the MNR was blurred in U.S. analyses. The British Ambassador and 
his Foreign Office colleagues smugly observed that American officials had “got little for their 
money” if U.S. policy was based merely on a fear of Lechín and preventing communist gains.15 
U.S. policy might have helped prevent Lechín from gaining the presidency, and helped craft 
Bolivian legislation on oil codes in 1955 and currency stabilization in 1956 that drove the Lechín 
faction into open revolt, but the radical wing of the MNR still remained in a position to 
“dominate” Bolivian politics according to Undersecretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 
Henry Holland.16 Though Bolivian diplomacy was able to elicit sympathy for Paz and the 
'moderates' from U.S. policymakers, officials throughout State and the CIA realized the influence 
of radicalism within the MNR remained strong throughout 1950s.17 But the administration 
decided to “just let it pass.”18 They had other priorities. 
                                                 
14 Reflecting on Lomax’s cable, M. S. Young opined that “Washington, in advocating anti-Communist 
representations, are [sic] ignorant of the local conditions.” Note by M.S. Young added to telegram from Lomax to 
Foreign Office, 28 November 1953, FO 371/103633, ax1103/7. 
15 Sir J Lomax to Eden, November 1953, FO 371/103633, ax1103/6. For the blurred line between MNR moderates 
and see chapter 2. 
16 Holland to W. Park Armstrong, Jr. (Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence), 6 March 1956, 
NARA, CDF, FOIA NW 37465, declassified 1 March 2012. 
17 Though by the end of the decade the Bolivian armed forces had begun to re-emerge as a counterweight to the 
power of COB militias and the MNR left had been chastened by its inability to prevent the Eder stabilization plan of 
1956 (more on this later). See Thomas C. Field, Jr. “Ideology as Strategy: Military-led Modernization and the 
Origins of the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia.” Diplomatic History 36:1 (January 2012), pp. 147-183. 
18 Herbert Thompson (head of the Embassy's political section in La Paz) interviewed by Thomas J. Dunnigan, The 





 Explanations for Washington's embrace of the MNR that focus on pragmatic 
anticommunism rooted in fear of the alternatives to the Paz government are in many ways 
accurate, but remain unsatisfactory by themselves. Not only do they fail to acknowledge that the 
radical left continued to influence the MNR and Bolivian politics, but they miss the positive 
qualities that attracted U.S. policymakers to the MNR independent of their intellectual Marxism 
and leftist political base of support. The MNR leadership's nationalism and their apparent 
capability to provide “social progress” were just as important to Cabot, Eisenhower and their 
colleagues as was the MNR's rhetorical commitment to resisting communism and support for the 
United States on the international stage.19 
 Continuing Cold War tensions and strategic preoccupation permeated U.S. politics, 
policy and culture, to be sure. However, to understand the new president's response to the 
declining situation in Bolivia in mid-1953 it is first crucial to understand that the administration’s 
appraisal of the situation in Bolivia went beyond “overzealous anticommunism.”20 In fact, it 
conscientiously rejected it. The administration and the State Department refused to equate 
revolutionary leftism with communism. In Bolivia, it seems Eisenhower was able to follow the 
advice of his younger brother and trusted advisor, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, that 
it is harmful in our own country and devastatingly harmful throughout Latin 
America for us to carelessly or maliciously label as “Communist,” any 
internal efforts to achieve changes for the benefit of the masses of the 
people… We should not confuse each move in Latin America toward 
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socialization with Marxism, land reform with Communists, or even anti-
Yankeeism with pro-Sovietism.21 
 
Though he never held an official cabinet post, Dr. Eisenhower was a close and influential 
confidante and advisor to the President.22 He was thought of by contemporaries and the president 
himself as a more liberal-minded counterpoint to those in the Republican Party and Eisenhower’s 
cabinet, like Vice President Richard Nixon or Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, who 
possessed stronger conservative and anti-communist reputations. Milton Eisenhower was not 
only the president’s brother, but his “most intimate general adviser.”23 The president recorded in 
his diary that he thought his brother was “the most knowledgeable and widely informed of all the 
people with whom I deal” and “the most highly qualified man in the United States to be 
president. This most emphatically makes no exception of me.”24 And it seems Ike took his 
brother’s advice on board, conceding that expropriation of land “in itself does not, of course, 
prove communism.”25 
On two occasions Dr. Eisenhower undertook high profile diplomatic missions to Latin 
America for the Eisenhower administration. Widely regarded as a Latin America expert, Dr. 
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Eisenhower visited the region during the summer of 1953 in the administration’s “outstanding 
instance of high-level sympathetic attention to Latin American problems.”26 After meeting top 
government officials and embracing the cause of agrarian reform in Bolivia, his findings were 
given effusive praise by the president and “crystallized the transformation of United States 
policy toward Bolivia to one of open support.”27 
  The Embassy in La Paz agreed with the two Eisenhower brothers’ reluctance to equate 
leftist reform and revolution with communism.28 Though it continued to report on radicalism in 
the MNR government throughout the 1950s the Embassy also parsed the Bolivian political 
landscape. The MNR’s ideology was indeed seen to be radically leftist and inherently nationalist, 
but the Embassy still “concluded that neither the MNR party in the mass, nor its most important 
leaders, are communist or crypto-communist in spite of some obvious Marxist ideological 
taints…and ingrained suspicion of the United States and its motives.”29 It was “obvious” to the 
U.S. ambassador in La Paz, Edward Sparks, “that there is a lot of anti-United States sentiment in 
the membership of the MNR,” but it was “doubtful if this can be automatically be equated with 
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Communism.”30 Edward Rowell,  the counselor of the Embassy, concurred. It seemed to him 
that, although the Communists in Bolivia had made symbolic and concrete gains after the 
revolution, “tolerance of the Communist parties cannot necessarily be equated with an 
acceptance of even their immediate programs” by the MNR leadership.31 As for Paz's “Marxist 
inclinations,” “they are of a personal nature and used as intellectual tools in an attempt to grapple 
with problems related to the development of Bolivia.”32 Though Marxism was orthodoxy in 
“intellectual and labor circles,” Paz and “the right wing of the MNR” were “endeavoring to carry 
out the Government’s program… independent of Communist pressure and infiltration.”33 
In fact, the State Department had always identified the MNR as separate from the 
Communist PCB and Trotskyite POR, though policymakers appreciated that these leftist parties 
had all cooperated and shared many goals during the first year of the revolution.34 Analysts had 
hyperbolically predicted in 1950 that, despite its embrace of a leftist popular front that included 
communists, “the MNR, should it come to power even with the aid of communists, would turn 
against its allies and liquidate them.”35 The embassy, even whilst demonstrating Paz' affinity 
                                                 
30 Memorandum from the Embassy in La Paz to the Department of State, 17 July, 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 
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with Marxist ideology and his willingness to tolerate or even promote communist infiltration and 
activism in government, still concluded that the objectives of communist groups s “differ from 
his own.”36 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 92-54 supposed that “Bolivia’s small and 
divided, but vociferous, Communist groups have been a source of both support for and 
opposition to the MNR,” but ultimately “the MNR has tended to recognize the fundamental 
rivalry between itself and the Communists.”37 
The Embassy concurred with a more upbeat analysis that reflected the new “era of good 
feelings” between the two countries at the end of 1953: “the Paz Government has believed it to 
be in the interest of political stability and its own survival not to break openly with the minority 
Communists, but rather to utilize them and allow them to have their say up until the final vote 
when the MNR Government imposes its policy.” Given what happened to the Arbenz regime this 
might well seem a dangerous game, but it was certainly one in which the MNR seemed entirely 
distinct from domestic communism.38 
U.S. officials also saw Bolivian communism as independent from a relatively disinterested 
and uninvolved Soviet Union.39 Policymakers at the beginning of the 1950s described the efforts 
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and influence of the Soviet Union in Latin America as minimal and “probably waning.”40 Even 
as late as 1959, months after the Cuban revolution, it seemed that “Latin America is more remote 
from the threat of Communist aggression than our other allies.”41 This downplaying of  Soviet 
ambitions in the region was also true of analyses of Soviet endeavors in Bolivia.42 Though 
policymakers certainly wished to exclude the Soviet Union from the hemisphere, this concern 
did not play a significant role in the discussions over Bolivia policy. William Cobb, Jr., the 2nd 
Secretary of the Embassy, analyzed the relationship between the Soviets and the far left parties in 
mid-1952, and reported that “the Embassy has not found any [evidence]…. Indicating that the 
local parties, the [PIR], the [POR], or the Communist Party are connected with or owe allegiance 
to a foreign power.”43 
In a remarkably nuanced public analysis, the State Department was even willing to describe 
the MNR as “Marxist rather than communist” when briefing Congress.44 This analysis was 
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buried in a report on the status of strategic materials throughout the world for the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, but nonetheless resembles a startling analysis for the State Department to 
be giving to members of Congress. Clearly, even at the height of the Cold War, policymakers 
could appreciate and perceive differences in left wing thought and not reject and oppose all 
leftists out of hand. To the administration, leftist political views did not automatically denote an 
affinity towards the international communist conspiracy or the Soviet Union. Those who sought 
to rely on such “smear” tactics attracted a great deal of skepticism from U.S. policymakers, many 
of whom had experienced similar attacks on their own department from one Senator Joseph 
McCarthy.45 
With this subtle appreciation of national and international leftist politics in mind, the State 
Department and embassy demonstrated a healthy skepticism of the MNR’s political opponents’ 
charges of communist and Soviet influence in Bolivia. Investigating these charges of communist 
influence at the behest of John Foster Dulles, Sparks wrote that some seemed either to be 
“complete nonsense” or “so vague that the Embassy has been at a loss as to how to approach” 
them.46  Peruvian charges against the MNR were of “dubious value” and represented the “dregs 
of rumor mongering that has been prevalent in Bolivia ever since the revolution of April 9.”47 In 
May 1954, the former CIA head and then Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith aptly 
summed up the Department’s attitudes to these continued accusations. When forwarding 
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Amarayo’s petitions to address the MNR’s communism, Smith thought it best “to throw them 
away.”48 
Similar frustrations crept into other officials' language when dealing with Big Three 
lobbyists.49 Undersecretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland pointed to the fact 
that Tydings “frequently used 'we' in a way which implied a mutuality of interest between his 
principals and the U.S. government.” He then brusquely stated that neither Aramayo nor 
Hochschild mining companies “involve U.S. interests.”50 Gerald Drew, who replaced Sparks as 
U.S. ambassador to Bolivia in 1954, went further. After a meeting with businessmen ostensibly 
eager to invest in Bolivia under more favorable conditions, ambassador Drew wrote “the 
proposal of the Lehman Corporation to recapitalize the Bolivian petroleum industry seemed …to 
contain the 'cloven hoof of Patiño et al.'“ In a line that seems straight out of a Bolivian Foreign 
Ministry press release, he accused the Big Three's lobbyists and proxies of seeking to “strike at 
the very heart of Bolivian social and labor policies” and return Bolivia to pre-revolutionary 
conditions. This was a Bolivia in which vast companies with inordinate economic clout and little 
accountability to the government could ship in their own skilled workers, pay and support 
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Bolivian workers less, and allow profits to leave the country: the very things that had contributed 
to Bolivia's chronic instability and what the MNR fought so hard against.51 
 U.S. diplomats' increasing annoyance at those who continued to insist the MNR were 
communist stooges reflected that they had concluded the MNR were not communists, nor were 
they likely to gravitate towards the Soviet Union. The conclusion that the MNR were not proxies 
for the Soviet Union, and that those who suggested they were had dubious motivations, hint at 
the efficacy of MNR diplomacy. Rather than buying into the narratives, MNR diplomats and 
officials managed to get their North American counterparts, from Embassy staff and South 
America desk officers at the State Department to the Eisenhower brothers, to see things from 
their point of view.52 This convergence of understanding between U.S. and Bolivian officials 
helps to explain why the Eisenhower administration was willing to look beyond a narrow, 
doctrinaire anticommunist agenda in Bolivia. It helped U.S. officials to identify the “Marxist” 
and “revolutionary nationalist” MNR leaders as “moderates,” distinct from domestic and foreign 
communists. 
It might seem easy to conclude, therefore, that administration officials and the State 
Department demonstrated a pragmatic and nuanced ability to parse leftist politics in Bolivia, and 
which supports theories that U.S. policy was successful example of pragmatic anticommunism, 
which the Bolivians seemed eager to reward with action in late 1953.53 Yet whilst the 
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administration began to justify its embrace of the revolutionaries along anticommunist lines, 
citing MNR moves towards a more actively communist agenda, numerous analyses in the decade 
came to show the Bolivian commitment to anticommunism was superficial at best.  
 
A move in the right direction? Bolivia adopts an “actively anticommunist policy” 
 
As a result of increased U.S. pressure following the granting of aid and a tin contract in 
the fall, by the end of 1953 it seemed to the Bolivia Desk at the State Department that the MNR 
was “moving toward an actively anticommunist policy.”54 Domestically, although Lechín 
remained as Minister of Mines and Petroleum, those close to Paz suspected of communist 
sympathies by some (such as Ballón and Fellman) were, according to Sparks either “no longer in 
favour” or no longer in government, though some still remained in the party.55 This analysis does 
not seem accurate in the case of Fellman, who continued to serve as Paz’s secretary and then go 
on to fill top ministerial positions in the late 50s/early 1960s. Nevertheless, a “cleanout” of 
communists in the COB seemed possible to Embassy officials after the MNR secured Guillermo 
Lora's exit from the organization, and Bolivian authorities arrested the editor of the communist 
newspaper El Pueblo on October 26.56 
Despite having shared the left wing ticket with the PCB and POR in the general election 
of 1951, the MNR openly pitted itself against the Communist party in the November 1953 
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FSTMB elections, and did very well at the expense of “the Lechín group.”57 The Communist 
Party, in turn, disavowed any common aim with the MNR, which by 1954 lead Rowell to the 
conclusion that in their “three major pieces of legislation,” the MNR Government had taken 
positions “considerably to the right of those advocated by the Communist parties.”58 
 The MNR made this move towards a more openly anticommunist policy partially in 
response to U.S. pressure to “dispel strong suspicions, still held by some sectors of American 
opinion, that the Bolivian Government is dominated by communist influence.”59 The MNR’s 
leaders were well aware of such suspicions and had already consulted with U.S. labor leaders to 
lobby on their behalf to refute such allegations.60 The revolutionary government were also in 
desperate need of aid and a tin contract to stabilize their economy.61 The MNR leadership’s 
experiences of non-recognition from Washington in the 1940s had also helped shape their 
attitudes to the United States, reinforcing Paz’s realization, made as far back as 1941, that 
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Bolivia “could not and cannot be against the United States,” if only for pragmatic reasons.62 The 
calamitous drop in world tin prices from over 1.21 dollars a pound to 80 cents a pound in March 
1953 made placating the United States even more of a practical necessity. The cost of this price 
collapse to the Bolivian economy was $26 million per annum.63 Driven by the need for 
American support to bolster the Bolivian economy, the party leadership therefore sought to 
demonstrate careful appreciation of their potential benefactor's concerns openly and behind 
closed doors whilst orientating its foreign policy towards the West.64 
 Bolivian diplomats were certainly aware of the stakes for the new government in seeking 
U.S. approval, and were attentive to the anticommunist agenda. Bolivian Ambassador Victor 
Andrade was present when Eisenhower gave his State of the Union address on 7 January 1954, 
and wrote back to Foreign Minister Walter Guevara with his reflections. In part of his report, 
Andrade noticed the strong positive reaction from Congress to Eisenhower's denunciation of 
“communist conspiracy” and his desire to remove citizenship rights from any domestic 
communists.65 In their fight against communism, Andrade observed, the U.S. was “willing to go 
to extremes.” With this in mind, Andrade reemphasized the importance of the anticommunist   
issue for the United States, reminding the Foreign Minister that: 
 We would not have created the favorable atmosphere [in Washington] necessary to 
resolving our problems without me… destroying our adversaries' truly diabolical 
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accusations tying us to communist influence. Today they continue with the same activities, 
trying to sell the idea that the headquarters of communism in Latin America for 1954 will 
have shifted from Guatemala to Bolivia.66 
 
Andrade took his own advice to extremes, to the extent of provoking some considerable 
concern from the rest of the Bolivian diplomatic corps. One Bolivian UN delegate complained to 
the Foreign Minister that Andrade was putting himself out on a limb unnecessarily to prove his 
government's commitments to anticommunism. Andrade had gone so far as to make a public 
defense of Senator McCarthy, something that “very few North American conservatives” had 
done, as one of his colleagues stressed. Some MNR officials worried that Andrade's praise of the 
Senator from Wisconsin might have a negative impact “not only on our international position, 
but also our internal politics. I want good relations with the U.S., but this is too much!”67  
Whether Andrade's strategy was useful or not, McCarthy certainly seemed uninterested in, 
or at least uninformed, as to the nature of MNR radicalism. Though a staunch critic of those 
sympathetic to the Bolivian revolution such as “extreme radical” Milton Eisenhower, McCarthy 
referred to the Bolivian government as an enemy of Latin American communists. In a New York 
Times article in the sumer of 1953, McCarthy claimed communists in Latin America had plans to 
overthrow Bolivian government.68 
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The Bolivian revolution's avoidance of McCarthy's ire seems somewhat strange given the 
U.S. press reaction to the revolution in 1952 and continued rumblings into 1953. Although 
McCarthy did not attack U.S. policy toward Bolivia, this did not remove the need to address the 
charges of communist influence in Bolivia. Sharing Andrade's concern that the revolution might 
fall foul of the U.S. in the same way that Guatemala had done, Siles and Guevara promised U.S. 
officials that they would stop consulting Guatemalans on land reform.69 Whenever dealing 
directly with the United States, they were always careful to present themselves as independent 
from both domestic and Soviet communism.70 Paz claimed his government was in fact the “last 
bulwark against Communism” and was independent of Moscow, Buenos Aires and 
Washington.71 He had stressed this point in a letter to the State Department written in exile from 
Argentina, two years before the MNR rose to power, and reiterated it to any American that 
would listen.72 Guevara, having made his speech on agrarian reform that had helped earn him the 
label of “Marxist” at the Embassy, recognized that his government’s measures to remove 
“feudalism” from Bolivia through land redistribution without compensation were “considered 
communism” by many in the U.S. He therefore set out to carefully expose this as “a gross 
misconception,” emphasizing that both “Peron and Stalin represent the negation of the MNR.”73 
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 In addition to their appreciation of the potential for conflict with the United States over 
communism, Paz also recognized that its desire for U.S. aid and tin contracts would push it into 
conflict with the POR and PCB, both of which had supported his candidacy in the thwarted 
elections of 1951, but who also favored non-alignment or a pro-Soviet orientation. Once U.S. aid 
was secured, the shift toward greater conflict with the far left became a foregone conclusion as 
these groups began to criticize the revolution's betrayal to U.S. imperialism. 
 Administration officials used the MNR's drift away from the far left in late 1953 and 
1954, and further ruptures in 1956 over the adoption of a U.S.-backed austerity plan, as proof of 
the effectiveness of their aid package and support for the Bolivian government. Testifying before 
a congressional committee in 1955, ambassador Sparks reassured Senator Aiken “frankly and 
categorically that our assistance to Bolivia changed the attitude of the Bolivian Government 180 
degrees from antipathy toward the United States to friendship toward the United States. Having 
made the supplies available to the country, it saved Bolivia from chaos. It saved them from 
communism and the extreme left.”74 In a briefing paper from later in the decade, Assistant 
Secretary for Latin American Affairs Roy Rubottom noted that “to help Bolivia overcome the 
threat of imminent economic collapse and resulting political chaos, the US government decided 
in 1952 to extend grant aid to that country thus far prevented “penetration by international 
communism.”75 
 However, the shift towards a more “actively anticommunist policy” by “moderate” 
centrists in the MNR was not obvious in the months when the Eisenhower and his State 
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Department decided to provide aid to Bolivia. Quite the opposite was true if anything, as the 
MNR's opponents were at pains to point out.76 And furthermore, for all the Bolivians' 
understanding of U.S. concerns over communism and the steps they took to demonstrate this, 
officials from across the foreign policy bureaucracy in the United States quickly came to the 
conclusion that the commitment of the MNR to anticommunism was superficial at best.  
 
 
The MNR and radical leftism: “we just let it pass” 
 
Bolivia was firmly aligned with Washington by the spring of 1954, having voted for the 
U.S.-sponsored anticommunist resolution at the inter-American conference at Caracas, a clear 
test of regional loyalties that John Foster Dulles insisted upon in no uncertain terms.77 Bolivia 
had also already received a substantial aid package from the United States the previous autumn. 
To secure this aid the MNR had promised to compensate the former owners of the now 
nationalized mines over the summer of 1953, which had proved a significant sticking point in 
U.S.- Bolivian relations during the revolution's first year. Furthermore, by the end of 1953 the 
MNR appeared to the State Department to be embracing a more “actively anticommunist 
policy.”78 
 The appearance of progress on the issue of anticommunism was quickly undermined. A 
National Intelligence Estimate declared that the “advent of the MNR regime has benefited the 
Communists in Bolivia and they enjoy a considerable degree of government toleration of their 
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activities.”79 Streibert of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) reported in 1954 that “his people 
and the CIA representative both agree that Communism is growing steadily stronger in Bolivia, 
emphasizing the “great deal of teaching of Marxist doctrine in schools.”80 
 The U.S. was not alone in making these observations. Ambassador Victor Andrade 
himself admitted as much in a letter to Foreign Minister Walter Guevara at the end of 1955. 
Andrade noted that in the Cold War era the U.S. was now even freer to intervene throughout 
Latin America, and could thus determine the “rules of conduct established by the big brother of 
this continent.” Andrade admitted that, under the rules of this hegemon “we haven't exactly been 
circumspect children.”81 As Ambassador clarified in his argument for Holland for U.S. support 
for the MNR to continue, the party leadership accepted without reservation the need to oppose 
“international communism” whilst, demonstrating “a partial tolerance of domestic 
communists.”82 Bolivians had been able to play test the limits of the hegemon's patience over 
maintaining discipline in the Cold War struggle, including proposing the sale of tin on the wrong 
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side of the iron curtain, and the president explicitly singling out American imperialism as the 
source of Bolivia's economic problems during the spring of 1953.83  
 Whilst American officials also continued to recognize reassuring signs in the MNR of 
moderation and amenability to U.S. objectives, they were by no means completely convinced of 
this moderation.84 U.S. officials continued to be concerned over MNR radicalism and far left 
influence throughout the 1950s. To both policymaking and academic elites in the United States 
and beyond, it seemed leftists in the MNR retained substantial influence on the Bolivian polity. 
The British ambassador in Bolivia, Sir John Lomax, laid out his complaints in no uncertain 
terms. Venting his frustration over U.S. support for the MNR for his superiors in Whitehall, 
Lomax lambasted the naive Americans for being duped by the irredeemably radical MNR, which 
had allowed “the Marxist-dominated labour movement” to gain power, intimidating public 
officials and dominating government ministries. If left unchecked ambassador Lomax warned 
that, as soon as “next year [1955]… Bolivia will become half sovietised. The proletariat dictate: 
and their dictation rests upon overwhelming force.”85 
 The Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), which Eisenhower founded to study the 
implementation of NSC directives, echoed Lomax's concerns for the Eisenhower administration's 
top policymakers. The OCB concluded in its 1955 study that 
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The MNR lacks a true understanding of the subversive nature of Communism. It 
operates sporadically against communist subversive forces but does so largely on the 
basis of political expediency, regarding the Communists merely as domestic political 
rivals for mass support. The general political and intellectual climate, especially in 
educational and labor circles, is favorable to Marxist economic theories; this is 
reflected in the presence of Communist fellow travelers, and allegedly reformed 
Bolivian and foreign communists in the MNR itself. Widespread poverty, the 
political immaturity of the population, the existence of a large working class militia 
susceptible to Communist subversion, and the low morale of the much smaller 
national army and air force provide opportunities for subversive exploitation and 
manipulation.86 
 
A later draft of the study emphasized the “disturbing situation” in Bolivia, where “it is not 
widely realized that there is a serious threat [to internal security] and U.S. military programs 
are non-existent.” Whilst the MNR might have the money and power necessary for more 
concerted anticommunist measures, the OCB concluded the MNR's “will” to do so remained 
seriously in question.87 
The following year Undersecretary Holland made a similar analysis as to the extent of 
leftist influence in Bolivia, though he did not make the alarmist connection to the Soviet Union 
or the forces of international “Communism,” as the OCB had.88 Analyzing the MNR's 
                                                 
86 “Operations Coordinating Board: Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Bolivia and Recommended Action,” 
Report from OCB to Staats (Executive Secretary of the NSC), 22 June 1955, p. 1. DDEL, White House Office, 
National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961, OCB CDF Series, Box 24, OCB 091.Bolivia (2) June 1955-
December 1956. Similar transgressions against U.S. attitudes towards communism were central factors in the 
removal of Arbenz, according to Piero Gleijeses’ definitive study of United States policy in Guatemala. Kenneth 
Lehman also argued that Arbenz’s personal identification with communist ideology led to his use of pro-communist 
rhetoric and appointment of a few Communist Party members in government positions. See Gleijeses, Shattered 
Hope; Kenneth D. Lehman, “Revolutions and Attributions: Making Sense of Eisenhower Administration Policies in 
Bolivia and Guatemala,” in Diplomatic History, vol. 21, Issue 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 185-213. 
87 OCB report to NSC pursuant to NSC action 1290-d, 23 September 1955, pp. 12, 14, DDEL, White House Office, 
National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1948-1961. OCB Central File Series, Ocb 014.12 [internal security] (file 
#2) (1) Oct-Dec 55,Box 17. See also OCB “Analysis of Internal Security Situation in Bolivia and Recommended 
Action,” 21 December 1955, DDELWhite House Office, National Security Council Staff: Papers 1948-61, Box 24, 
OCB 091.Bolivia(2) {June 1955-December 1956], p. 7. 
88 The capitalization of “Communist” in the OCB report is perhaps instructive. Official “Communist” party 
influence seems clearly linked to the Soviet Union, or at least 'international communism', and is directly juxtaposed 
with the idea of domestic communism or communist ideas unaffiliated directly to an organized political party or 





convention in the run-up to the 1956 election, Holland believed that “[e]ven though a 'moderate' 
was nominated presidential candidate, the leftists dominated the convention and secured an 
overwhelming majority in the party's political committee.” This committee was responsible for 
writing the party platform for the coming election, and was thus in a position of significant 
power for MNR leftists to utilize. Holland concluded that the “MNR leftists” were “now in a 
good position to dominate the new administration.”89   
Holland's observation was not an isolated case. Throughout the administration's dealings 
with the MNR, the radical wing of the party exerted powerful influence on Bolivian politics. 
According to the Bolivian Foreign Ministry's own analysis, the government's principal supporter 
and mouthpiece in the Bolivian press La Nación gave nominal support to U.S. aid programs 
whilst still employing “subversives” and providing a platform for their anti-American agenda.90 
The MNR left was able to use the threat of strikes in the nationalized mines to secure 
concessions for Bolivian workers (and in the process undermined the government's anti-
inflationary stabilization strategy).  
 The extreme left, along with “identifiable communists,” continued to fuel anti-
Americanism in Bolivia that would explode in lethal anti-American riots in 1959. The riots, 
directed against the US embassy, began the publication of an article quoting an Embassy official 
proposing the solution to Bolivia's problems would be to “abolish Bolivia.”91 In reaction to this 
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disturbing evidence of anti-Americansim, Wymberly De Coerr at the State Department's 
Americas desk complained of the increasingly brazen passivity of the MNR leadership when 
faced with their own party grassroots and increasingly influential Orthodox and Trotskyite 
Communists, who continued to launch “incendiary attacks” against the United States.92 
Ambassador Carl W. Strom agreed: to him it seemed that the MNR showed disquieting 
“passivity” in the face of the “growing leftward drift in internal affairs.” The MNR 
accommodated the “threats and demands from Communist-controlled labor sectors,” leaving 
Washington to “bear the political and public relations burden.”93 Herbert Thompson, who had 
arrived to serve as the head of the Embassy's political section in La Paz the year before the riots, 
also agreed with Strom that oftentimes the Bolivians would do the bare minimum to confront 
voices on the far left. Taking a markedly more conciliatory tone, Thompson remembered “there 
certainly had been government participation in putting the riot in motion,” but the MNR 
government “had gone through the motions of trying to protect us from this incident… they had 
given us fair warning that they could no longer protect us and to some extent helped us evacuate.  
So I think we just let it pass.”94 
 As officials repeatedly emphasized, they were concerned at the MNR's shortcomings on 
promoting anticommunism and concerned that it’s approach was superficial, counterproductive 
and even subversive actions. Yet U.S. monetary support for the regime intensified over the 
course of the 1950s. Clearly substantive progress on anticommunism was not a central concern 
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of policymakers in determining their level of support for the MNR government. Instead, U.S. 





During the early 1950s MNR diplomats and officials had, at times, tried to demonstrate 
their anticommunist credentials to the Eisenhower administration rhetorically. As U.S. aid 
dollars began to flow more freely, they also took symbolic actions to placate its anticommunist 
proclivities, and those of other interest groups looking on from the United States. This helped the 
administration to rationalize its embrace of the MNR as having been an effective, perhaps even 
‘enlightened’ method of waging the Cold War, by empowering MNR moderates to resist a 
further swing leftwards in Bolivian politics, even if this shift had not been apparent in the months 
leading up to the decision to provide aid to the MNR government. 
For all the MNR’s rhetoric and subsequent action on the anticommunist agenda, the 
administration got very little results, as the British Foreign Office smugly observed. Leftists like 
Fellarde, Lechín and Chavez still remained at the heart of governmental power, whilst the 
miners’ militias and COB had further solidified their military, political and economic influence.95 
As the next chapter will demonstrate, whatever the 'moderate' leadership's underlying attitudes 
towards communism were, U.S. policymakers and analysts still had strong indicators from 
within their own ranks that communists might still be able to influence MNR policy and were 
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growing in strength politically. The 'moderate' MNR's intellectual affinity for Marxism and their 
passivity towards leftist radicals within the MNR and COB was especially provocative given that 
Bolivia’s general political, economic and intellectual climate appeared to the OCB, Embassy and 
State Department to be very favorable to communists. Thus, despite U.S. officials’ public self-
congratulation for the efficacy of anticommunism in Bolivia, we must look elsewhere to find the 






 The Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario's appeal in Washington: 





The MNR's superficial approach to anticommunism had, according to U.S. analyses, allowed 
radical leftists to gain power and influence in Bolivia.1 Concerns over the continued strength of 
communist elements in Bolivia echoed through the foreign policymaking establishment during 
the entirety of the 1950s, though some officials also saw the MNR as leftist nationalists 
preferable to an explicitly communist and pro-Moscow government. In spite of Bolivian 
fostering of radical leftist influence, U.S. policymakers chose to continue to support the MNR 
with increasingly large and long-term aid packages. To understand why U.S. policymakers chose 
to overlook MNR transgressions of Cold War ideological divides, it is essential to understand 
how important the rise of third world nationalism was to U.S. officials' outlook, and their 
understanding of their role in the region as guardians of the “inter-American” system. 
Policymakers and analysts described this system as a mutually beneficial partnership. In fact, it 
served as a vehicle to both secure American interests and propagate American values.  
 When viewed from the perspective of maintaining U.S. hegemony, the MNR's radical 
and transformative vision for Bolivian society was less of a worry and more of a potential boon 
for U.S. regional leadership in the minds of key administration and State Department figures. 
Bolivian leaders recognized this mindset in their North American counterparts, and they framed 
                                                 





their revolution as one seeking cooperation with the United States. This framing garnered 
acceptance and support from U.S. policymakers who saw an opportunity in Bolivia to align with 
the most popular government in the Americas; a government that seemed to many in the State 
Department and beyond to be on the right side of history.2 In accepting the symbolic importance 
of cooperating with Bolivia, and the long-term opportunities it seemed to afford, foreign 
policymakers were willing to stretch the limits of acceptable behavior within that system 
surprisingly far. This flexibility became especially clear with regards to the MNR's commitment 
to anticommunist policies and the propagation of free-market principles. 
 
The appeal of the MNR: moderation and revolutionary zeal 
 
The Eisenhower administration was still able and willing to look beyond knee-jerk 
anticommunism in Bolivia, and treated continued MNR leftist radicalism as an annoyance rather 
than a threat to hemispheric security. This challenges existing narratives of U.S. policy in Latin 
America and the third world during the early Cold War, which describe administration officials 
as marked by “obsess[ive],” “overzealous,” “virulent,” “reactionary” and “hardline” 
anticommunist ideology.3 In these narratives, such a mindset led policymakers to interpret global 
                                                 
2 Holland remarked during a visit to Guatemala with Vice President Nixon that Paz Estenssoro had the greatest 
popular mandate in all of the Americas. Eduardo Arze Quiroga to Guillermo Albero Velasco, 4 March 1955, 
Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archives, Correspondencias: Embajada Boliviana en Guatemala a Ministerio de 
Relaciones Exteriores mayo 1952-febrero 1957. 
3 Quotes on the Eisenhower administration’s anticommunism are from, respectively, Rabe, Eisenhower in Latin 
America, p. 69; Ira Chernus, General Eisenhower, p. 304; Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign 
Economic Policy, 1953-1961, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 9; Shawn Parry-Giles, The 
Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2002), p. 161. 
See also Carlos Alzugaray Treto, Cronica de un fracaso imperial: la politica de Eisenhower contra Cuba y el 
derrocamiento de la dictadura de Batista (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2000), p. 4. 
 Bolivia scholars also portray the president as “a fervent ‘cold warrior’ with anticommunist beliefs nurtured 





events “solely within the context of the Soviet-American confrontation,” which in turn meant a 
“hostil[ity] to all revolutionary regimes” and an embrace of right wing dictatorships.4 
The suggestion that the administration was guilty of a “simplified” and knee-jerk 
“attribution” of moderate and anticommunist intentions to Paz and the MNR leadership not only 
underestimates United States policy, analysis, and the opposition it faced, it also gives short 
shrift to the Bolivian diplomatic initiatives that helped shape U.S. appraisals.5 When understood 
as a Bolivian diplomatic coup in the face of considerable opposition, the Eisenhower 
administration's embrace of the Bolivian revolutionaries seems less a result of a knee-jerk 
attribution or the charisma of Bolivian ambassador to the U.S., Victor Andrade, and Milton 
Eisenhower. Instead it seems more of a positive response to the program of the MNR as framed 
by Bolivian diplomats. Their program’s appeal was not centered around its anticommunist bona 
                                                 
or incorrect, in keeping with the dominant tendency in the foreign service at this stage in the cold war.” Lehman, 
Bolivia and the United States, pp. 105-106; Blasier, The Hovering Giant, p. 227. 
4 Quote on the Soviet Union in Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, p. 32. See also Stephen Rabe, “Dulles, Latin 
America and Cold War Anticommunism” in Richard H. Immerman (ed.), John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of 
the Cold War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 162.  
 On hostility to revolutions, see Herbert Klein, A Concise History of Bolivia, Second Edition (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 218; David F. Schmitz, Thank God They’re on our Side: The United States 
and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). See also Odd 
Arne Westad's argument that the Iranian intervention represented the death of the idea that the United States should 
co-opt radical Third World nationalism. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and 
the Making of Our Times, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 122, 119. For a more polemical 
account that see U.S. policymakers as motivated by a desire to eliminate or “combat” economic nationalism in the 
Third World, see Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States foreign policy, 1945-1980 (New York, 
NY: Pantheon Books, 1988).  
5 Such well-designed and executed diplomacy has only recently begun to be explored in detail by historians, but has 
yet to articulate the nature and purpose of U.S. policy in the region (See chapter three). Accounts have long 
emphasized the access to Eisenhower afforded to ambassador Andrade, who was able to golf with President 
Eisenhower. But it is the work of James Siekmeier that has sought to put Bolivian diplomatic initiatives front and 
center of our understanding of how the MNR won and maintained high levels of U.S. support. Siekmeier, The 
Bolivian Revolution and the United States; James Siekmeier, “Trailblazer Diplomat: Bolivian Ambassador Víctor 






fides or even its direct impact on the role of the Soviet Union in the region.6 Neither was it a 
result of moderation or conservative tendencies on behalf of the MNR. The vision of leaders in 
the 'moderate' wing like Paz and Guevara was far more ambitious than merely managing the 
revolutionary expectations of the miners' unions and the peasants. The MNR appealed to U.S. 
officials and policymakers because their revolutionary nationalism promised to transform Bolivia 
and had potential to serve as an example of both good conduct and the U.S.' hegemonic 
beneficence within the inter-American system.  
Bolivian diplomats certainly emphasized their understanding and affinity for 
anticommunism for U.S. policymakers. Yet they also sought to downplay the importance of an 
actively anti-communist policy at crucial junctures, instead focusing on MNR reforms as the 
keys to promoting development and stability in Bolivia when soliciting U.S. support. In the face 
of Washington's renewed interest in communist activity during late 1953, President Paz and 
Foreign Minister Guevara explained to U.S. ambassador Sparks that the MNR’s leftist members 
were “competent…[and] react well under responsibility.” They were “at worst Marxists and not 
International Communists” according to the president, whose justification mirrored those being 
made by U.S. diplomats and analysts behind closed doors.7 
Months previously, a group of U.S. officials met with top Bolivian government leaders. 
After addressing Cabot's concerns about the influence of Guatemalans on Bolivian agrarian 
reform in a meeting with other U.S. policymakers, Guevara and Siles “proceed[ed] to downplay 
the importance of communism.” They highlighted Bolivia's need for aid, which represented a 
                                                 
6 The communist superpower's regional presence was very limited in the early 1950s. Stalin had been dismissive of 
the prospects for challenging U.S. hegemony in Latin America, and renewed Soviet attention to the region did not 
begin until 1956 with the arrival of a Soviet economic offensive and Khruschev's ability to secure his position at 
home. 





relatively small portion of the U.S. aid budget. Both parties ended the meeting “somewhat 
pessimistically,” with a “frankness and appreciation of each others’ difficulties.”8 
Andrade would later make the same effort to minimize the importance of communism 
when the State Department complained that Juan Lechín, the Minister for Mines and Petroleum 
and leader of the MNR's left faction, had made a speech invoking the French, Russian and 
Chinese revolutions and proclaiming a desire for control obrero to extend to foreign capital 
investments as well as nationalized industries. The Bolivian ambassador reminded the Americans 
that the key concern in Bolivia was providing economic stability and controlling inflation.9 
Such concerns over social and political stability might have had a wider applicability to the 
Cold War struggle for diplomatic influence and the hearts and minds of the world's peoples, but 
certainly not in the immediate, overt and politicized anticommunism that one might associate 
with the Cold Warriors of the Eisenhower administration. Ernesto Galarza was another U.S. 
official at the C.I.O. with special interest in Bolivia that saw the potential in a friendly 
relationship with the MNR government, along with A.F.L. Latin America representative Serafino 
Romuldi.10 As a former Pan American Union representative who had worked in Bolivia amongst 
the tin miners, Galarza advised South America Desk officers in the State Department that, 
although  
 it was difficult to spot Communists in a situation like that of Bolivia... the best procedure 
in such a situation was to leave in abeyance the question whether certain leaders might be 
communist and to proceed with whatever course of action was dictated by the other 
                                                 
8 Memcon Paz, Siles, Guevara, Gutierrez (Bolivian Economics Minister), Barrau (President Comibol), Milton 
Eisenhower, Sparks, Cabot, Oscar Powell, and Andrew Overby, 8 July 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 4606, 
824.00/7-853.  
9 Andrade to Foreign Ministry 9 May 1955, Bolivian Foreign Ministry Archive, Cables Dirigidos y Recibidos 
Embolivia Washington 1955, CL-359; Andrade to Foreign Ministry 11 May 1955, Ibid. 





circumstances of the case.  The Communists would then...have to reveal their true attitude 
by their actions.11 
 
 The administration seems to have agreed with Galazra's approach, and the positive report 
on the MNR he co-authored circulated widely in Washington, convincing potential skeptics as it 
did so.12 In a letter from Senator J. William Fulbright to John Moors Cabot, the Arkansas senator 
who would become a prominent critic of the Vietnam War during the Johnson administration, 
confessed the report “rather surprised me.”13  
 The “other circumstances” of the case dominating U.S. concerns in 1953 that Galazra 
alluded to were Bolivia’s chronic economic and political instability.14 According to ambassador 
Sparks and like-minded colleagues at the State Department, “the MNR, for the future, offers the 
brightest, if not the only, possibility for any political grouping in Bolivia eventually to bring 
about enduring political stability and expanding economic progress.”15 William Hudson at the 
Bolivia desk at the State Department concurred:  
 Despite its ineptitude, irresponsibility, and recent attacks on the US, the MNR 
government is preferable to any successor which is in sight, including a government of the 
                                                 
11 Memcon Jackson, Galarza, Fishburn, Hudson, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 4606, 824.00/4-2353. For more see 
Galarza to Gardner Jackson and Andrade, 26 April 1953, WGA papers Box 7 Folder 5, I.1.a/10/1415. Galarza was a 
former Pan American Union representative, who had written pieces on labor conditions in Bolivia, helped organize 
strikes and had worked as a consultant for the sexenio-era Bolivian government. He also clashed with the Roosevelt 
administration over what he saw as attempts to undermine Bolivian labor legislation in 1942. From Guide to the 
Ernesto Galarza Papers, 1936-1984 (Stanford University. Libraries. Dept. of Special Collections and University 
Archives), ONLINE RESOURCE: http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/tf2290026t/admin/?query=Bolivia 
(last accessed 16 April 2013). See also Richard Chabran, “Activism and Intellectual Struggle in the Life of Ernesto 
Galarza, University of California Riverside, ONLINE RESOURCE: http://egarc.ucr.edu/about.html last accessed 9 
July 2013). 
12 H. Alexander Smith to Cabot, 4 May 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 4607, 824.00/5-453. 
13 Fulbright to Cabot, 13 May 1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 4607, 824.00/5-1353. 
14Milton Eisenhower, Report to the President on Latin America trip, 11January, 1954, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 
513, 120.220/1-1154, pp. 8-9. 
15 Sparks to Holland 17 September 1954, NARA, CDF, RG 59, LOT FILES, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 






Falange and other discredited opposition parties, because it alone comes near combining the 
will, the ability, and the popular support requisite for a successful attack on fundamental 
Bolivian economic problems.16 
 
These prescriptions certainly contain pragmatic concessions to the limitations of the MNR and 
what was achievable in the Bolivian political and economic context. The willingness to overlook 
the ideological transgressions of the MNR demonstrates U.S. officials' appreciation and 
endorsement of the MNR's apparent potential to transform Bolivia's society, economy and 
political stability: a positive embrace of the MNR's project that went beyond pragmatic 
acquiescence.17 This positive embrace was made much easier by a shared understanding of the 
constraints Bolivian leaders were under, constraints that MNR diplomats had done well to 
demonstrate to their North American counterparts. 
 Previous accounts emphasize that the appeal of the moderate MNR rested on a “handful 
of top leaders” who looked moderate to U.S. observers, especially in comparison to their 
political allies.18 In some accounts this apparent moderation made the MNR leadership appealing 
because they seemed “reluctant revolutionaries,” and appealed to an inherently conservative, 
                                                 
16 “Premises on ‘Bolivian problem,’” Memorandum from Hudson to Atwood, April 30, 1953, NARA, CDF, Central 
Decimal File, RG 59, Box 4607, 824.00/4-3053. [Emphasis in original]. 
17 For more on the MNR's plans to use supposed profits from the nationalized mines to pay for an expanded social 
safety net, and a diversified economy, see chapter one. 
18 Sparks to Holland 17 September 1954, NARA, CDF, RG 59, LOT FILES, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Country Files, 1953-56, Box 2, Bolivia 1953-
55. 
 Memcon Gardener Jackson (CIO), Ernesto Galarza (AFL), Fishburn (ARA), Hudson (OSA), 23 April 
1953, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 4606 824.00/4-2353: Jackson and Galarza, although “aware of the widespread 
corruption and inefficiency of the MNR Government, they had been greatly impressed with the sincerity of the 





even “reactionary,” Eisenhower administration seeking to “brake” revolutionary zeal wherever 
possible.19 
 Historians who emphasize the appeal of the MNR as a conservative or even a moderate 
political force have identified a common theme in justifications of U.S. support for the MNR. 
But in doing so, their analyses have missed crucial elements of the MNR's appeal to U.S. 
policymakers. According to Sparks, the MNR's “essential characteristics” were “its intense 
nationalism and its bona fide revolutionary nature.” The Embassy emphasized that the MNR 
leadership wanted to “destroy the feudal structure in agriculture”, diversify the Bolivian 
economy, and free the body politic from the tin oligarchy's domineering and exploitative 
control.20 
 The government's economic approach to Bolivian problems, largely independent of an 
explicit communist threat, provided a key selling point for the MNR in its courting of U.S. 
support. In a plan summarizing the government's long range plans that was presented to Milton 
Eisenhower during his visit to Bolivia in the summer of 1953, Guevara emphasized that the 
“Bolivian people want development, a stable national economy, and to be able to rely on both 
                                                 
19 Klein, Bolivia, p. 232; Lehman, Bolivia and the United States, p. 92; Carlos Alzugaray Treto, Cronica de un 
fracaso imperial (Havana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 2000), introducion. See also Kevin Young, “Purging the 
Forces of Darkness: The United States, Monetary Stabilization, and the Containment of the Bolivian Revolution,” 
Diplomatic History Vol. 37, No. 3 (2013), pp. 514, 520-21; Kenneth D. Lehman, “Braked but not broken: Mexico 
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(eds.), Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2003), pp. 91-113. 
20 [emphasis added]. Sparks to Holland 17 September 1954, NARA, CDF, RG 59, LOT FILES, Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Country Files, 1953-56, Box 
2, Bolivia 1953-55. See also Holland's description of the MNR as a “radical, nationalistic reform government.” 
Memorandum from Holland to Hoover, “Proposed Joint Program for Bolivia,” 1 June 1955, NARA, CDF, RG 59, 
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their own efforts and the financial and technical aid of the United States.”21 This pitch, developed 
in collaboration with top MNR politicians, economic advisors, unions and industry leaders was 
expressly designed to appeal to the U.S. and attract aid, yet within the government's plans lay a 
transformative and state-centered solution to Bolivian long-term economic problems.22 
 The MNR planned to enfranchise the indigenous population, making them landowners 
through agrarian reform and making them full citizens with voting rights. Miners would be 
supported through state employment and extended benefits through subsidized food in pulperias 
(government-run grocery stores), a voice in the running of the mines through control obrero, and 
greater investment in healthcare, education and pensions. The MNR planned to use the 
remaining profits from the mines, bolstered by a heavy investment of U.S. aid, to develop and 
diversify the Bolivian economy, particularly in the East. 23 
It was this radical vision that defined the MNR, and that held the key for Sparks, Hudson 
and Topping at OSA, the Eisenhower brothers, and Undersecretaries of State for Inter-American 
Affairs Henry Holland and John Moors Cabot.24 These officials provided a receptive audience for 
                                                 
21 Walter Guevara Arze, Plan inmediato de política económica del gobierno de la revolución (La Paz: Ministerio de 
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22 Ibid., p. ii. 
23 “Estatuos de la Confederacion Naciónal de Trabajadores,” International Institute of Social History, Movimiento 
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MNR diplomacy and their framing of the Bolivian economic and political context, as well as 
Bolivia’s role in the inter-American system as “a radical, nationalistic reform government.”25 
 MNR diplomacy and emphasis on the causes of Bolivia's economic and political 
instability clearly found a receptive audience from U.S. officials. In the midst of castigating the 
MNR's irresponsible and demagogic pandering to the radical left in May 1953, the Embassy 
conceded that Paz' criticisms stemmed from a “not entirely irrational view of the situation.”26 
Ambassador Sparks, briefing the new Undersecretary of State for inter-American affairs, went 
further. Sparks warned Henry Holland that “the tendency... to stress difficulties or questionable 
orientation [of the MNR] and then to explain the mitigating circumstances... tends to leave a 
wrong impression.” Holland should instead bear in mind that Bolivia's “feudal” history had left 
“85% of its human population… isolated from the economic and political life of the country.” 
Meanwhile, the oligarchy, “largely concerned with its own immediate welfare, had created 
“endemic and chronic political and economic illnesses” in Bolivian society.27Ambassador Drew 
would later echo these sentiments when referring to Patiño's “cloven hoof” making itself felt in 
Bolivia.28 
                                                 
25 Holland to Hoover, 1 June 1955, NARA, CDF, RG 59, LOT FILES, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Office of 
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 The fact that there was very little space between the Embassy's analysis and the 
prescriptions of MNR leaders as to the motivation for their revolution and the nature of their 
enemies stands as a testament both to the effectiveness of Bolivian diplomacy and its diplomats' 
ability to recognize an agenda beyond anticommunism that might motivate their North American 
counterparts.29 As Andrade noted, the American desire to provide aid and technical assistance 
was strong, especially in the service of cementing the “unity of the hemisphere” using 
“constructive nationalism.”30 This was a desire that the MNR government should use to help 
frame its goals and actions for observers in the United States: by presenting themselves as 
ambitious nationalists seeking to transform their country’s economy and social stratification, 
whilst seeking a constructive and cooperative relationship with Washington and the broader 
regional system it presided over.  
Philip Bonsal, a Republican businessman sent to Bolivia as ambassador in 1956, also 
emphasised the value of the United States aligning itself with the Bolivian revolution along the 
lines Andrade had identified in Eisenhower’s rhetoric. The “profound” nature of Bolivia's 
“social, political and economic revolution” merited U.S. attention, understanding and support. 
The Cold War had raised the stakes for the United States confronting movements such as these, 
and now the U.S. had “become identified with a current of historical change in Bolivia which 
seeks to broaden the long-restricted horizons of the Bolivian people.”31 Looking back on U.S. 
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kind of exploitation which had robbed the country for many decades” 
29 See “cloven hoof” comment, Drew to Topping, 18 July 1955, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 4278, 824.25/7-1855. 
30La Nación, 15 December 1953, p. 5. See also Letter from Andrade to Guevara, 7 January 1954. Papers of Walter 
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policy towards the revolution, State Department officials reflected that “we have succeeded in 
identifying ourselves with what we believe to have been an inevitable and deeply rooted effort of 
the Bolivian people to better themselves.”32 What the administration then sought “to do is 
demonstrate that our system is good for Bolivia and can solve its problems,” to Bolivians, Latin 
Americans, and particularly to the United states' communist detractors.33  
Though Embassy staff could be written off as having contracted a case of ‘localitis,’ their 
shared appreciation of Bolivian problems found sympathetic reception beyond cocktail 
receptions in La Paz.34 At the first high level discussion of aid to the MNR regime in June 1953, 
Undersecretary of State for Inter-American Affairs John Moors Cabot described the aid program 
devised by the Department of State as “designed both to meet the immediate economic crisis in 
Bolivia and to provide a stimulus to economic diversification, which appears to be the only long 
term solution for the basic Bolivian problem” of tin dependence.35 By mid-1953 the Embassy 
staff had helped convince colleagues back the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA)  and the 
Office of South American Affairs (OSA) in the State Department that the MNR could “bring 
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about enduring political stability and expanding economic progress. Only with such development 
can domestic tranquility and democratic political forms have any hope for emergence.”36 
It was therefore the MNR's economic vision for Bolivia that justified the U.S.' “positive 
approach” and even, as one Bolivian official remembered, provoked “visible excitement” in the 
U.S. Embassy.37 The MNR's revolutionary vision and their “intense nationalism,” combined with 
its leaders' recognition that they had to demonstrate willingness to deal with the United States 
within the framework of the inter-American system, explains the Eisenhower administration's 
positive embrace of the Bolivian government.38 This embrace was forthcoming despite U.S. 
officials' “soul searching” over “the brutalities and injustices inherent in a revolutionary 
movement,” the “lack of a fully implemented program against communism” and even 
widespread “ineptitude, confusion and dishonesty.”39 
  
Nationalism, the Eisenhower administration and Bolivian diplomacy 
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Though the Embassy and officials back at State offered top policymakers often pragmatic 
and subtle analysis of the MNR and the wider political context that they operated under, they 
also presented plenty of alarming evidence as to the push towards radicalism in Bolivia and 
within the MNR itself. The Embassy’s efforts to secure support for the MNR would not have 
been effective if the administration had not been prepared to treat Bolivia’s situation with 
sympathy. 
 Why was this sympathy from the Eisenhower administration so forthcoming? Other 
historians have argued that the administration seemed befuddled by the violence and radicalism 
of Third World revolutions, seeing them as naive or even willing pawns in Moscow's bid for 
global domination. Odd Arne Westad sees Eisenhower's “wondering aloud” at an NSC meeting 
in March 1953, why it was not possible to “get some of the people in these down-trodden 
countries to like us instead of hating us” as particularly indicative of the administration's 
mindset.40 Richard Immerman holds that, in the Third World, Dulles “floundered in an alien 
sea.”41 
 Other historians have also recognized the antagonism for third world nationalist 
movements that Westad identified, but they reject the Cold War as the primary reason for U.S. 
opposition to Third World nationalists and revolutionaries. These explanations seek to explain 
the real basis for and motivations of U.S. policy in Bolivia, Guatemala and beyond as a result of 
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U.S. officials' desire to quash economic nationalism as a threat to Washington's hegemony.42 For 
Siekmeier and others, anticommunism was merely a reformulation of this broader antinationalist 
agenda.43 
 But administration leaders and top foreign policy officials recognized nationalism as a 
vital regional and global force that would profoundly shape the coming decades, and sought to 
act on this knowledge in Bolivia. Rather than insisting on a Cold War frame of reference, 
policymakers in Washington sought not to “contain” or “fight,” but rather to co-opt leftist and 
reformist nationalism.44 Though they recognized the potential for hostility between these groups 
in the Third World and the United States, if possible many U.S. officials during the Eisenhower 
administration sought to work with these groups, symbolically aligning Washington with popular 
calls for national empowerment and development whilst integrating them into the ‘Free World’ 
economically and diplomatically. Cold War opportunism and nationalist intransigence might 
have made this project highly tendentious. Yet it was a project close to the hearts of many 
policymakers, and when they saw its contours being reflected back at them by Bolivians, they 
took comfort. 
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To Eisenhower nationalism was so important it meant embracing and even nurturing Latin 
American nationalism. This held true even for ‘extreme,’ or “ultra-nationalism.”45 Eisenhower 
sought to bring these political movements into closer cooperation with what administration 
officials described as the “inter-American system” (and what many others have termed 
“hegemony” or “empire”).46 Analyses of U.S. hegemony in Latin America have focused on the 
dominant role of free markets, anticommunism, race and gender, all of which emphasize an 
explicitly antinationalist purpose behind U.S. policy. It is simple enough to acknowledge that 
hegemonic designs, whether expressed through covert operations or diplomatic pressure that 
accompanied U.S. investment capital and aid, would antagonize Latin American leftist 
nationalists. But this conclusion misses the motivation and rationale for U.S. policy: and 
understanding these motivations had important consequences for those on the receiving end of 
that hegemony.  
 The U.S. relationship with Latin America was important to Eisenhower, who though he 
may well have been distracted by other problems and hampered by domestic constraints, by no 
means “gloss[ed] over” Latin America.47 He conceived of support for Bolivia and the wider 
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region as key for the United States regardless of the Cold War. In a time he recognized as 
destined to be marked by considerable nationalist ferment, Eisenhower sought “a healthy 
relationship” with Latin American nations, one that could embrace the possibilities of 
cooperation with reformist and even revolutionary nationalists, and thus cement a bond within 
the Americas that would “permanently endure.”48 
 In January 1953, as he prepared to enter office, Eisenhower met with Winston Churchill 
to discuss the special relationship. The president-elect recorded in his diary that Churchill’s “old 
fashioned and paternalistic” attitude displayed an “almost childlike faith that all of the answers 
are to be found merely in British-American partnership…Winston is trying to relive the days of 
World War II.” For Eisenhower, the old colonial order was over: “Nationalism [was] world-wide 
and undoubtedly the strongest political emotion of our day,” and “world Communism [was] 
taking advantage of that spirit of nationalism to cause dissention in the free world.”49 
 Though Eisenhower worried that too speedy a transition from colonial dependency to 
independence could engender anarchy and destructive (anti-American) radicalism, he believed 
that the transition had to take place to allow the United States to continue its role as world 
superpower. In the post-war world of rapid modernization, Third World aspirations could not be 
contained; they had to be met and addressed. This realization shared much in its thinking with 
the analyses and assumptions of the proponents of modernization theory, somewhat ironic given 
that the modernization theorists were amongst Eisenhower’s strongest critics on foreign policy 
and foreign aid. 
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 At one meeting of the NSC on 19 June, 1958, the president revealed how important Third 
World nationalism was to his view of the United States’ global interests. His statements were 
perhaps a product of frustration with Latin America’s most recent bout of violent anti-
Americanism during Nixon's tour of the region, when the vice president had been harassed by 
angry mobs in Caracas and Lima during his tour of Latin America. Eisenhower’s words 
nonetheless demonstrated the depth of his feeling on the issue. He “wished to emphasize” that 
the United States should “go to our Latin American neighbors and preach ultra-nationalism to 
them, insisting that the goals of their nationalism can only be achieved in conjunction with us.”50 
Further along in the discussion, Eisenhower interjected on two occasions to expound the 
importance of his “ultra-nationalism” formula. He concluded his remarks on the subject by 
arguing that the United States “must exploit this force in Latin America rather than try to fight 
it.”51 
Though Eisenhower did not elaborate a precise definition of ultra-nationalism, his passion for 
the subject during this particular meeting of the NSC seems in keeping with a broader tendency 
within his administration seeking to support nationalism as a 'Third force' to bolster the 'Free 
World.' Supporting Latin American nationalism meant appropriating and their drive for 
modernization and their dedication to the creation of a functioning, cohesive and all-inclusive 
state. These nationalist states would mobilize popular loyalties, manage their own affairs and 
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“stand on their own economic feet,” provide stable trading partners and cooperative diplomatic 
support for the United States.52 
Eisenhower was not alone in his appreciation of the importance of nationalist movements. 
John Moors Cabot, his first Undersecretary for inter-American Affairs, emphasized that when  
the ultra-nationalist talks of exploitation and colonialism and gutted national resources 
and unfair terms of trade, do not let us forget there are times when he is right…Do not let us 
reject his arguments with a contemptuous snort, but rather let us seek his understanding.53 
 
According to the recollections of one “top MNR leader,” the president's brother Dr. Milton 
Eisenhower “fell in love” with the cause of agrarian reform after visiting Bolivia in the summer 
of 1953, and wrote after completing his tour of the region of the need to destroy the Bolivian 
“feudal” oligarchy” in his report to the president.54 President Eisenhower, though highly 
enthusiastic about his brother's report and its general findings, worried that the initial draft’s 
passages criticising “ultra-nationalism” would “cause resentment” and should be removed to 
“save the feelings of our South American friends.”55 The OCB absorbed these concerns in its 
work, emphasizing that “we must constantly bear in mind the necessity for avoiding offense to 
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the strong nationalistic sentiments common to all segments of the MNR.”56 Though Milton 
Eisenhower had cautioned against the excesses of extreme nationalism, he also advised that 
regional nationalists had positive contributions to make. This force could be used to further 
“general adherence, even devotion, to the guiding principles of inter-American conduct.”57 
 Milton Eisenhower’s reference to the role of nationalism within the inter-American 
system demonstrates the core of the MNR’s appeal, and it was here that Bolivian diplomacy 
secured American assistance and friendship for the long haul. Bolivian diplomats, most notably 
Andrade, perceived there were issues beyond Cold War anticommunism and exclusion of the 
Soviet Union that could attract American diplomatic and financial support. 
 Andrade's account of Eisenhower's state of the union address in 1954, which had focused 
on U.S. attitudes towards communism, also identified other more important factors independent 
of the anticommunist crusade in securing U.S. aid. Andrade wrote to foreign Minister Walter 
Guevara:  
From our point of view, and aligning with our interests, there are certain indications that 
the president is thinking of continuing his policy of cooperation… The phrase of highest 
importance [was] 'the policy of friendship and mutual cooperation with all our American 
neighbors is a foundation stone of the foreign policy of the United States.'58 
Andrade felt that this sentiment, coupled with stated a desire to promote technical aid and 
Eisenhower's reference to using agricultural surpluses to support countries in “crisis situations,” 
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meant that Bolivia could expect further aid from the United States. Furthermore, Andrade's 
emphasis on Eisenhower's need for “congressional authorization” seems to suggest he 
understood the U.S. political context in a similar way to Eisenhower and his State Department.59 
Both Andrade and Eisenhower appreciated that the political climate in the United States 
demanded the framing of foreign aid policy as crisis management and therefore essentially short 
term. 
 But it was Andrade's speech at Denison University which perhaps most eloquently laid 
out his appreciation of alternative dynamics at work that would allow his government to appeal 
to US policymakers. Andrade called for the “unity of the hemisphere” in working towards a 
“constructive nationalism” that would follow the MNR's lead and “destroy reactionary forces.” 
Citing “the importance of the inter-American system,” as well as the growth of nationalism in the 
region, Andrade felt that Latin Americans would “have to help support the United States in the 
role of leader that destiny has imposed upon it.” He added “this is why South Americans will 
have to talk about the foreign policy of the United States as if it were their own.” Whilst the 
destiny of civilization seemed to ride upon this commitment, it also suggested a level of 
reciprocity from the United States.60 In private, while he emphasized the necessity of towing the 
line with American foreign policy, he also admitted that Bolivia had been able to push the 
boundaries of acceptable behavior and acquiescence to U.S. foreign policy, particularly the Cold 
War agenda.61 
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 Such a posture from the Bolivian government explains how it came to be accepted and 
embraced by the Eisenhower administration. Andrade, Guevara and the MNR leadership worked 
hard to emphasize the potential for the U.S. in supporting a popular nationalist revolution that, 
though infused with domestic Marxism and anti-imperialism, could still work in partnership with 
the U.S. on the international stage. Bolivia would furthermore serve as an example of the 
benefits of cooperation with the United States in nations seeking to modernize and develop their 
economies. Bolivians demonstrated this on numerous occasions, but always seemed to manage to 
preserve a surprising degree of independence while doing to. Bolivia's stance at the Caracas 
conference saw it ambivalently accepting the U.S. resolution on communism whilst still 
articulating an independent line on land reform.62 Accepting the label of “anticommunism” 
whilst doing little in practice to further the cause did not stop the administration from deepening 
its rhetorical and financial commitment to Bolivia. And as chapter six will show, the MNR 
managed to accept the need for compensation for nationalized mines while failing to provide it, 
and embracing the need for private capital investment whilst cementing state control of the vast 
majority of the Bolivian economy backed by U.S. soft loans. 
Eisenhower’s emotional outburst that the United States should “preach ultra-nationalism” 
to the Latin Americans raised some eyebrows at the 19 June, 1958 meeting of the NSC.63 John 
Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles spoke later that day on the telephone, concurring that they “did 
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not agree on what the pres[ident] said on [ultra-]nationalism.”64 Though officials throughout the 
administration recognised the importance of nationalism and the desirability of co-opting it, they 
were not prepared to accept political movements that were overtly challenging the United States 
and its desire to determine the bounds of acceptable behaviour within bilateral relations and the 
inter-American system.65 Thus “ultra-nationalism” was actually referred to with much disdain 
and hostility by policymakers at times, when they used it to refer to the passionate anti-
Americanism that often accompanied calls for greater national autonomy. Milton Eisenhower 
described the force as “a major retrogressive influence…with its blindness to true long-term 
interests” and resisted the president’s suggestion that his report’s “paragraph on ultra-
nationalism” be omitted, because “nationalistic laws of several countries are proving to be a 
serious deterrent to the flow of private capital.”66 Henry Holland too was highly critical of 
“extreme nationalism,” and the USIA felt it to be “inimical to US interests, along with 
neutralism, totalitarianism and racialism.67 Underlying these concerns was the potential for the 
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Soviets to exploit independent ultra-nationalism for their own designs, undermining the United 
States. 
The key to understanding Eisenhower’s seemingly incongruous outburst was his insistence 
that “the goals of their [Latin Americans’] nationalism can only be achieved in conjunction with 
us.” Though he saw nationalism, even “ultra-nationalism,” as a potential asset in America’s quest 
for global strength, nationalists could not be allowed to pursue independent goals to the point of 
challenging U.S. national interests. When the United States deemed its interests were at risk, all 
rhetoric surrounding the inter-American system, non-intervention and embracing change and 
progress to combat radicalism was quickly set aside.68 Policy towards Guatemala served as a 
prime example: policymakers recognised the destabilising impact of their interventionism, but 
felt that the U.S.’ “purpose should be to arrest the development of irresponsibility and extreme 
nationalism” and their proponents’ “belief in their immunity from the exercise of United States 
power.”69 To the CIA, if the Guatemalans were “unhappy about being in the US sphere of 
influence, they might be reminded that the US is the most generous and tolerant taskmaster 
going, that cooperating with it is studded with material rewards, and that the US permits much 
more sovereignty and independence in its sphere than the Soviets.”70 Demonstrating this 
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benevolent hegemony was something the administration tried to demonstrate in post-Arbenz 
Guatemala, and it was also a key component of Bolivia policy. 
 Andrade’s rhetoric on the necessity for “constructive nationalism” to work in concert 
with the U.S. and its regional system meshed tightly with ideas that held significant currency in 
the foreign policymaking bureaucracy and at the highest levels of the Eisenhower administration: 
the importance of nationalism and the necessity for the United States to strengthen its leadership 
of the “inter-American system.”71 The administration's acceptance of the MNR was not a 
pragmatic acknowledgement of its effective anticommunism at home, as others have argued, but 
a recognition that its domestic politics were not of concern as long as compliance with the inter-
American system was ensured. 
 
The “inter-American system” 
 
When Eisenhower entered the White House, his administration inherited a policy priority 
in Latin America: retaining its effective hegemonic presence in the region. Latin American 
nationalism presented itself as a dynamic force which had the potential to wreak havoc on what 
policymakers and officials dubbed the “regional,” “hemispheric” or “inter-American system.” 
Policymakers described this system principally as a cooperative diplomatic system, formalized in 
the OAS, to further U.S. foreign policy concerns, such as the exclusion of the Soviet Union and 
its agents from the hemisphere. Though bolstering the system’s effectiveness took on added 
significance in the face of growing global competition with the Soviet Union, this system of U.S. 
regional dominance was valued by policymakers, irrespective of the existence of superpower 
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conflict. Not only did U.S. officials demand close cooperation and loyalty from fellow American 
states, they also saw such cooperative relationships as a vehicle to propagate their values and 
their vision for development and political stability. Such developments would, they believed, 
provide for more stable allies in a country and a region that often seemed synonymous with 
political instability, economic weakness and hence unreliability.  
On 18 March, 1953 the NSC drafted a paper on the new administration’s Latin America 
policy: NSC 144/1. Though anticommunist concerns certainly pervade the document, to describe 
its analysis as “solely” within the Cold War framework is misleading.72 After a short preamble 
outlining the rise of regional nationalism and its accompanying calls for “immediate 
improvement” in living standards, the document sets out general regional objectives: 
a) Hemisphere solidarity in support of our world policies, particularly 
in the UN and other international organizations. 
b) An orderly political and economic development in Latin America so 
that states in the area will be more effective members of the 
hemisphere system and increasingly important participants in the 
economic and political affairs of the free world.73 
 
The paper goes on to mention anticommunist and military concerns, and opposition to 
communist influence in the hemisphere certainly pervades it. But the fact that the first two 
objectives listed fit within wider regional goals seems significant, and belies the blanket assertion 
that the United States was “solely” concerned with confronting the Soviet Union in Latin 
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America. The main policy goal of “hemisphere solidarity” was repeated in every declaration of 
policy objectives for the region issued by the administration.74 
NSC 144/1 concluded that, rather than a “disastrous…Policy of compulsion” or a “Policy 
of detachment,” the US should pursue a “Policy of cooperation.” This cooperative stance would 
help “to create a true hemisphere community, each nation contributing to the whole the best of 
its ability. At first, U.S. assistance would be required; later each country could do its full share 
and also assist the U.S.”75 
This desire to maintain U.S. hegemony was an agenda that both pre-dated and outlived the 
Cold War. As Eisenhower himself declared to his brother Milton, in South America he wanted 
“to establish a healthy relationship that will be characterized by mutual cooperation and which 
will permanently endure. This will apply whether or not the Communist menace seems to 
increase or decrease in intensity.”In Eisenhower’s eyes, South America was not “directly open to 
assault” from international communism. This contrasted with the situation in Asia, where 
Eisenhower argued the United States was “largely concerned with meeting a crisis...[if] the 
Communist menace should recede in the area, we would consider ourselves still friendly, but we 
would feel largely relieved of any obligation to help them economically or militarily.”76 
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In this analysis, Eisenhower displayed an affinity for the idea that America’s neighbours to 
the south occupied a special place in U.S. foreign policy, for their strategic location, strong 
economic ties to North America, supply of raw materials, and perceived “common values” with 
the United States.77 Latin America also provided a useful political bloc at the UN, though 
Washington continued to hold that the regional organization of the OAS took precedence over 
the UN when seeking to pass an anticommunist resolution that served as a de facto mandate to 
intervene in Guatemala.78 Various analyses of regional policy emphasise that attracting regional 
loyalties was crucial to reinforcing U.S. hegemony.79 The Randall Commission’s study of 
economic foreign policy concluded that “the inter-American system” was “one of the main 
achievements of American policy.” According to its analysis, “effective support of the system” 
and ensuring “adherence to it” was a “continuing objective of U.S. policy” that “constitute[d] 
one of our major political commitments.”80 
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 Policymakers perceived that the strength of the U.S.' special “healthy relationship” with 
Latin America was under threat in the 1950s, not just from communism but also from 
nationalism.81 In fact, Eisenhower felt that “world Communism is taking advantage of that spirit 
of nationalism,” and the NSC believed that the “growth of nationalism is facilitated by historic 
anti-U.S. prejudices and exploited by Communists.”82 After the disastrous Nixon visit to Latin 
America in 1958, even Allen Dulles conceded that “there would be trouble in Latin America 
even if there were no Communists.”83 Undersecretary of State C. Douglas Dillon agreed, arguing 
that “our foreign aid programs would exist even if Lenin had never been born.”84 Latin American 
nationalism was, in these renditions, a more fundamental cause of friction that was exacerbated 
by communists, not caused by them. These concerns were voiced well before the dramatic 
attacks on Nixon across the region in 1958, which seemed to some observers to be the catalyst 
for greater U.S. investment in Latin America.85 Eisenhower felt from the beginning that this 
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challenge had to be met by appealing to nationalists, even the MNR's “ultra” or “intense 
nationalism.” Though potentially dangerous and volatile, U.S. policymakers were ready to 
sympathize with and co-opt such movements as long as they were willing to submit to U.S. 
patronage and pay symbolic deference to its diplomatic concerns.  
 The idea that Bolivia might serve as an example to the region of U.S. benevolence was 
not just an afterthought or a rationalization for other calculations; it won converts in the U.S. 
press and within Bolivia. Andrade clearly believed this was an important part of how U.S. 
support was conceived and defended by the administration, and MNR diplomats noted with 
pleasure that U.S. journalists and academics believed that Bolivia was “the United States' answer 
to the charge” that “the US was considerably less opposed to totalitarianism on the right than 
communism.”86 
The MNR’s usefulness for promoting inter-American cohesion was of particular relevance 
for the administration at a time when the regional system was under increasing strain.  The post-
war hope of progressive Latin Americans that liberal democracies would spread faded as 
dictatorships seized power at the expense of leftist, nationalist and democratic regimes in Cuba 
(1952), Venezuela (1952), and Guatemala (1954). All three replacement leaders, Fulgencio 
Batista, Marcos Pérez Jiménez and Castillio Armas, were given U.S. political support and 
military aid. The shift towards support of dictatorships was calculated to strengthen pro-U.S., 
                                                 
U.S. reacting belatedly to Latin American nationalism, see Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, pp. 100, 134. 
Burton Kaufman sees strands of this policy shift developing earlier in the administration, around 1955-56. Burton I. 
Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1982). 
86Alexander, Andrade My Missions for Revolutionary Bolivia, Letter from Renán Castrillo to Guevara, 4 May 1954. 
Papers of Walter Guevara Arze, Box 9, Folder: Correspondencia Estados Unidos-Bolivia, Archivo y Biblioteca 





anti-communist regimes. As John Foster Dulles commented publically, Latin American dictators 
were “the only people we can depend on.”87 
The image created by Dulles’ statement or Pérez Jiménez receiving the Medal of Honor 
also caused disquiet amongst administration officials.88 Policymakers worried about their pro-
dictatorship image in Latin America and raised the problem repeatedly in NSC meetings and 
reports, often tinged with frustration that Latin Americans also demanded observance of non-
intervention by the United States.89 It seemed Bolivia policy could be useful in countering 
charges that the United States supported regional dictatorships and opposed reformists. To State 
Department officials, the Bolivian revolution presented the United States with “an opportunity 
for possible successful cooperation with a popular government, as distinguished from various 
dictatorial governments which we are accused of favoring.”90 This argument was echoed more 
forcefully by the Embassy in a message to the State Department five days later: 
The Bolivian situation presents a sharp choice…between support of a 
clearly nationalist, home-grown force determined to pull the nation out of 
its feudal condition or benevolence toward an old and brutal power 
structure that has kept the country in that condition.91 
                                                 
87Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 148. 
88 Smith, Talons of the Eagle, p. 131. 
89 Milton Eisenhower was “deeply disturbed” by the charge that the United States supported dictators. Milton 
Eisenhower’s Report to the President, 27 December, 1958, p. 5. DDEL, Milton Eisenhower Papers, 1938-1973, Box 
7, US-Latin American Relations; “Third Progress Report on NSC 144/1, United States Objectives and courses of 
Action with Regard to Latin America,” Report from OCB to NSC (via Staats), 28 May, 1954, p. 6. DDEL, White 
House Office, NSC Staff Papers, 1948-61, OCB Central File Series, Box 72, OCB91.4 Latin America (File#1) (5), 
p. 11; NIE-80-54, August 24, 1954, State Department paper on the “Tenth Inter-American Conference, March 
1954,” FRUS, 1952-54, vol. 4, pp. 381-2, 389. 
90 Office memo, Hudson to Atwood, 30 April 1953, NA, RG 59, Box 4607, 824.00/4-3053. The economic situation 
in Bolivia combined with the reality that the support of the United States was the only viable way to obtain 
substantial and stable aid. These facts defined the U.S.-Bolivian relationship, a view that is supported by James 
Siekmeier, Stephen Zunes and Rebecca Scott. 
91 Though the State Department felt the analysis to be somewhat hyperbolic, it was not rejected in substance. Quoted 






John Foster Dulles argued that holding back aid to Bolivia would have been interpreted as 
punishment of the revolution for nationalizing the tin mines. Dulles felt the threat “to the United 
States position in the Western Hemisphere which would be posed by the spectacle of United 
States indifference to the fate of another member of the Inter-American community” was 
significant and should be strenuously avoided.92 The revolution had already, as the State 
Department noted, “attracted the sympathetic attention of many of her Latin American 
neighbors, and any collapse in Bolivia would be widely believed to be the result of pressure by 
‘American Imperialism.’” This would cause a “very dangerous current propaganda situation, and 
one very dangerous for our future Latin American relations.”93 
 Such an image of U.S. hegemonic beneficence at work in Bolivia became almost cliché 
throughout the foreign policymaking apparatus. In 1959, the intelligence community described 
U.S. policies in Bolivia as having “sought to demonstrate that people in social revolutions can 
make effective gains through cooperation with the U.S.”94The idea that Bolivia might serve as an 
example to the region won converts amongst academics who advised on policy like Robert 
Alexander and Carter Goodrich. Victor Andrade also believed that aid to Bolivia had been 
designed to improve Eisenhower’s image as “a reactionary, inflexible Republican” and prove he 
“could support a revolution” that challenged a traditional Latin American oligarchy.95 
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The administration’s attempt to seize this opportunity therefore undermines the argument 
that “questioning the rule of elites would only,” in the minds of Washington officials, 
“destabilize Latin America and make it harder to foster an inter-American system.”96 In fact, the 
administration recognized that the inter-American system’s continued appeal depended on 
attracting exactly these kinds of nationalist, reformist and moderate movements. John Moors 
Cabot, Milton Eisenhower, William Hudson and the Embassy staff all argued that Bolivia could 
demonstrate that the United States was not a reactionary punisher of nationalism, as it appeared 
in Vietnam, Iran and Central America.97 
Milton Eisenhower believed that “rapid peaceful social change,” as advocated by the MNR, 
was “the only way to avert violent revolution in Bolivia,” which might very well have given “the 
Communists control.”98 Cabot argued that technical assistance programs demonstrated that “we 
do value [Bolivia’s] friendship,” and “want them to rise in the constellation of nations.” They 
also showed “the ignorant peon that communist propaganda is clap-trap and that democracy is 
the path of progress for the great mass of humanity.”99 These policymakers framed the stakes of 
Bolivia policy within the Cold War struggle with communist ideology, in the broadest possible 
terms of 'long-haul' ideological struggle with the Soviet Union. This framing was unavoidable 
given the wider political, and indeed strategic context of the 1950s. But the fact that the Cold 
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War context permeated foreign policy and domestic politics should not obscure how other 
agendas, such as maintaining U.S. hegemony in the Americas and placing the United States in 
the right side of history vis-à-vis third world nationalism and development, did not depend 
necessarily upon that Cold War competition. Moreover, the Cold War context most certainly did 
not mean that U.S. policy shied away from revolutionary change and the rhetoric of the left due 
to an a priori fear of global communist conspiracy. 
Similar to policy justifications using a Cold War lexicon, language emphasizing MNR 
moderation helped smooth the way toward greater support of the Bolivian government. But this 
emphasis on moderation also masked the revolutionary potential that observers in Foggy Bottom 
and the U.S. embassy in La Paz noted with excitement as a potential boon the future of Bolivia 
and a U.S.-Bolivian partnership.  
By supporting the MNR, the administration would show the United States could not only 
accept a reformist regime that was both nationalist and leftist, but could also bring real benefits 
to other developing nations if they were willing to follow Bolivia's example of pro-U.S. 
nationalism.  This was intended to attract the interest and sympathy of other Latin American 
nations, which would guide them towards similar friendship towards the United States and desire 
for foreign capital, thus cementing the inter-American system and ushering in what Milton 
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The MNR, despite possessing dedicated enemies and seeming in many ways similar to the 
agrarian reformers and Marxist collectivizers in the Arbenz government, avoided attracting U.S. 
reactionary opposition. Amidst the early turmoil of the Cold War, and with McCarthyism raging 
at home, U.S. officials sought to shore up their position in Bolivia by backing a regime that 
seemed the most stable and pro-U.S. for the foreseeable future. U.S. officials saw the source of 
that stability as rooted not in the MNR's essential conservatism, but in its ambitious program to 
transform a country that had witnessed more governments than years of existence. Bolivian 
diplomats helped create the impression in Washington that their government was led by popular 
revolutionaries seeking to transform Bolivia's fortunes whilst orientating its foreign policy 
towards Washington. Bolivian diplomats were ultimately successful because they demonstrated 
the profound nature of their revolution and their genuine nationalism to their U.S. counterparts. 
U.S. officials, eager to exploit the emerging force of third world nationalism and employ it to 
strengthen the inter-American system, were gratified to hear their own ideals and sense of 
purpose reflected back at them.  
The Bolivian revolution demonstrates that U.S. hegemony was flexible enough to 
incorporate a movement that consciously identified itself as inspired by Marxist ideology and 
Guatemalan land reform, as long as its leaders identified their revolution with the United States 
and its leadership of the hemisphere by symbolically accepting the anticommunist resolution at 
Caracas, the principle of compensation for expropriated properties and the desirability of seeking 
U.S. assistance in developing its economy. The fact that such a partnership was so rare is a 
testament to the United States' history of intervention and interference in Latin American affairs, 
making leftist movements reluctant if not overtly hostile to the notion of cooperation with such 













Guatemala: Testing the limits of the inter-American system 
 
The Eisenhower administration had proved to be remarkably flexible over Bolivia’s behavior 
within the inter-American system, but its response to the Guatemalan revolution demonstrated 
the essential nature of that system. The Arbenz government defied the U.S. by openly defending 
the proliferation of communist ideas and communist politicians in positions of power, against 
Washington’s explicit requests. This principled defiance continued long after the U.S. had 
decided Arbenz had to be removed, and if anything Guatemalan rhetoric started to intensify in 
the face of growing U.S. pressure. Arbenz welcomed communists into the governing coalition 
government in January 1953, and charged the U.S. with using anticommunist rhetoric to mask its 
economic imperialism on behalf of the interests of United Fruit, ironically confirming U.S. 
suspicions of communist influence in Guatemala in the process. Guatemala also cast the sole 
vote against an anti-communist resolution at the Organization of American States’ conference in 
Caracas: a resolution widely understood to provide a veneer of legality to an impending U.S. 
intervention. Barely three months later, Castillo Armas would lead a small contingent of armed 
exiles to invade Guatemala, given final permission by the CIA after Guatemala had been caught 
attempting to buy arms from Czechoslovakia. The invasion was no military threat on its own, but 
its tacit support from the U.S. led the Guatemalan military to demand Arbenz’ resignation, 
paving the way for Castillo Armas to take power and undo the reforms of the revolution.1 The 
CIA marveled at its power, Guatemala quickly fell off of Washington’s radar, and the country 
                                                 





returned to rule by a narrow set of economic and military elites who waged increasingly violent 
campaigns against the Guatemalan left for the remainder of the century. The democratic, 
redistributive and revolutionary hopes of the generation of 1944 had been shattered, and it would 
take until the 1990s and over 100,000 lives before the civil war born of the political conflicts 
fueled by the U.S. intervention would move towards resolution.2 
Or so the story goes. Yet this well-known narrative overlooks some important truths 
about U.S. policy towards Guatemala, whilst also demonstrating an important difference between 
the diplomatic positioning of Bolivia and Guatemala vis-à-vis their powerful Northern neighbor 
and its broader hemispheric agenda. The Arbenz government’s crime in the eyes of U.S. officials 
had its roots more in its uncompromising defiance of Washington and its vision of the inter-
American system, and less in preoccupation with the Cold War and dogmatic anticommunism. 
By examining the Caracas conference through the eyes of Bolivian diplomats, it becomes clear 
how the MNR government’s approach to the United States was fundamentally different from 
Guatemala’s, even as the MNR embraced common cause with the Arbenz government on land 
reform and expressed no small degree of skepticism regarding U.S. aims at Caracas. 
Furthermore, contrary to the charges of the Arbenz government and many historians, U.S. 
officials did not understand their role in promoting the Castillo Armas regime as meaning they 
supported the forces of reaction. Nor did they view his regime as merely a tool to secure a 
climate suitable for foreign capital investment.3 The Eisenhower administration, State 
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department and Congress, did not demand a return to business as usual.  They recognized the 
importance of Guatemalan nationalism, indeed “leftist nationalism,” and sought to yoke these 
important political forces to the now more compliant Castillo Armas government. They 
continued to hold out hope that Castillo Armas could be a unifying, “middle of the road” 
nationalist who would modernize the Guatemalan economy whilst remaining respectful of U.S. 
hegemony, a role similar to the one that many U.S. officials had initially hoped that Arbenz 
might have played in 1950 or that presidents Paz and Siles would occupy in Bolivia.  
Their hopes were spectacularly misconceived. Leftist nationalists would never forget the 
injustice of Arbenz’ downfall and the illegitimacy of the Castillo Armas presidency. Indeed, a 
young medical student who was in Guatemala City at the time of the Castillo Armas coup was so 
incensed by the U.S.’ actions that he dedicated his life to inspiring a new generation of left-wing 
revolutionaries. He sought to promote social justice whilst explicitly rejecting U.S. hegemony as 
an enemy of third world nationalism and better, fairer ways of organizing society. His name was 
Ernesto “Che” Guevara.  
But despite Washington’s misconceptions that Arbenz’ non-communist allies could be 
won over to cooperate with Castillo Armas and a pro-U.S. government, such attitudes draw into 
focus the real nature of the inter-American system in the eyes of U.S. officials. They also bring 
into focus the real limits of that system. Understanding that vision helped Bolivia obtain U.S. 
support whilst still advocating for many of the same political projects that Arbenz had. It also 
refocuses our attention on Latin American diplomacy as an important influence in shaping U.S. 
policy and the nature of U.S. hegemony.  
 






In 1950 Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzman ran to succeed Juan José Arévalo as president of 
Guatemala and inheritor of the revolutionary legacy of 1944. Arévalo’s program of “spiritual 
socialism” had also emphasized Guatemalan nationalism: what he would later define as “customs 
barriers, independent industry, protection of the native citizen, exaltation of creole life; and also 
just prices for raw materials…insistence on commercial equality, defense of our money, 
reciprocity, respect, dignity.”4  
By the late 1940s, Arévalo had already made important enemies. The United Fruit 
Company opposed his legislation on organized labor and road building campaigns as inimical to 
their rail monopoly and profit margins. And the Truman administration had become increasingly 
concerned by Arévalo’s efforts to spread revolution by equipping and sheltering pro-democracy 
exiles attempting to overthrow dictatorships in Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic, in an 
effort U.S. journalists would label “the Caribbean Legion.”5 The US State Department White 
Paper justifying the overthrow of the Guatemalan revolution years later would cite this 
“campaign of assassination” aided and abetted by Arévalo as justification for the overthrowal of 
Arbenz.6 Guatemala had chosen an independent and destabilizing approach to inter-American 
affairs that was deeply troubling to the State Department. Furthermore, there were the inevitable 
aspersions cast about Arévalo’s attitudes towards communism given his embrace of “socialism,” 
spiritual or otherwise. Although the State Department complained about radical and communist 
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influence within the Guatemalan government, Arévalo had refused to remove these people from 
power.7  
In 1950, Arévalo’s term came to an end, and Guatemala held new presidential elections. 
The State Department reflected that “[f]or several years there has been developing in Guatemala 
a situation which the Department has viewed with concern. Excessive nationalism, manifested by 
a hostile attitude toward private U.S. companies” combined with “an enigmatic and crusading 
President” and communist penetration of government to cause friction in relations with the 
United States. “We could have been concerned with any tendency towards excessive nationalism 
in Guatemala,” the report continued, “but we are the more deeply concerned because the 
Communists have been able to distort this spirit to serve their own ends.”8 Much like 
Eisenhower, U.S. officials distinguished between ultra-nationalism and radical leftism, but 
worried that Arévalo’s “excessive” and anti-American nationalism could be exploited by the 
communists.9 
 When considering Arévalo’s potential successors, officials at the Embassy and State 
Department felt Colonel Arbenz a likely and not unwelcome prospect. A military figure 
committed to the Guatemalan nationalist revolution, there were initial hopes that he might prove 
more amenable to a rapprochement with Washington. U.S. diplomats welcomed Arbenz's 
apparent role in the banning of the Communist publication Octubre, and in causing Manuel Pinto 
Usaga and José Manuel Fortuny (“communists and outspoken enemies of the United States”) to 
resign from the Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR) in the run-up to the election. Embassy 
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officials “believed that Arbenz insisted that campaign speeches be less anti-American and less 
pro-communist.” State Department bureaucrats at the Latin America desk argued that, with the 
transition of the 1950 elections “Guatemala is now beginning to take serious cognizance of the 
communist problem,” in part due to “Cuban and Costa Rican pressure... to dissociate [the] 
Government from the communists.”10  
In a later cable, the Chargé of the Embassy Milton Wells argued that Washington could 
afford “restrained optimism as to the long range policies of the coming Arbenz regime.” Wells 
made allowances for Arbenz, arguing that Washington could not “logically” expect “effective 
steps toward curbing the influence of communists” given the immediate political climate and 
necessity for less divisive political stance going into an election.11 But at heart, Wells judged 
Arbenz to be a “realist,” “rather than a devotee of ideological principles.”12 Even as late as 
October 1952, a CIA report argued that Arbenz could still be convinced to cooperate with the 
United States: “although President Arbenz appears to collaborate with the Communists and 
extremists…he personally does not agree with the economic and political ideas of the 
Guatemalan or Soviet Communists.” Arbenz's ideas seemed to stem “from the US New Deal” 
and “FDR is his personal idol.”13 
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Arbenz’s association with communism, clear and worrying to some in Congress, the State 
Department and the Press, was still unclear to many U.S. officials in the early 1950s. 
Undersecretary of State James E. Webb even went so far as to claim that there were “no 
communists in Guatemala” as Arbenz came to power.14 Like early analyses of Fidel Castro, the 
degree of communist influence on him and his government was unclear in the initial years to 
many in Washington: it was only after the U.S. attempted to overthrow these leaders using Cold 
War rationales that this narrative became entrenched and universally accepted in official 
thinking.15 But back during 1950-52, though Arbenz was denouncing domestic anticommunists 
and “foreign interests” (United Fruit), using similar rhetoric to the PGT, the Embassy also 
described Arbenz as advocating “capitalist” and “progressive” stances, and welcoming foreign 
capital.16 
These analyses of Arbenz’ tolerable, pragmatic non-communist leftism seem remarkably 
similar to rhetoric surrounding the Bolivian president, a figure who was initially much more 
worrying to US observers than Arbenz as president. Both had ideological affinity for Marxism, 
but the State Department emphasized that the MNR contained pro-capitalist and moderate 
inclinations also. Paz and fellow MNR leaders, like Arbenz, seemed to be “calculating and 
primarily interested in political survival.” But unlike Arbenz, Paz had calculated that political 
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survival was “dependent upon economic survival, and economic survival is dependent on the 
United States. Hence, the foreseeable future for Bolivia in the eyes of practical politicians must 
be linked to the United States and not the Soviet Union.”17 Paz agreed with their analysis: 
arguing to a crowd of supporters in La Paz “we need dollars for our subsistence.”18  
The similarities between the two movements did not end there. Both, channeling Marx, 
advocated land reform to transform their countries from the “feudal” to the “modern and 
capitalist.”19 Both nationalized U.S.-owned property. Both demonstrated tolerance of 
communists, though the Guatemalans were initially much more reluctant than the MNR to 
engage in a clampdown on their opponents to the right in the press.20 Both explicitly saw their 
revolutions as anti-imperialist and as inspiration for others, and sought to promote the spread of 
revolution, land reform, and rights for indigenous Latin Americans through word and deed.  
Yet, as this dissertation has argued, these political goals were not necessarily at odds with 
U.S. hegemony. Leftist nationalism provoked some ambivalence, and worries for the U.S., to be 
sure.  In 1950 charge d’affairs Milton Wells maintained that “even should the communists 
disappear from the governmental scene, leftist nationalism would... remain to carry forward the 
1944 revolution, and, no doubt, will produce its quota of problems for United States-Guatemalan 
                                                 
17 Memorandum from Sparks to the Department of State, 27 January, 1953, NA, Central Decimal File, RG 59, Box 
3310, 724.001/1-2754, pp. 4-5. 
18 El Diario, 8 January 1953, p. 6. 
19 “Discursos del Doctor Juan Jose Arévalo y del Teniente Coronel J. arbenz G. en el acto del transmission de la 
presidencia de la Republica,” 15 March 1951, p. 26. Archivo General de Centro América, Memorias, legación 1183. 
20 Rowell to State, 2 January 1953, NA RG 59, Box 3309, 724.00 (W)/1-253. Rowell noted “Further evidence that 
communist and communist-line activities have no fear of official suppression.” Thomas Mann to Ambassador Nufer, 
18 July 1951, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 3248, 714.001/7-1851. Arbenz would later restrict the opposition press, but 





relations”21 But leftist nationalism also excited many officials as an important world historical 
force and important ally, both in the Cold War and in U.S. efforts to maintain its hemispheric 
leadership.22 
Though both Guatemala and Bolivia wanted to spread revolution, land reform and social 
democracy across the region, the ways they went about achieving these aims were markedly 
different. Their diplomatic approaches demonstrated a crucial difference in their attitudes 
towards the United States and its position as hegemonic arbiter of acceptable behavior within the 
inter-American system. Thus it was not merely “simplified” U.S. “attributions” of intent to these 
movements, but concrete differences within their diplomatic approach to U.S. power that 
determined how the Eisenhower administration would react to revolutionaries in Guatemala and 
Bolivia.23 These differences were clear at the tenth inter-American conference at Caracas, where 
the Bolivians and Guatemalans would embrace similar causes, but articulate their support for 
those causes in very different ways.  
 
 
Overthrowing Arbenz: Caracas and the Inter-American system 
 
Despite some initial enthusiasm for the incoming president, Arbenz quickly disappointed 
the U.S. officials. His landmark land reform, enacted by presidential decree 900, distributed large 
plots of uncultivated land to landless tenant farmers, in a country where 2.2 percent of the 
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population owned 70 percent of the land. 24 In doing so Arbenz clashed with the U.S. corporation 
United Fruit, which controlled vast swathes of Guatemala’s arable land and kept much of it 
fallow. Lobbied intensively by United Fruit, the U.S. government became increasingly worried 
by the presence of communists within the Arbenz administration, and put increasing pressure on 
Arbenz to distance himself from what they saw as dangerous radicals that might begin to pave 
the way towards Soviet influence in Guatemala.  
On point of principle, the Guatemalan government rejected the very notion that the 
United States had any business in determining the path of its domestic reforms or the internal 
political dynamics of its governance: principles that were supposedly enshrined in the Good 
Neighbor Policy, and the OAS charter agreed upon in Bogota in 1948.25 U.S. officials were less 
interested in these points of principle, and more concerned with the Guatemalan refusal to take 
seriously their anxieties regarding the influence of communism as a potential vehicle for 
encroaching Soviet influence. The Guatemalan government was unwilling to accept the basic 
premise of what was at stake for the U.S. This meant the revolution could not be seen as a 
responsible member of the U.S.-led inter-American system.  
The Guatemalans were intent on trying to articulate a different version of pan-
Americanism, one that rejected anticommunism as a cover for right-wing governments 
committed to silencing dissent and pressure for redistributive reform, and one increasingly 
independent from the United States. Arbenz had sought to use the Central American regional 
organization, ODECA (the Organización de Estados Centroamericanos) to promote the values 
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and policies of the revolution: democracy, land reform; and to advocate for the promotion of a 
more independent foreign policy line seeking a common “definition of aggression.”26 
Guatemala’s goals for ODECA proved difficult to achieve, given that countries such as 
Nicaragua and Honduras continued to be ruled by right wing military governments allied to the 
United States and hostile to Guatemala’s land reform. Potential allies in democratic Costa Rica 
also proved elusive, with President Jose Figueres in Costa Rica reluctant to align himself with 
measures that might destabilize the region.27 Frustrated by the lack of traction in the 
organization, the Arbenz government decided to withdraw from ODECA in April 1953. This 
decision stuck in the memory of Eisenhower, and is a principal reason he gave in his memoirs for 
the decision to oppose Arbenz.28 Guatemala was disengaging from regional organizations on 
terms that the United States saw as directly challenging of its agenda and leadership. 
In the weeks after the Guatemalan withdrawal from ODECA John Moors Cabot, 
Undersecretary of State for inter-American affairs and keen supporter of the Bolivian revolution, 
visited Guatemala and had an audience with President Arbenz. He made the U.S. position plain 
to the president, explaining,   
I am not trying to interfere in your internal affairs but you have got to make a choice. 
You have either to cooperate with us or you can cooperate with communism, but you 
cannot do both. If you want any cooperation from us you have to make a clean break with 
the communists and no fooling.  
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Communism had become the sticking point in relations between the two countries, and “it was 
quite clear that he was not prepared to make that choice at the present time,” as Cabot explained 
to Congress on May 22nd upon his return. And yet, Cabot insisted that “the situation is not 
hopeless although it is very bad.” He elaborated, echoing other State Department officials:  
There is rather complete Communist infiltration and strong Communist influence in all 
government decisions. There is close friendship between the president and the 
communists. There is strong intellectual domination in the government of communist 
ideas. It is a bad situation. Yet, the President and the cabinet are not communist, and I 
presume the government could still kick the commies out, if it chose to.”29 
 
Arbenz was not a communist, but he was publically defying U.S. requests to distance 
himself from the communists. His crimes were not those of a dissembling communist shill, but 
of a principled nationalist who refused to accept the U.S. vision of the inter-American system.30 
Anti-communism had to be accepted in principle, especially when the United States insisted 
upon it. But this was not a case of a confusion of nationalism and communism, but an 
articulation of how one could be manipulated by the other.31 
Given his perceptions of the Arbenz government’s intransigently independent attitude, 
Eisenhower instructed the CIA to begin planning to remove Arbenz in the summer of 1953.32 
This decision was a serious step, and marked how far relations had collapsed between the two 
countries. But this decision was not irreversible and there was much in the diplomatic realm still 
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to play for. Much as with the administration’s attitudes towards Castro during 1959, 
policymakers saw clear differences between the non-communist nationalism of Arbenz, and 
though his government seemed dangerously susceptible to communist influence, he still had the 
potential to alter course. 
The U.S. sought to implement an anticommunist resolution at the inter-American 
conference scheduled for Caracas in March, 1954. The administration did this to send a clear 
message to the Guatemalans, particularly the military, which had already defeated an abortive 
exiles invasion at Salamá the previous year: the United States was willing to use its considerable 
power to bring about a change in government in Guatemala. The new resolution also gave the 
United States, in the view of its diplomats, a modicum of legality and legitimacy whilst 
enforcing regional solidarity behind any upcoming change in Guatemala’s government. 
The Bolivian government understood the stakes at Caracas. Foreign Minister Guevara 
argued to his colleagues that the Eisenhower administration saw the Arbenz government’s 
refusal to hove to the US line on communism represented a “test of inter-American regionalism,” 
which would in turn have implications for the U.S.’ other regional defense organizations, such as 
SEATO.33 Yet at the same time, the Bolivian Foreign Ministry wanted to emphasize to the rest of 
the world that Bolivia could “contribute to the inter-American system.” The U.S. demanded 
adherence to its hegemonic leadership, and its desire to police acceptable behavior within it, but 
the Bolivians still saw an opening for pan-American diplomacy “helping to foster democratic 
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institutions,” “social justice” and “individual liberty.”34 And there might even be possibility of 
aligning with the Guatemalan government at Caracas in order to achieve this. 
Some accounts of the MNR’s relationship to the Arbenz regime emphasize that the 
Bolivian government was largely isolated from the Guatemalan revolution. These narratives hold 
that the MNR sought common cause with Guatemala only briefly in March and April of 1953 as 
a product of “frustration” with the United States. At that time Washington was proving unwilling 
to grant aid and a more comprehensive tin contract, and the MNR was becoming increasingly 
desperate for funds.35 But identification and cooperation with the Guatemalans went beyond 
temporary frustration or as a negotiation tactic. The MNR sought identification with the 
Guatemalan revolution from the first moments of the revolution to the last months of the Arbenz 
administration, and displayed this enthusiasm at the Caracas conference even as it voted for the 
anticommunist resolution that would help undermine the Guatemalan government.36 
During preparations for the conference the Bolivian foreign ministry was well aware of 
regional sympathies for the Guatemalan government in the face of a U.S.-backed anticommunist 
resolution designed to undermine Guatemala’s position in the region. The Ministry asked its 
ambassadors in neighboring countries to “find out discreetly” if other governments supported 
Guatemala, and if so could they contemplate supporting the Guatemalans at Caracas?37 The 
Cabinet and Foreign Ministry also discussed the likely domestic political fallout, particularly 
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from organized labor, should the Bolivians be seen to be cooperating with the U.S. against 
Guatemala.38   
Reflecting on Washington’s briefing papers sent to the Bolivian government in the run-up 
to the conference, Walter Guevara summarized the thinking of the Cabinet and the Foreign 
Ministry.39 These papers from the Eisenhower administration outlined the need of a resolution 
providing for OAS intervention should any nation in the hemisphere be subject to “communist 
infiltration.” The definition of “communist infiltration” was very unclear to the Foreign Ministry 
and the Cabinet: a problem that would be made clear during the conference itself. But beyond 
discomfort at the broad remit behind such vaguely-crafted treaty language, the Foreign Ministry 
recognized the clear U.S. “preoccupation” with the military power of Guatemala. This 
preoccupation “did not seem to have sufficient relation to the problem of communist 
infiltration.” To Guevara, the US’ worries over the “preponderance” of Guatemalan power in 
Central America were “very much linked to the problems, difficulties and differences of political 
orientation” and had “no relation to communist infiltration.”40 
What Guevara meant by “differences of political orientation” is unclear. Perhaps he 
meant that Guatemala’s crime had less to do with Soviet encroachment in the hemisphere (i.e. 
“communist infiltration”) and more to do with political differences between the United States 
and Guatemala over domestic policy. Yet these political differences, which U.S. officials also 
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clearly identified between the U.S. and Bolivia, did not stop the Bolivian government from being 
accepted and even embraced by Washington.41  
The unclear wording of the resolution and its disproportional treatment of Guatemalan 
behavior certainly did its part to cause confusion over the true motivations of the United States, 
but its more sinister implications were clear. Washington would not tolerate Guatemalan 
attempts to defy and discredit the U.S. The Eisenhower administration warned of danger of 
having the Soviets “deprive [Guatemala] of its independence” to the point where it will “become 
subordinated to the international communist conspiracy to achieve world domination through 
violence and subversion.”42 Months later, exiles recruited, funded, armed and supported by the 
U.S. would use violence and subversion to overthrow the democratically elected Arbenz 
government and carry out summary executions of political activists and labor leaders following 
his removal. 
At the Conference itself, the anticommunist resolution dominated proceedings. The 
Guatemalan Foreign Minister, and former ambassador to the United States Guillermo Toriello 
Garido, gave an impassioned address that openly charged the United States with trying to 
undermine their government. The Guatemalan foreign minister “said many things some of the 
rest of us would like to say if we dared,” according to one delegate’s confession to a New York 
Times reporter.43 Toriello went on to dismantle the intellectual premise behind the 
anticommunist resolution. He charged that Washington’s invocations of the right to intervene in 
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sovereign nations to prevent the encroachment of “communism,” loosely defined, in practice 
served as a mask for U.S. imperialism.44 Toriello worried that the resolution “might be intended 
to fight...nationalism” and frustrate the “struggle for independence.” Appealing to his fellow 
Latin Americans, he warned that this might be used to justify interventions to prevent 
“establishing diplomatic or commercial relations with the Soviet Union, anti-imperialism, the 
struggle against economic privilege, control of natural resources...the fight for peace, social and 
union movements or the expropriation of oil, tin, copper or land.”45 
Dulles found it “worrying” that a Latin American foreign minister could pose such a 
question as to trying to define the nature of “international communism,” and decried Toriello's 
“injurious attack” on the United States (to which Toriello replied Guatemala was a “friend of the 
United States,” and that he had only attacked the monopolistic practices of the United Fruit 
Company).46 In the minds of US policymakers, they were more than capable of supporting Latin 
American nationalism and reform. Any Guatemalan attempt to criticize US policy as supportive 
of reactionary oligarchies and imperialism, especially in the forum of the OAS, added weight to 
the interpretation that Arbenz was a dangerous and destabilizing force in the hemisphere system. 
As Undersecretary of State John Moors Cabot explained, though the Guatemalans were 
nationalists with their own agenda, they had never-the-less “play[ed] the Russian game.”47 
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In fact, Guatemala’s critiques of U.S. power as complicit with exploitative corporations 
and imperialism seemed to suggest that the Arbenz government had bought into Soviet and 
communist propaganda and its arguments against US power in the region.  Toriello seemed to 
have fulfilled the predictions of Thomas Corcoran, United Fruit's PR director and former brain 
truster for FDR, who had emphasized: “whenever you read 'United Fruit' in Communist 
propaganda you may readily substitute 'United States.'“48 The administration was keen to reject 
close association with United Fruit, and in fact Eisenhower decided to proceed with antitrust 
hearing against United Fruit even before the coup took place.49 To equate U.S. interests with the 
forces of reaction, the business interests of specific companies, or even as a challenge to “the 
very foundations of Pan-Americanism” was to confront administration officials with an image 
they not only rejected, but one that undermined the intellectual underpinnings of their project for 
the entire region in a manner not dissimilar from Communist propaganda.50 
Thus Toriello’s speech, though widely popular throughout Latin America, intellectually 
compelling, symbolically powerful and in many ways poignantly prescient, represented a 
diplomatic failure. According to the Guatemalan opposition paper El Imparcial and commentator 
Clemente Marroquin Rojas, Toriello showed “unnecessary belligerence” at Caracas, and though 
he was given a hero's welcome and might have appeared “macho,” his intransigence was “bad 
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form,” “bad politics” and “bad diplomacy.”51 Even the Mexican Communist Party chided their 
Guatemalan counterparts for poor tactical decisions before the conference: their “childish 
squabbles with vast American interests” were counter-productive. To the Mexican Communists 
it seemed the Guatemalans should play a subtler, more hard-headed game in subverting 
American imperialism.52 
With promises of U.S. aid in return for support, the resolution passed 17-1. There were 
two abstentions from Argentina and Mexico, countries more willing and able to turn down U.S. 
economic incentives to provide a yes vote.53 Though the Guatemalan failure seemed complete, 
recent scholarship has begun to question the meaning of the vote. All but three Latin American 
nations initially had opposed the U.S. resolution, which called for “appropriate action” in the 
face of “ideological intervention,” until its language could be substantially altered. The final 
draft only authorized a “meeting of consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action,” 
suggesting to many Latin American delegates that interventionism had not been enabled or 
legitimized by their vote.54 This semantic battle certainly allowed face-saving on behalf of Latin 
American delegates, but to observers in the the United States, their victory was clear. The 
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resolution it fought for and that clearly targeted the Guatemalan government had been 
approved.55 
The Bolivians understood the U.S. agenda at Caracas, and the mentatilty that lay behind 
it. The Bolivian delegation, led by Foreign Minister Walter Guevara Arze, chose a different 
approach to the defiance of the Guatemalans. Guevara agreed with Toriello’s critique of the 
anticommunist resolution, but he was more circumspect in his articulation of that critique. In his 
final speech at the conference he gingerly avoided trying to provide a precise definition of 
communism.56 Defining communism had absorbed much of the delegates' time during the 
conference, and both Guatemala and Bolivia had expressed fears that reactionaries would use 
anticommunism as a “pretext” for further “oppression,” which would “impede the economic and 
social development of peoples fighting for their internal liberation.”57 Though Guevara was 
unwilling to go as far as Guatemala and tie these forces of oppression directly to the United 
States, in the OAS he decried the tendency of the Bolivian oligarchy to “pretend to defend 
democracy from Nazi fascism and communism” whilst they allowed oligarchs to amass great 
fortunes and subject the Bolivian people to “the most inhumane domestic exploitation and the 
most disgraceful international deceit.” By this Guevara meant the attempt to “internationalize” 
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the tin mines and get American investors on the books in order to prevent nationalization of the 
mines or provoke U.S. intervention.58 
 Guevara was willing, however, to make a crucial distinction between “international 
communism” and “genuinely progressive social and political movements of the continent.”59 
International communism conspicuously “renounced nationality” and was ultimately interested 
in its own agenda “rather than solving the problems of the country it is in.”60 Progressive 
movements, “conceived on a nationalist basis,” represented for Guevara and his government the 
best “middle path” between reactionary stagnation the millenarian promises of international 
communism. Progressive nationalism also provided the best method of addressing the “causes 
that made international communism a threat,” to Latin American sovereignty: namely 
“underdevelopment.”61  
Guevara was again tapping into the language and rhetoric that provoked “visible 
excitement” from U.S. officials and the Eisenhower administration: the need to support third 
world nationalism, economic development and social reform, even revolution, to shore up the 
inter-American system. Leftist nationalists could fulfill this role as well as rightist nationalists in 
the eyes of U.S. officials.62 If the US could engage with and nurture these powerful forces, it 
could develop the “healthy relationship” Eisenhower, his advisors and the State Department 
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sought.63 The MNR leadership understood this, and not only cultivated personal relationships, 
but conscientiously framed their revolutionary projects in ways that would make them seem 
ambitious and radical, but also responsible, and amenable to US hegemony.  
Bolivia wanted the 10th Inter-American conference to “condemn feudal regime[s] in the 
agrarian economy” and Guatemala seconded the proposal, seeking a resolution to “liberate the 
peasants.” Bolivia and Guatemala proclaimed themselves to be “united on the goal of land 
reform,” and proposed that the OAS consider setting up a body of technical experts to advise 
member states on land reform projects. The Bolivian and Guatemalan governments called for 
“solidarity” and “unit[y]” in reaching the “final goal” of land reform and asked the OAS to 
“condemn the feudal regime in the agrarian economy” and “liberate the peasants.”64 At the heart 
of their critique was the observation that land and wealth were concentrated in the hands of a few 
economic elites, who as a result wielded inordinate political and economic power in their 
respective countries. But whilst the Guatemalans advocated outright expropriation, Bolivian 
proposals were much vaguer. The MNR government recommended member states do everything 
possible to “implement systems of agrarian reform,” adapting this principle to “their particular 
characteristics” in order to modernize their societies and economies.65 
The united front on land reform was remarkable. Land reform was the very issue that had 
sparked renewed and intensive U.S. interest in the position of communism in Guatemala. And 
both Guatemala and Bolivia articulated the need for land reform in strikingly Marxist language. 
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Yet the United States did not react, in part because of the Bolivians’ softer framing of their 
agenda, but also in part because land reform in and of itself was no bad thing.  
The MNR leadership, in its 'semi-official ' newspaper La Nación, made it clear during 
their “propaganda campaign” in the US that they wished to spread revolutionary ideals “by 
example” whilst “respecting sovereignty.”66 Modifiers like these made the MNR seem more 
responsible members of the hemispheric system to the likes of Milton Eisenhower, who 
exhibited “extraordinary understanding and sympathy” for the MNR and unbridled enthusiasm 
for its program of land reform.67  
Arbenz did not believe such enthusiasm was possible, seeing US hegemony as dominated 
by the desire to support US monopolies seeking to quash Guatemalan economic nationalism, and 
sought to continue to support efforts to create more democratic, prosperous and just societies 
covertly and overtly, but outside of U.S. auspices. As U.S. National Intelligence Estimate 84 
observed in May 1953, the Arbenz government “frequently [took] occasion to demonstrate its 
independence of US leadership and in general has been less cooperative than could be desired, 
particularly in hemispheric affairs.”68  
Arbenz’s government underestimated the potential reach of U.S. hegemony, but also 
misunderstood its basic purpose. The United States demanded symbolic deference to its 
leadership within the regional system, and Arbenz failed to satisfy this requirement. In fact, his 
government increasingly represented an outright challenge to Washington’s narratives about the 
nature of the Cold War and the community of interest in the Western hemisphere. One 
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Guatemalan government official told New York Herald-Tribune journalist A. T. Steele that 
“communism is your problem, not ours.” 69 In such a climate, Arbenz’ refusal to eject 
communists from his governing coalition presented a strong challenge to U.S. hegemony. After 
the communists entered coalition government in January 1953, Arbenz proceeded to lead the 
Guatemalan parliament in a minute’s silence for the death of Stalin, withdrew from ODECA, and 
rejected the right of the United States to interfere with national sovereignty and the “will of the 
people” whilst castigating its subservience to the United Fruit Company.70 Guatemalan Vice 
President Estrada believed “if we are called communists because our principles are derived from 
the popular will, then it is not our fault.”71  
Such attitudes betrayed the fact that the Guatemalan government did not respect U.S. 
views on communism within the inter-American system, which in turn displayed a lack of 
respect for the United States as the arbiter of acceptable behavior in the region. The Guatemalan 
government seemed remarkably unconcerned at the prospect of U.S. intervention until very late 
in the day, according to the Mexican Communist party, Guatemalan newspaper El Imparcial and 
journalist Clemente Marroquin Rojas. As the purpose of the United States became clear Arbenz 
did make some efforts to placate Washington. Arbenz tried to explain to the ambassador 
Puerifoy that “there were some Communists in his Government…but they were ‘local’…[They] 
followed Guatemalan not Soviet interests. They went to Moscow…merely to study Marxism, not 
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necessarily to get instructions.”72 Given Guatemala’s continued defiance of direct requests from 
the U.S., these explanations very late in the day were insufficient to alter U.S. perceptions. The 
Bolivians, sensitive to the travails of non-recognition the MNR government had suffered in the 
1940s, anticipated this problem and addressed it to a much greater extent, albeit more 
rhetorically than substantively.73 
The Bolivian and Guatemalan governments shared broadly similar political views, and 
sought to use the OAS to spread those views. The two governments articulated common interests 
on land reform, the dangers of a loosely defined anticommunist resolution, critiques of 
imperialism, and shared a skepticism of U.S. policy at Caracas. Yet whilst the Guatemalans 
chose principled defiance of U.S. hegemony, the Bolivians demonstrated loyalty towards the 
United States and its desire for regional leadership whilst still pursuing their revolution.  
 
After Arbenz: US hegemony, land reform and leftist nationalism 
 
 
The Eisenhower administration had confronted Arbenz’ intransigent nationalist 
independence because it worried his politics might become a vehicle for communist subversion, 
but more importantly because they already posed as a direct challenge to Washington’s 
hemispheric leadership. The Guatemalans had raised some uncomfortable charges against the 
United States, charges that helped convince U.S. policymakers that Arbenz was in thrall to the 
communists. However, these charges needed addressing by U.S. policy which, going forward, 
would try to demonstrate the benevolence of its hegemony and reassert values that were more 
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comforting to themselves. Guatemala would provide the United States with a blank slate, an 
opportunity to modernize Guatemala’s society and economy. In their undertaking of this project 
they hoped, vainly, to attract the support of non-communist leftist nationalists in Guatemala. This 
effort in Guatemala was markedly similar in intent to they were attempting in Bolivia, albeit 
from a very different starting point. 
 Explaining the U.S.’ reasoning in the weeks before the fall of Arbenz, Undersecretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland told Bolivian Ambassador Andrade that “if 
Guatemala paid the United Fruit Company tomorrow the full amount claimed by that company 
as compensation for the properties of which it had been deprived, the views and proposals of the 
United States… would not change one iota.” Communism was “separate and apart from the 
question of the protection of private foreign investment in the Hemisphere.” Andrade accepted 
the “extreme seriousness” of the situation, but emphasized that “collective corrective action 
would be extremely difficult for his Government and would create delicate and dangerous 
internal problems” given the unpopularity of U.S. interventionism amongst the Bolivian public, 
politically influential and armed miners’ unions. Andrade insisted that Bolivia needed a “positive 
program” to combat communism aimed at “improving the conditions of life for the under 
privileged groups of the world.” Holland agreed.74 
 Weeks later, at the same time Castillo Armas was entering into Guatemala to overthrow 
the government, Holland’s colleague at the State Department’s American Republics desk, Robert 
Woodward, wrote a memorandum on the State Department’s plans for Guatemala’s future. In it 
Woodward emphasized that “the great mass of people want some form of agrarian reform to 
                                                 
74 Memcon Andrade, Topping, Holland, 3 June 1954, NARA, CDF, RG 59, LOT FILES, Bureau of Inter-American 






continue… this is the issue above all others which will shape the Guatemalan people’s support 
for the new government.” Whilst the U.S. did not endorse Arbenz’ decree 900, it should “express 
in strong terms that the U.S. is in sympathy with genuine agrarian reform and is willing to help 
Guatemala work out their [sic] problems.”75 Though unwilling to acknowledge the “genuine” 
achievements of increased productivity and land under cultivation after Arbenz’ widespread 
redistribution of land titles to individual Guatemalan peasants, the State Department clearly saw 
much merit in the reasoning behind the reforms. They merely disliked the politicians who 
advocated for them.76 
 Land reform, in fact, could become a useful vehicle to prevent communist politics from 
gaining traction. Nationalist “measures such as land reform are the most effective means of 
combating communism in Latin America, and that without such reforms there is a very real 
danger of revolution as the industrial way of life seeps down to the village level.”77 Milton Barall 
at the State Department’s Office of South American Affairs found this reasoning “exceptionally 
interesting and soundly conceived,” much like the president he served, who said it was “often 
heard” within policymaking circles that “the only force in the modern world capable of 
effectively combating communism is nationalism.”78 
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 Castillo Armas was a nationalist, and his vision of Guatemala’s future he spoke of fit, in 
theory, very neatly with U.S. visions of the inter-American system and the politics it was trying 
to nurture and align with. Firstly, Castillo Armas was a willing lieutenant for U.S. power, the 
complete opposite of Arbenz. Sneered at by some U.S. officials for his inexperience, Castillo 
Armas was nonetheless clearly subservient to U.S. power. On one occasion Castillo Armas 
demonstrated this very bluntly to Nixon, who was visiting Guatemala to congratulate Castillo 
Armas on his rescuing of Guatemalan “democracy” from putative communist tyranny. He looked 
to Nixon, and said “tell me what to do and I will do it.”79 
 The idea that Castillo Armas was representative of a return to democracy in Guatemala 
was difficult for many to swallow, but one that the United States was keen to believe and 
promote throughout the region. The CIA supplied the funding to help create the Congress for 
Cultural Freedom (CCF) to support and promulgate the ideas of non-communist leftists. At a 
meeting sponsored by the CCF, Latin American delegates reacted with hostility to the notion that 
the Congress should support Castillo Armas as a liberal democrat and even an ally of “reformist 
socialism.”80 
This more pro-leftist nationalist image of Castillo Armas, so hard for Latin Americans to 
accept, was the very thing that U.S. officials were keen to promote. In Guatemala, the United 
States had become attached to the fate of the new regime, and as such the State Department saw 
it as a “priority country,” a place, like Bolivia, where American rhetoric about its role in the 
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region was on trial.81 Dulles sent Edward Sparks, the ambassador who had demonstrated support 
and understanding of the Bolivian MNR, to Guatemala City to serve as the Ambassador. As in 
Bolivia, U.S. officials sought not to be seen as lackeys of exploitative oligarchies, but as siding 
with ambitious and popular reform movements that aimed to transform Latin American societies 
for the better. 
One such arena of social reform was land reform: the issue that had precipitated the 
breakdown in relations with Arbenz and the issue that Milton Eisenhower had fallen “in love” 
with.82 Though the Castillo Armas years saw the return of the land expropriated from United 
Fruit in 1952, dictatorial rule through “emergency powers” and violent clampdowns on political 
dissidents, the President was also keen to promote land reform as a path towards political and 
economic stabilization of the country. In fact, almost half of the land that the government 
returned to United Fruit was then returned by the company to the state to help Castillo Armas 
carry out further land reform, though much of it was of marginal value for cultivation.83 This 
desire to promote efforts to reapportion land remained a rhetorically “important” part of the new 
government’s plans, expressed in Castillo Armas’ presidential Decree 170. The Agriculture 
Minister, Lazaro Chacon, wrote to Guatemalan regional governors emphasizing the importance 
of Decree 170 to apportion land to peasants (who were not tenant farmers, or colonos).84 This, 
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according to the Minister, was for the good of the Guatemalan economy: to rationalize 
production whilst also promoting social “harmony and understanding” that would hopefully seep 
through to influence the political realm.  
In the view of the State Department, Castillo Armas’ drive for greater stability through 
advocating land reform was especially vital in the political climate he faced in Guatemala, where 
the “spirit of 1944” was still in the ascendency a year into Castillo Armas’ presidency.85 As 
Cavlin Hill prepared to leave his posting at the U.S. Embassy in Guatemalan on the anniversary 
of Castillo Armas’ coup, his valedictory analysis of the Guatemalan political situation was 
forwarded to Foggy Bottom by Thomas Mann. Mann, the Charge d’Affaires and future 
Undersecretary of State, emphasized that he was in “complete agreement” with Hill’s analysis.86  
Hill argued that the United States had to align itself with the “democratic nationalistic 
principles of the 1944 revolution,” and push Castillo to maintain a broad coalition from the 
“nationalistic left to the far right.” This desire to co-opt the (non-communist) “authentic 
revolution” of the “nationalistic left” depended very much upon the allegiance of the “unions,” 
the “middle and 'intellectual' classes.” The Guatemalan government and the United States had to 
understand and appeal to their “desire for freedom,” uniting behind the goals of national 
autonomy, social reform and prosperity.87 These were the very groups that had flocked to Arbenz 
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and Arevalo before him, but they also represented powerful and important potential allies to U.S. 
officials. Hill and his colleagues worried that nationalism could become extreme and become 
expressed in explicitly anti-U.S. tones. Washington therefore needed to channel these “leftist 
nationalist” forces into less antagonistic directions, and to push its client governments to take 
heed of that need too.88 
Attempting to curry favor with the nationalistic left, Castillo Armas tried to side with the 
peasants against large landholders during the spring and summer of 1955. Though he put a halt 
to expropriations, Castillo Armas publically announced he would allow peasants to remain on 
lands they had been given by Decree 900. The president embraced “middle-of-the-road” rhetoric 
(whilst failing to follow up with rigorous enforcement from the state), in a move designed to 
placate a domestic audience and the United States.89 Such middle of the road posturing was all 
very well in theory, but given his lack of a strong base of organized political support, and the 
story of how he rose to power, Castillo Armas lacked authority and legitimacy.90 If anything, 
according to the U.S. Embassy, this middle of the road posturing was interpreted as weakness by 
observers on the right, and as completely inauthentic by observers on the left.91  
Despite Washington’s desire to see Castillo Armas’ co-opt some of the language of 
progressive land reform, his government oversaw the rollback of Arbenz’s Law of Forced Land 
Rental and Decree 900, and the imprisonment, torture and murder of rural and labor organizers, 
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activists and officials who had tried to implement the redistribution of land to peasants. His 
Department of Agricultural Affairs largely sided with large landholders in returning land that had 
been redistributed, despite the president’s promises they would be able to stay on the land.92 
Large landowners proceeded to plant cash crops for export, reversing the trend in increased 
productivity for staple crops that Arbenz’s reforms had catalyzed, bringing up food prices for 
Guatemalans.93 U.S. hopes that he might capture the ‘spirit of 1944’ were fantastical and perhaps 
only conceivable in the abstract, but their somewhat surreal quality only serves to highlight the 
extent to which these ideas pervaded official thinking, and how far they could be twisted in an 
effort to support a broader ideological view of the nature and purpose of U.S. policy within the 
inter-American system. 
Castillo Armas sought to use not only advice from Washington, but also its money, to try 
and maintain political power. The State Department was eager to embark on a program of aid in 
Guatemala to try and demonstrate the beneficence of its hegemony and the benefits of 
cooperating with Washington and spread “the American ideal of progress.”94 Keen to capitalize 
on this mood in Washington, the newly installed Castillo Armas regime requested 260 million 
from a shocked and condescendingly skeptical U.S. State Department.95 Washington ended up 
giving 138 million dollars to Guatemala during the Eisenhower years, amidst significant back-
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and-forth within Congress and the foreign policymaking bureaucracy.96 Whilst the U.S. embassy 
expressed frustration at the economic recession caused by Governmental incompetence and large 
Guatemalan landowners’’ speculation and hoarding, much of its initial round of aid failed to 
make it to Guatemala through bureaucratic inefficiency, and heavy expenditure on materials and 
salaries for officials based outside of Guatemala itself.97  
U.S. officials had grand hopes that they might help shape Guatemalan modernization and 
development, but, as was the case in Bolivia, they often found it difficult to define priorities and 
identify feasible development projects in Guatemala. Some at the Embassy and the International 
Cooperation Administration began to blame the inexperienced government. These frustrations 
would boil over into outright contempt at times. Six months into the Castillo Armas presidency, 
the Embassy fumed at the “pathetic” government that had to be “literally led by the hand step by 
step,” something that was difficult to do “without nationalistic reactions.”98 Within this context 
of U.S. interventionism and lack of improvements in Guatemalan life, U.S. officials saw rising 
nationalism as an increasing problem, a problem that if anything was being exacerbated by the 
promises of “U.S. promoters, carpetbaggers and others” in Congress and the press.99 
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Such promises and commitments to improving Guatemalan society led the State 
Department to over-commit resources in situations where they saw no viable projects to invest 
in. However, to deny the funds requested by Congress would be politically undesirable giving 
the Guatemala boosters an opportunity to accuse the administration of abandoning “little 
Guatemala.100“ Given the higher profile of the Guatemala coup in the United States, 
Congressional attention could put pressure on U.S. policy to invest further resources in 
Guatemala. And indeed it did: Republican Congressmen convened a committee to investigate 
why funds had taken months to arrive in Guatemala, and Senator McCarthy began to blame the 
State Department’s communist sympathies for the delays.101 
Nevertheless, as it would also prove to be in Bolivia, Congress’ support for the economic 
travails of the Latin American nation ended up being rather lukewarm. “The knife wielders” in 
Congress cut proposed aid packages to ribbons, despite the complaints of senior foreign policy 
officials and even some in Congress, such as William Fulbright.102 Enthusiasm for aid to 
Guatemala quickly died down, with aid budgets for Guatemala shrinking to 12.4 million dollars 
for FY 1959.103 Frustrated U.S. officials resorted to sermons about avoiding Guatemalan 
dependence on the U.S. through trade and loans rather than grant aid.104 
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The United States had tried to imagine itself at the forefront of an effort to transform and 
modernize Guatemala’s society and economy whilst combating communism, and tried to fit 
Castillo Armas into this mold. They were, unsurprisingly, unsuccessful in this endeavor. Castillo 
Armas’ reign was cut short by an assassin’s bullet in 1957. The government blamed the 
communists, though some historians have suggested that this was the act of political rivals to 
Castillo Armas’ right. Despite the State Department’s hopes for his putative “middle of the road” 
approach, his rhetoric on anti-communism and the continuation land reform, he had inspired no 
confidence from either the Guatemalan right or left: he was an inexperienced, vacillating and 






As their joint positions on land reform help reveal, Bolivia and Guatemala demonstrated 
a common agenda and sources of political motivation and support, but their attitudes and 
behavior towards U.S. hegemony were fundamentally different. U.S. Policy towards Guatemala 
and Bolivia in the 1950s demonstrated that there was coherency to U.S. policy, but not based 
primarily on anticommunism.105 The Bolivians were not effective anticommunists, but 
demonstrated symbolic adherence to the notion that it was an important cause for the hemisphere 
as a whole.106 Neither was Arbenz a communist, but he refused to publically disassociate himself 
with the communists. Initially this could be explained away as political expediency by U.S. 
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officials with dreams of a more cooperative relationship with the political impulses behind the 
Guatemalan revolution. Eventually, however, his intransigent resistance to U.S. interference in 
Guatemalan domestic politics was increasingly recalibrated as bullish independence which boded 
ill for hemispheric unity under Washington’s leadership.  
Once the threat to U.S. hegemony had been removed, U.S. officials demonstrated a 
coherent, if ultimately unrealistic, purpose behind their approach to revolutionary politics in 
Guatemala and Bolivia. They wanted to appeal to nationalist movements to maintain a U.S.-led 
inter-American system. Under Armas, they continued to promote land reform and seek 
cooperative relationships with “leftist nationalism” in Guatemala. In this effort, and by 
supporting the Bolivian revolution, the United States was attempting to engage with and nurture 
the powerful political forces of Latin American nationalism to develop the “healthy relationship” 
Eisenhower, his advisors and the State Department sought within the hemisphere.107 
This is not to suggest that Castillo Armas and Arbenz were cut from the same political 
cloth, far from it. The crucial point is that the United States believed that both could be co-opted 
into North American hegemony along similar lines. U.S. policy tried to mold both into allies they 
could rely upon, but also be proud to be associated with: examples to the wider region of the 
American brand of progress and the benefits of cooperation with Washington. That rhetoric was 
self-serving and strained beyond credibility, but it remains vital to understand nonetheless. To 
appeal to leftist nationalism, and demonstrate its benevolent hegemony U.S. officials needed 
compliant leaders willing to demonstrate symbolic deference the United States. U.S. officials 
also needed cooperation from Congress to supply the aid dollars to maintain their influence, and 
a competence and political legitimacy that the Castillo Armas government lacked.  
                                                 





Perhaps most importantly, the very act of overthrowing Arbenz whilst continuing to 
wield substantial influence on its client regimes made the notion of a U.S. appeal to the 
“authentic revolution” or “leftist nationalism a very tall order indeed. But it was nonetheless an 
order that policymakers and officials wished to fulfill, and this wish was exploited by the MNR 
in ways that the successive Guatemalan regimes in the 1950s could not. President Paz in Bolivia 
was more than willing to demonstrate understanding of North American attitudes, whilst 
continuing with a series of domestic and inter-American policies that tested the limits of 
Washington’s hegemony. The Arbenz government, by contrast, sought to pursue similar policies 
to the MNR whilst forcefully and openly rejecting North American interference in Latin 







Eisenhower, Congress and Bolivian aid: 'trying to do something intelligently 
about South America' 
 
 
President Eisenhower, in an interview conducted seven years after he left office, vented his 
frustration at Congress for stymieing his efforts in foreign aid:  
…Congress has very little interest in foreign relations except that it treasures its power 
of the purse…You try to do something intelligently about South America, but…[t]he 
demagogue or even the ordinary politician thinks… ‘I’d rather spend the money on helping 
my farmers right here in Abilene, Kansas, then I would on helping Bolivia.’1 
 
Eisenhower, who had grown up in Abilene and had chosen the town to host his Presidential 
Library and museum, had never been to Bolivia. Yet he came to believe aid to the country that 
promoted long-term economic prosperity and political stability was of great importance for the 
United States’ wider strategic needs. There were many like-minded officials within his 
administration, but also many dissenters and competing agendas throughout the policymaking 
apparatus. These obstacles hampered the realization of the type of aid programs that the 
administration hoped might cement the special bond that the president perceived between the 
United States and Latin America. Such hopes were strikingly ambitious, and perhaps needed to 
be so in order to combat political opposition, but they ultimately failed to deliver on their 
promise.  
By the end of his time in office, Eisenhower appeared to be making good on the promises 
of paying more attention to Latin America he had made as a candidate for president in 1952.  
                                                 





The administration helped to create a regional development bank and oversaw an increase in aid 
that laid the groundwork for the Alliance for Progress, Kennedy’s flagship program of aid for 
Latin America.2  
Modernization theorists like Walter Rostow criticized these efforts as too little, too late, 
and pointed to the rise of Castroism the year following the disastrous Nixon visit to Latin 
America in 1958 that provoked widespread rioting in many of the cities he visited.3 This obvious 
blow to the prestige of the United States helped garner political capital for the administration to 
achieve some of its officials’ vision for a more comprehensive regional approach. But despite the 
failures of the Eisenhower years in the wider region, from the administration’s first moments in 
power the Bolivian revolution represented an opportunity for policymakers in Washington to 
confront Latin American political and economic instability. Policymakers working on aid to 
Bolivia came up with a similar set of solutions that the administration would advocate for post-
Arbenz Guatemala and, after 1958, the wider region. Convinced of the MNR's nationalist 
promise to address Bolivia’s underlying economic and social problems, the administration 
sought to enable the cooperative MNR government’s revolutionary agenda 4 Eisenhower was 
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able to do so in spite of political, bureaucratic and ideological disquiet in the U.S. because 
Bolivia was a cooperative government seeking American patronage, and represented a “crisis” 
situation dire enough that it could be used to leverage Congress for money it was reluctant to 
appropriate.  
Given these circumstances, the administration was able to move towards providing 
substantial aid packages well before the rise of open anti-Americanism and Castroism in 1958-
60, or the wider shift towards 'trade-and-aid' in response to a more ambitious Soviet approach to 
the Third World under Khruschev after 1956.5 By providing economic aid and support for the 
popular revolutionary movement, the administration hoped to revitalize the inter-American 
system and diminish the type of anti-American radicalism so prevalent after what many Latin 
Americans saw as decades of political and military intervention and economic exploitation and 
neglect.6 Bolivia, like the crisis of 1958 and the Nixon visit, gave the administration the 
opportunity to act upon deeper beliefs about the potential for U.S. policy in the region. 
Accordingly, the U.S. sponsored increasingly substantial aid packages to Bolivia from 
1953 onwards. After an initial period of apparently “stop-gap” aid from 1953-55, between 1956 
and 1961 the United States provided $145.5 million to Bolivia (averaging $24.25 million per 
year), compared to $34.3 million between 1953 and 1955 (averaging $11.4 million per year).7 
                                                 
5 Kaufman argues for a pivot from “trade not aid” sermons from the administration to the rest of thet world up until 
1956 and more aggressive Soviet moves towards foreign aid. Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s 
Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982). 
6 See chapter 4. 
7 Richard Patch, “Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting,” in Richard N. Adams et al., Social Change in 
Latin America Today: Its Implications for United States Policy, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 152, table 
1; Eder, Inflation and Development in Latin America, p. 596; Siekmeier, Aid, Nationalism and Inter-American 
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Total aid to Bolivia came to almost half of the 400 million dollars in military aid that Latin 
America received during the Eisenhower administration, well over a billion in 2016 dollars.8 The 
United States also contributed millions to inter-American technical assistance programs, 
programs that President Paz presented to the Bolivian Congress as the most valuable in 
furthering the progress of the revolution.9  
Whilst providing this aid, the administration also sought to further manipulate Bolivian 
economic policy with its own advisors and agenda. Advisors from Washington played a direct 
role in drafting the Bolivia’s petroleum codes in 1955, from the consulting firm of Meyers and 
Batzel. Batzel would also go on to help craft oil codes in Guatemala that same year.10 In 1956 
Washington dispatched businessman George Jackson Eder to La Paz, to overhaul the currency 
stabilization plan the MNR was attempting with the guidance of the UN’s Arthur Karaz. The 
Eder Plan of austerity and currency stabilization attempted to curb rampant inflation and attract 
more private capital investment in Bolivia, whilst, as Eder remembered it, also striking a blow 
against the Keynesian ideas at the heart of the Karaz approach.11  
 The administration's long term strategic goal of cementing U.S. hegemony through 
patronage of the Bolivian government had to contend with considerable fiscal conservatism and 
criticism of Bolivia aid from Congress, the General Services Administration and the Treasury. 
                                                 
8 Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America, p. 77. 
9 In 1955 Bolivia received a total of 13.766 million dollars in cash and 37.336 million dollars worth of equipment 
through the Servicio Agricola Interamericano, Servicio Cooperativeo Interamericano de Salud Publica and Servicio 
Cooperativo interamericano de Educacion. Bolivian Foreign Ministry, Mensaje del Presidente de la Republica Dr. 
Victor Paz Estenssoro al H. Congreso Naciónal (La Paz: 1956), p. 150. 
10 Cable from Hoover to U.S. Embassies in Guatemala La Paz, NARA, CDF, RG 59, Box 4213, 814.2553/2-455. 
11 See George Jackson Eder, Inflation and Development in Latin America: A Case History of Inflation and 
Stabilization in Bolivia (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1968); Richard Patch, “Bolivia: U.S. Assistance 
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The tension between pressure to support the Bolivians’ revolutionary agenda and cutting back on 
aid commitments more generally led the administration to grant aid packages and tin contracts on 
a rather short-term basis, leading many to conclude that U.S. policy was essentially “stop-gap,” 
crisis management that found policymakers reluctantly supporting the MNR to stave off an 
economic collapse that might benefit those further to the left in Bolivia.12  
 At the same time as preventing Bolivian economic collapse, U.S. officials designed their 
support of the revolution to push forward other American interests and values: austerity, and oil 
codes that favored U.S. capital. Such an approach was, in the view of some historians, essentially 
antinationalist in conception and execution. These historians argue that the Eisenhower 
administration was more interested in the MNR's nationalism than its attitudes towards 
communism, but they ultimately see a reactionary, antagonistic impulse behind US policy 
towards Bolivian nationalism. In these histories, U.S. policy was primarily concerned with 
quashing meaningful Latin American reform, autonomy or challenges to U.S. hegemony, and 
reinforcing Latin America's economic dependency on the United States.13 
 This chapter argues otherwise. Bolivia did increasingly depend on U.S. aid during the 
1950s, and made many hard sacrifices and symbolic gestures, in part to placate the United States. 
                                                 
12 Herter to American embassy Bonn (Enclosure “US Objectives and Programs of Aid to Bolivia”)  “NA RG 59, 
824.10/2-1458 250/43/17/6 Box 4276. Lehman, “Revolutions and Attributions,” p. 213; Siekmeier, Aid, Nationalism 
and Inter-American Relations, p. 247; Blasier, The Hovering Giant, p. 134. For references to “stop-gap” see Herter 
to American embassy Bonn (Enclosure “US Objectives and Programs of Aid to Bolivia”) “NARA, CDF, RG 59, 
Box 4276, 824.10/2-1458; Memorandum of Conversation between Siles, VP Frederico Alvarez, Barrau, Hugo 
Moreno Cordoba (Finance minister), Jorge Tamayo (Minister of Economy), Nixon, Bonsal, Rubottom, Waugh, 
Bernbaum (director OSA). 5 May 1958, NA, RG 59, LOT FILES, LOT 59 D 573, Box 5, Folder: 1958 Bolivia, Roy 
R. Rubottom Papers.   
13 Siekmeier, Aid, Nationalism and Inter-American Relations, Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United 
States foreign policy, 1945-1980 (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1988). See also the more recent scholarship of 
Matt Loayza. “‘A Curative and Creative Force’: The Exchange of Persons Program and Eisenhower’s Inter-
American Policies, 1953–1961,” Diplomatic History, vol. 37, issue 5 (Fall 2013) pp. 946-970, and Kevin Young, 
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However, the influence of the U.S. in forcing these policies on an unwilling MNR has been 
overstated, and U.S. policymakers' Machiavellian intentions to undermine the revolution's search 
for greater economic autonomy is wholly inaccurate.14 Many at the State Department, Bolivian 
Foreign Ministry, and Eisenhower himself were keenly aware of domestic opposition to 
expanding foreign aid programs (or at least able to come up with such opposition as a plausible 
excuse). But their conceptual approach to US policy in Bolivia and the potential gains the United 
States could make there went much deeper and broader than a reluctant program of “stop-gap” 
aid or “crisis management” along the lines of Robert Pastor’s whirlpool model of inter-American 
relations.15  
 In narratives that emphasize U.S. antinationalism in its approach to Bolivia, one 
mechanism for preventing economic nationalism was Washington's insistence on a program of 
generous compensation for nationalized mines formerly owned by the Patiño group. This 
compensation placed a substantial burden on the Bolivian economy and the MNR's revolutionary 
project, according to this argument.16 Yet despite the extensive pressure the U.S. put on the 
MNR to compensate former mine owners, Washington's key concern was not to punish the 
revolutionaries through punitive reparations, but to make a symbolic gesture towards the wider 
position of private capital investment in Latin America as a whole. Once the revolutionary 
government agreed to provide compensation in principle, the matter became relatively 
                                                 
14 In the words of Eder “a rejection, at least tacitly, of virtually all the revolultionary government had done.” Eder 
quoted in Lehman, Bolivia and the United States, p. 123. See also Dunkerley, Rebellion in the Veins, pp. 86-87; 
Rebecca Scott, “Economic aid and imperialism in Bolivia,” Monthly Review 24:1 (1972), pp. 48-60. 
15 Robert Pastor, Exiting the Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean (Boulder: 
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unimportant to U.S. officials. In fact, these officials repeatedly complained at lack of follow-
through from La Paz on the issue, even as their aid spending in Bolivia continued to increase. 
A second mechanism to enforce economic dependency, according to some, was U.S. aid 
and development policy. Some historians describe U.S. officials' explicit desire to use aid policy 
as leverage not only to secure Bolivian cooperation with the United States, but to also further 
entrench Bolivian economic dependency. Using doctrinaire free market principles and fiscal 
conservatism, they argue that U.S. policy achieved its agenda of undermining economic 
nationalism and statism.17 The narrative emphasizing the underlying anti-nationalist purpose of 
U.S. aid programs and the advice of its economic experts, Public Law 480, the role of U.S. 
officials in drafting Bolivian legislation on petroleum industry codes, and the stabilization plan 
of 1956 form key elements in the U.S. struggle to contain economic nationalism. 
Whilst U.S. aid programs did undercut Bolivian food production and coincided with 
Bolivia's increased need for outside financial aid and greater food imports for the period 1952-
64, this was not the design and underlying purpose of the officials such as Holland, the 
Eisenhowers, Bolivia Desk officers and embassy officials. Aid programs for Bolivia, including 
PL480, were designed to transform the Bolivian economy, diversify it, and help Bolivia to “stand 
on its own economic feet.”18 U.S. officials' desire to aid in the diversification of the Bolivian 
                                                 
17 This is one of James Siekmeier's key arguments, which remains constant throughout his extensive writings on 
Bolivia: the administration's aid programs were expressly designed to promote Bolivian dependency and combat 
economic nationalism. For Seikmeier, Milton Eisenhower displayed consistent “ardour in fighting economic 
nationalism” in keeping with administration policy. In particular, Siekemeir emphasized the administration’s 
coercive aid policies, policies which “hindered the Bolivians from reaching their often-articulated goal of economic 
diversification.” Siekmeier, Aid, Nationalism and Inter-American Relations, pp. 207, 352; James Siekmeier. “Latin 
American Economic Nationalism and United States-Latin American Relations, 1945-1961.” The Latin Americanist 
52:3 (October 2008): 59-76 
18 Letter from Bonsal to Senator Green, February 21, 1958, NA, RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, 
Records of the Bureau of inter-American Affairs, Lot Files, LOT 62 D 16, Box 27, Folder 21.1. See also 





economy should be seen as empowering the MNR revolution, not as its nemesis or a “brake.”19 
And in that effort to diversify trading partners, export revenues and the internal economy, at least 
by the 1970s, they enjoyed a moderate level of success in growing and diversifying the Bolivian 
economy, lessening dependence on tin exports and on the U.S. as the primary market for that 
tin.20 
 In making the error of attributing meaningful intent behind the growing dependence of 
Bolivia on the United States in this era, and by ignoring the considerable friction and divergence 
of interests between U.S. policymakers and business elites desperate to quash the Bolivian 
revolution, historians have misunderstood the fundamental underpinnings of the American 
hegemonic impulse. U.S. officials saw no conflict between greater Bolivian economic autonomy 
under the MNR and the extension of U.S. hegemony. Bolivia would represent a reliable partner 
less susceptible to overthrow by communist or anti-American malcontents if it maintained the 
ability to feed itself, a stable rate of inflation, and a diversified economy less dependent on the 
price of a single commodity on the world market. The economic stabilization of Bolivia served 
two main purposes: ensuring political stability, and providing an example to Bolivia and the 
wider world of the benefits of cooperation with the United States.  
 Bolivian officials recognized the desire of the administration to provide more assistance 
to Bolivia and support the MNR in its attempts to transform and diversify the Bolivian economy. 
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MNR diplomats, as they had done with gestures towards anticommunism, made symbolic 
deference to the administration’s concerns over compensation and economic policy even as they 
delivered little substantively.  
Observers in the United States recognized this, but advocates of expanded aid programs 
to Bolivia were hampered not by the innate fiscal conservatism of the administration as a whole, 
nor dissatisfaction with the MNR government. Cabinet and State Department officials’ more 
expansive vision of what U.S. policy might be able to achieve over the long haul was held back 
by bureaucratic infighting and congressional squabbling over the nature and extent of the foreign 
aid budget. Congressional resistance encouraged bureaucratic inertia and forced the 
administration to hide its efforts behind an 'emergency aid' formula, even as many U.S. officials 
recognized that they would need long term solutions for Bolivian problems that were expected to 
be there for years to come. 
 
Expropriated mines: “prompt, adequate and effective compensation” or “nothing but 
words and no action”? 
 
One of the key sticking points in relations between the Eisenhower administration and the 
MNR from their first interactions was the issue of compensation for the recently expropriated 
mines of the Patiño group. Patiño was the only expropriated company with a majority of U.S. 
shareholders, and U.S. officials brought significant pressure to bear on the government to prove 
that they were not anti-capitalist by providing “prompt, adequate and effective” compensation to 
American investors.21 According to ambassador Andrade’s analysis, at the beginning of 1953 
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compensation for American shareholders seemed the “sole objective of the power of the U.S. 
government.”22 
 If the issue of compensation was such a vital issue, it seems U.S. officials did not get 
much of what they asked for. Negotiations dragged out for almost a year. The agreement 
eventually reached between the MNR and Patiño in the summer of 1953 left the total amount of 
the indemnity to be decided at a later date.23 Though payments continued somewhat sporadically 
over the following years, the slogan of “prompt, adequate and effective compensation” does not 
seem an accurate description of Bolivian behavior, despite their initial commitments.24 The 
Bolivian government quieted U.S. concerns and demonstrated symbolic and rhetorical deference 
to the preservation of a positive environment for private capital and private enterprise, whilst 
preserving an essentially state-centered economy and failing to follow through on providing 
compensation to the satisfaction of the State Department. 
 As quickly as six months after the agreement's conclusion, the compensation issue 
seemed to the British ambassador in La Paz to still be a “sore” on U.S.-Bolivian relations.25 
Compensation payments made based on the initial agreement only lasted until April 1955, 
provoking a flurry of activity from Big Three lobbyists in Washington and Bolivian negotiators. 
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1953 Embol Washington CL-354. 
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The two sides tried to arrange a series of patchwork arrangements in the absence of the MNR's 
willingness to offer a long term formula for compensation. The Bolivians agreed to pay five 
percent of all sales into a compensation fund without finalizing what the final amount should be. 
The two sides recognized “the Bolivian Government was not in a position to make any large 
payment toward compensation at this time, or for some time to come,” but disagreed profoundly 
on what the final amount should be. Negotiations dragged on for years, over American 
investments in expropriated companies totaled between 5 and 15 million dollars (the larger 
number mirroring the United Fruit Company's claims against the Arbenz government in 
Guatemala).26 The archival record remains unclear on the final ammounts paid out.27 But 
although the impact of Bolivian payments to former mine owners was not insignificant on the 
Bolivian economy, to observers in the US it seemed only minimally adequate in fulfilling the 
spirit of the agreement. 
In a 1958, as the U.S. program of aid in Bolivia hit unprecedented levels, Philip Bonsal 
was “deeply disturbed that after so long” compensation arrangements were “still so preliminary.” 
Bonsal concluded that he had seen “nothing but words and no action” from the Bolivian 
government on finalizing the compensation agreement.28 Even Milton Eisenhower, champion of 
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27 According to James Dunkerley, consistent U.S. pressure over the extended compensation negotiations helped 
secure 27 million dollars for the former mine owners, or two thirds of Bolivia’s foreign exchange reserves in 1952. 
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the MNR revolution and its land reform, conceded in his memoir that the settlement of the 
Bolivian compensation agreement had not been based upon “a realistic formula.”29  
 Such foot-dragging over the payment of compensation was hardly surprising given 
Bolivia's ongoing economic woes and the political outrage directed at the Big Three for its 
exploitation of Bolivian workers and expatriation of capital earned off of the back of Bolivians' 
labor. Though U.S. officials exhibited much sympathy for Bolivia's economic plight as 
articulated by the MNR, the Eisenhower administration remained stubbornly unwilling to grant 
the Bolivian government the long term tin contracts they so desperately wanted and persistently 
asked for. As a result, the Bolivian government could not count on tin revenues from the 
nationalized mines' entire output for more than a year, or a year and a half, over the entirety of 
the 1950s.  
 Why did the U.S. repeatedly back away from giving the Bolivians a long term contract? 
Was the reluctance based on a moralistic reciprocity for the Bolivians' lack of traction on settling 
the compensation issue and sympathy for the recently dispossessed tin companies? Was this the 
innate fiscal conservatism of the Eisenhower years at work, holding back from buying large 
amounts of tin to pile on top of the already excessive U.S. stockpile? Or perhaps it was a result 
of competing bureaucratic interests stymieing the desire of some at the State Department to 
provide more long term support. The government agencies responsible for operating the smelter 
(the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and later the General Services Administration) and 
many in Congress were keen to shut down the Texas City Smelter, which made it difficult for the 
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administration to commit to purchasing more Bolivian tin ores. Perhaps most persuasive of all 
explanations, the parceling out of tin contracts in shorter durations was an effort to maintain a 
degree of leverage with which to influence Bolivian behavior whilst notionally pushing the MNR 
towards greater economic independence.  
 North American officials did not think their pressure on Bolivia over compensation for 
nationalized companies meant they were serving as an instrument of individual private 
companies.30 Nor did they really aim to protect individual stockholders: the State Department 
never even definitively calculated the extent of U.S. ownership of Patiño stocks and was not 
terribly responsive to La Rosca’s lobbying efforts to oppose the MNR. In fact, Acheson 
explained to Truman that the State Department’s “extreme concern” over the nationalization of 
Bolivian tin “did not arise so much out of sympathy for the Patiño and Hochschild interests.” 
The companies were, according to Acheson, “in a large part responsible for their present 
predicament.”31 
 Despite U.S. disquiet over the doubtful prospects for adequate compensation and 
Bolivia's subsequent poor record on the issue, Washington insisted on it because the precedent of 
providing compensation was more important than saving U.S. investors between five and fifteen 
million dollars. William Hudson of the Office of South American Affairs noted as much even 
before the agreement was concluded. 32  
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 This precedent mattered for the overall health of the inter-American system. U.S. 
officials wanted to preserve the principal of compensation in order to promote a favorable 
investment climate for foreign capital in Latin America. The administration repeatedly 
emphasized that foreign capital was what Latin America needed in order to spur growth and 
modernization across the region. Central to Eisenhower’s foreign policy vision for Latin 
America, indeed the whole non-communist world, was a vibrant U.S. economy leading a global 
system of free trade. It was this dynamic “corporate commonwealth” that would compete with 
and defeat the Soviet Union in the long run.33 Private capital was Eisenhower’s preferred engine 
for economic development in the specific case of Bolivia, and as a general model for the 
region.34 Private capital-led development would also ease the burden on the foreign aid budget 
(and hence the U.S. taxpayer), and ideally strengthen both the U.S. and the Third World.35 
 With such stakes in mind, the State Department noted that Chile was watching the U.S. 
reaction closely, given that there were similar demands for it to nationalize its copper mines. 
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Also watching was Venezuela, where pressure to nationalize oil resources was ever-present.36  
Milton Eisenhower argued that “we cannot overemphasize that all of South America is 
concerned with [the] problem of strategic materials and is watching what we do with respect to 
the Bolivian situation,” repeating almost verbatim the concerns President Eisenhower himself 
expressed to his cabinet: “South America is watching closely what we do in Bolivia.”37 
  The goal of promoting private capital investment in Latin American development was 
reflected across the administration. Cabot agreed with Milton Eisenhower’s influential report on 
Latin America that the fundamental assumption of U.S. policy was that “to develop, Latin 
America must have capital,” which should, wherever possible, be private.38 NSC 5432/1 
reasoned along similar lines, calling for U.S. policy to:  
encourage [Latin American governments] by economic assistance and other means to base 
their economies on a system of private enterprise, and, as essential thereto, to create a 
political and economic climate conducive to private investment, of both domestic and 
foreign capital, including: 
(1) Reasonable and non-discriminatory laws and regulations affecting business. 
(2) Opportunity to earn, and in the case of foreign capital, to repatriate them at a 
reasonable rate of return… 
(5) Respect for contract and property rights, including assurance of prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation in the event of expropriation.39 
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Creating an environment conducive to private investment was a prevalent component of policy 
towards Bolivia. Policymakers insisted that the MNR reach a concrete compensation settlement 
with the tin companies affected by government policy, and display “fair treatment” towards 
private capital and property.40 Washington officials were willing to give the MNR room to 
nationalize the Big Three’s tin mines because they accepted that nationalization had been a 
political necessity for the MNR. However, policymakers still retained misgivings over the 
“unwisdom of nationalization per se” and concerns over the likelihood of the MNR providing 
“prompt, adequate and effective compensation.”41  
 In keeping with the administration’s specific concerns and wider aims for the region, the 
Bolivian government tried to demonstrate that it was receptive to foreign and domestic 
investment and the symbolic importance of gesturing towards expropriation with 
compensation.42 This was whilst its leaders were nationalizing the private mining concerns that 
dominated the Bolivian economy and attempting to create a far-reaching welfare state, including 
subsidized government-run grocery stores, or pulperias, for miners employed by the state. As 
reported in the New York Times, Andrade’s opening statement to the U.S. upon being installed as 
ambassador was that his government would respect private property rights, and he took great 
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pains to explain to the administration that “we intend to pay the former owners every cent that is 
due to them.”43 The Bolivians also stressed that nationalization of the Big Three was a special 
case that did not reflect wider government attitudes towards private capital. The administration 
followed this promise carefully and ensured that other companies were not subjected to what 
policymakers felt was unfair treatment.44 Paz made repeated efforts to attract private capital to 
Bolivia, described dismissively as “frantic” by the unsympathetic Barron's Magazine.45  He also 
emphasized the significance of the Glen McCarthy contract, which granted permission to 
construct a match factory and sulfur mining rights to a U.S. company even as the Big Three’s 
mines were being nationalized.46  
Bolivian diplomatic efforts to calm U.S. concerns over their economic approach seem to 
have worked, despite some evidence of anticapitalist rhetoric from moderate MNR leaders.47 Paz 
appeared “intelligently aware of the problem” of nationalization to U.S. officials.48 Because the 
MNR leadership had convinced U.S. officials of their desire to preserve “a basically capitalist 
economic system,” the United States was willing to grant it leeway to attempt to cement 
“substantial social welfare concepts and with few inhibitions on state controls and state 
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intervention.”49 The administration seems to have absorbed the advice of the Randall 
Commission, which emphasized that, whilst it was “beyond the competence of U.S. policy to 
arrest or reverse the current revolutionary trend, some of whose manifestations we find so 
distressing” it was “within reach of our power to influence the course of events” towards 
outcomes “favorable to us in the long run.”50 By promoting a private-capital led development 
model in a nationalist revolution in the heart of South America, the administration hoped to 
provide the rest of the hemisphere with a success story that could be emulated.51 
 The idea that private capital would flood into Bolivia and push the revolution away from 
statist economic models might have held some appeal to conservative skeptics of the 
administration's support for Bolivia, but these hopes were not borne out. In fact, U.S. policy, 
whilst on the one hand helping push through austerity measures that some saw as distinctly 
antirevolutionary, on the other was becoming more deeply committed to providing soft loans to 
support Bolivia's state-led economy. Political pressure from lobbyists like Tydings and fiscal 
conservatives in Congress and the cabinet meant that the U.S. government shied away from open 
collaboration with or support for the nationalized mining industry, but through providing aid to 
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the Bolivian government that is exactly what it ended up doing.52 In its desire to support the 
Bolivian revolution, the administration ended up indirectly subsidizing the nationalized mines 
through aid to the Bolivian government. By the end of the decade officials previously hostile to 
the very idea of COMIBOL (the state-run mining company) began to call for this support to 
become more direct. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Richard Roy 
Rubottom, in a cable to ambassador Bonsal, vented his frustration at the Bolivian government's 
handling of the economy, yet ended up recommending a direct loan to the state company that ran 
the mines: 
As regards Comibol, while a government agency is not the best medium for running a mining 
enterprise, and while we strongly dislike to see a government expropriate private holdings 
without even considering how or when just compensation will be provided, it is undeniable 
that mineral production is still the mainstay of the Bolivian economy and therefore I am 
forced to agree that it is desirable, in the absence of any practical alternative, to review our 
policy toward COMIBOL.53 
 
As U.S. aid efforts increased towards the end of the decade, ambitious statist solutions remained 
at their heart. US technical and financial assistance in FY 1958 aimed to “facilitate the rational 
reallocation of labor in that new employment opportunities, both temporary and permanent, will 
be made available through land clearing, resettlement, road building program[s].”54 Although 
efforts were made to curb the use of pulperias after the stabilization plan of 1956, U.S. aid was 
still, in the words of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, William P. 
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Snow, “primarily a vehicle for keeping one political party, the National Revolutionary 
Movement, in power in Bolivia. We are in little more than an expensive holding operation.”55 
 The strong pressure that the United States placed on the MNR to provide compensation 
for the mine owners betrayed a concern for keeping up appearances for the wider region to insure 
a more favorable climate for private capital investment. These pro-capital ideas furthered the 
administration's wider vision of the economic developments that would secure U.S. regional 
hegemony. The MNR leadership paid symbolic deference to U.S. shareholders and accepted the 
need for compensation in principal, and framed their plans for Bolivia's mines as politically 
necessary but not at odds with foreign capital in general. Both gestures were explicitly designed 
to placate Washington and lessen their concerns over U.S. regional hegemony, despite there 
being no need for such maneuvers within the context of Bolivian law or politics in the judgment 
of Paz and Guevara.56 Yet once that symbolic deference had been secured, the Bolivians were 
able to push the limits of acceptable behavior within that framework relatively far. The MNR 
provided minimal cooperation on the provision of compensation and continued to pursue statist 
economic projects contrary to the free market, 'trade not aid' maxims of the Eisenhower 
administration whilst receiving unprecedented amounts of economic support from Washington. 
 
Public Law 480: dependency and the U.S. Congress 
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In addition to pressure for compensation for the former mine owners, a central piece of 
the dependency critique of U.S. policy is its extensive use of Public Law 480 to provide food aid 
to the Bolivians. Indeed, Eisenhower and others justified PL 480 to Congress in those terms. 
Eisenhower claimed the law, designed to help sell U.S. agricultural surpluses abroad and thus 
stabilize prices for American farmers flooding the world market, would “lay the basis for a 
permanent expansion of our exports of agricultural products with lasting benefits to ourselves 
and peoples of other lands.”57 The law also provided for the provision of food aid in cases of 
“famine” or “emergency situations,” which would enable policymakers to make use of it heavily 
in the Bolivian case, where the perception of an “emergency situation” was widespread.58 
 
 
Year Food aid (millions US 
dollars) 
Food aid as a percentage of total Bolivian 
imports 
1953-54 10.9 17 
1954-55 18.3 22 
1955-56 17.5 25 
 
Source: Gustavo A. Prado Robles, Ensayos de historia económica (Santa Cruz, Bolivia: Instituto 
de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales Jose Ortiz Mercado, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas 
Administrativas y Financieras Universidad Autónoma Gabriel René Moreno, 2008), p. 111.59 
 
As the table above demonstrates, food aid to Bolivia increased during the Eisenhower 
administration. Some historians have argued persuasively that such a massive influx of aid only 
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served to harm the Bolivian economy by undercutting Bolivian producers, reducing Bolivian 
farmers’ ability to provide enough food to meet domestic demand and thus deepening Bolivian 
dependency. 60 Perhaps Gandhi’s warning proved apt, that “the import of food grains is the worst 
kind of slavery.”61 
In the 1950s, however, this dependency critique was not prevalent, certainly not from the 
Bolivian government. Food aid through PL 480 did not seem to be an insidious form of 
imperialism to senior MNR diplomats. These Bolivian officials thought the food aid would help 
“accelerate” the revolution, and help its leaders achieve their objectives.62 Far from acting as a 
'brake' on the revolution, it seemed to top MNR diplomats that the “economic collaboration of 
the United States had transcendental significance” for the new government and its revolutionary 
agenda of an expanded social safety net and a diversified and more autonomous community.63 
To Andrade it was clear that US policy was “aiding the diversification of the Bolivian 
economy.”64 Diversifying the economy was the principal path MNR leaders saw to breaking free 
of dependency: on a single export whose unstable prices on the world market left the Bolivian 
economy particularly vulnerable, and on the smelters able to refine the lower quality Bolivian 
ores. 
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From its first beginnings, U.S. officials saw the increased aid to Bolivia under 
Eisenhower as a buttress to the revolutionary project to diversify and stabilize the Bolivian 
economy, not a vehicle for promoting dependency.65 Such a task was seen as essential given the 
“almost hopeless” economic situation dependency on tin exports had fostered, especially in an 
era when Bolivian tin was becoming less competitive on the world market, where prices for tin 
were collapsing.66 Milton Eisenhower's report on Latin America, made after his high-profile fact-
finding mission in the spring of 1953, also included private recommendations on policy deemed 
unsuitable for wider publication. According to these restricted passages, assistance to Bolivia 
was “emergency aid” to prevent economic collapse, but it was also designed to promote 
“diversification of the Bolivian economy.” In his report Dr. Eisenhower placed great emphasis 
on increasing Bolivian food production through technical assistance.67  
Not only was U.S. policy attempting to increase food production, policymakers also saw 
it as a subsidy to the wider Bolivian economy and revolutionary project, not as a method of 
enforcing dependency. In theory, providing food aid would free up precious foreign exchange 
reserves that Bolivia was using to import a quarter of its food, and allow the government to 
invest instead in the diversification projects so central to its government's long term economic 
plan. This plan sought to restructure land ownership and increase participation in market 
relations. It also sought use revenue from the nationalized mines not only as “a vehicle to pay for 
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social reforms,” but to also diversify the economy.68 The revolutionary leaders made their 
intentions clear to U.S. officials, who again recognized the importance of the MNR’s efforts to 
transform the Bolivian economy. Walter Guevara Arze, Ambassador Andrade and William 
Hudson met on the 4th of November, 1953 in John Moors Cabot's office at the State Department. 
According to Guevara's record of the meeting, Cabot “recognized the merit” in Bolivia's plan to 
“leave dependency” through its diversification plan and “expressed his sympathy [for it].”69 
 Five years on, little had changed. If anything the administration was more deeply 
committed to the success of the MNR, for reasons that went well beyond Bolivia, and tapped into 
policymakers' vision of the grand purpose of U.S. policy. Such an expansive vision of the 
potential to transform Bolivia created more momentum behind increasing aid commitments. The 
worldview behind the growing program of aid to Bolivia serves as a striking juxtaposition to 
rhetoric concerning U.S. promotion of Bolivian independence, “so that we will be able to cease 
our financial assistance as soon as possible.”70  In a meeting with the Bolivian president and 
senior officials from both countries, Vice President Richard Nixon articulated this contradiction 
with apparently little sense of irony. The vice president praised Bolivia for “courageously 
helping herself,” thus serving as an  
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example to the world on what could be done by a country in difficulties to help itself and 
thereby merit the assistance of others. [He] felt it greatly important that the present Bolivian 
Government and its policies be vindicated by success. Its policies were the basis for the 
assistance already rendered Bolivia and for the additional assistance in the future to make 
certain that the great experiment would not fail. Failure under such circumstances would be a 
tragedy not only from the viewpoint of Bolivia itself but also from that of other countries 
which were watching Bolivia's example of intelligent self help.71 
 
Nixon made these justifications in the midst of increasing disquiet in the U.S. at rising aid 
budgets for Bolivia. Journalists' and politicians' concern over the MNR's relationship to 
communism and totalitarianism had diminished by mid-decade, by which point U.S. aid to the 
government increasingly became the principal topic for criticism. Opponents of U.S. policy 
criticized supporting what they saw as an economically wasteful and corrupt regime with 
taxpayers’ money.72 A Wall Street Journal article denigrating U.S. aid to the MNR on these 
grounds caused La Paz to issue a sharp rebuttal to the State Department.73 In the autumn of 1954, 
Barron’s magazine decried the administration’s use of “the U.S. taxpayer [to preserve] a 
misgoverned, impoverished” nation.74 Time magazine disparaged the “left-wing elements in [the] 
M.N.R. led by Labor Boss Juan Lechín, who have helped turn Bolivia's biggest dollar earner, tin 
mining, into a mismanaged, worn-out featherbed for his followers.”75 Criticism came from 
within the foreign policy bureaucracy as well. State Department official William P. Duruz wrote 
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to President Eisenhower on 28 June, 1958, complaining about the ICA’s “inadequate, indifferent 
and incompetent” handling of aid to Bolivia.76 Duruz's was not the only voice of concern raised 
at the ICA's failings and the ambitious overreach of State Department officials', who lacked the 
logistics and personnel to deliver on their projects.77 
 Fiscal conservatives from within the administration shared these concerns: particularly 
Treasury Secretary Humphrey and Commerce Secretary Sinclair Weeks, who repeatedly 
questioned aid increases to Bolivia and Latin America.78 Both men served the president as 
advocates for a fiscally conservative agenda that was close to Eisenhower’s heart.79 Humphrey 
and Weeks believed private capital was the only effective way to develop the economies of the 
United States and of foreign countries, and as a result, they fought to limit government spending 
in all spheres, especially that of foreign aid.80 Frustrated by Humphrey's influence, prominent 
modernization theorist and former assistant CIA director Max Millikan testified to a Special 
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Congressional Subcommittee that “it was quite apparent to me that the Treasury has skillfully 
and effectively sabotaged all efforts to produce a [developing world aid] program that will cost 
anything.”81 Humphrey and Weeks felt that federal government aid, if left unchecked, would be 
thrown into a massive Third World sinkhole that could make billions disappear through graft and 
misguided, unprofitable projects, whilst simultaneously dragging down the U.S. economy. They 
also feared that generous aid schemes would breed dependency in America’s allies, and in their 
eyes, the “corrupt” Bolivian government fit the mould.82 
The conflicting interests witihin the U.S. federal government were also of note. The State 
Department sought to secure Bolivian economic and political stability through purchasing 
Bolivian tin, whilst the General Services Administration, again under pressure from Congress, 
wanted to close the Texas City smelter capable of refining low-grade Bolivian ores. The GSA 
and Congress wanted the U.S. government out of the business smelting unprofitable tin ores and 
of competing with private companies.  
Congress proved a constant thorn in the side of the administration and the State 
Department's desire to support the Bolivian government. The administration and the State 
Department constantly tried to push for higher levels of aid to Bolivia, only to be rebuffed by 
Congress.83 Promises of help in building a Bolivian tin smelter had to be withdrawn, and to some 
it appeared that the administration was only too aware its aid programs designed to stabilize the 
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inter-American system were politically sensitive.84 Congressman Chipperfield “said he had the 
impression the Department was afraid of Congress and didn't ask for all it wanted.”85 Certainly, 
Congress cut appropriations for every proposed package of aid for Latin America, as it did for 
other parts of the world.86 Congressional leaders called for “drastic foreign aid cuts,” even spoke 
of eliminating foreign aid entirely, and the 83rd Congress denied Latin America a proposed $13 
billion aid program akin to the Marshall Plan.87 
 To the Bolivians, the importance of the U.S. Congress in determining U.S. aid levels was 
clear, if sometimes frustrating.88 Arthur Karasz, the U.N. economic advisor overseeing the 
Bolivian economic stabilization program between 1953 and 56, emphasized to MNR leaders that 
Bolivia's economic needs on multiple fronts were all “subject to complex negotiations, each one 
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depends on the domestic politics of the United States.”89 The foreign ministry informed President 
Paz that “the final decision [on U.S. aid levels] will depend exclusively on Congress, and to get 
the sought-after success, the State Department needed to have decisive arguments to convince 
Congress.”90  
The reluctance of Congress and some cabinet members to cooperate provoked considerable 
frustration from Eisenhower at times, who called Congress' cuts to foreign aid “pennywise and 
pound foolish,” “deplorable and short sighted,” even “bordering upon tragic stupidity.”91 The 
president rebuked his Treasury Secretary’s lack of vision whilst discussing Latin America: “of 
course it was all very well to say that we should not ‘finance socialism’, but the sad fact of the 
matter was that in many parts of the world the United States had to deal with situations as it 
actually found them rather than with situations which it would like to find.”92 By 1957, shortly 
before Humphrey left the cabinet, Eisenhower wrote that Humphrey and similarly minded 
conservatives were “out of touch with reality,” and unaware of the importance of appealing to 
“the spirit of nationalism.”93 Sinclair Weeks, meanwhile, was “so completely conservative in his 
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views that he seems to be illogical.” Eisenhower privately chided Weeks and hoped “that he will 
soon become a little bit more aware of the world as it is today.” 94 
Eisenhower's frustration reflected the significant concessions the administration had to 
make to this conservative body of opinion.95 As the First Secretary to the Ambassador in La Paz 
commented, the United States was always facing the “delicate problem” of “endeavoring 
continuously to strike a proper balance between the economically desirable and politically 
feasible.”96 The administration also had to justify its Bolivia policy as “emergency aid” in a 
“special situation” to Congress and skeptical Washington bureaucrats, stressing their policies’ 
stabilizing effect on an otherwise volatile economic and political situation.97 Indeed, the State 
Department retrospectively described its aid packages during 1953-56 as “stop-gap” in internal 
memos.98 
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Given the political climate in Congress, Administration officials also emphasized that large 
aid levels to Bolivia were temporary, and the U.S. goal was to allow Bolivia to “stand on its own 
economic feet, so that we will be able to cease our financial assistance as soon as possible.”99 
Secretary Holland “hoped to eliminate [aid to Bolivia]…as soon as it was possible to cut the 
country loose.”100 Top officials worried about widely publicizing aid to Bolivia, and Eisenhower 
and Dulles explicitly wanted to keep the extent of assistance to Bolivia out of press releases in 
1954, though other policymakers were proud of the “considerable amount of publicity” the State 
Department had given to U.S. aid to Bolivia.101 This desire to underemphasize aid levels in 
Bolivia had its roots in Humphrey-style conservatism and fear that other Latin American 
governments would come looking for similar extensive grants and soft loans, created unwanted 
diplomatic pressure and a possible domestic political backlash.102 
Though concessions were made to fiscal conservatism, they were not strong enough to 
overrule the arguments for more spending in Bolivia: not only to stabilize a crisis situation, but 
to provide the revolution with the long-term economic stability necessary to diversify its 
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economy and achieve a greater degree of self sufficiency and economic autonomy. The OSA’s 
William Tapley Bennett, Jr. argued in November, 1953, that “economic development of 
Bolivia…is in fact now our primary policy objective,” and “to make rapid progress toward 
economic diversification Bolivia requires large sums of foreign capital. It will not be possible to 
obtain all of this from private sources.” Bennett went on to say that economic development 
“rank[ed] ahead of our present strategic interest in Bolivia’s tin and tungsten.”103 
U.S. officials realized that Bolivia was destined to be “a problem child in South American 
affairs and at best will probably be something of an international ward” for the foreseeable 
future. 104  Yet the administration went ahead with substantial aid packages anyway, aid 
packages designed not simply to prevent immediate crisis, but to support Bolivian efforts to 
restructure and diversify the Bolivian economy over years if not decades.105 These perceptions 
and commitments to Bolivia for the long-haul undermine policymakers’ public protestations that 
Bolivia aid was a simply a temporary expedient. Eisenhower calculated that, in Bolivia, wider 
goals could be served by relatively inexpensive aid programs, in order to demonstrate to Latin 
America that cooperation with the United States and accepting its economic expertise (as well as 
largesse) could solve Bolivia's underlying and deep-rooted problems.106 
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Despite placing rhetorical emphasis on the need for private capital-led development, the 
administration in fact supported the revolution’s goal of a strengthened role for the state in the 
economy.107 The OSA’s William Tapley Bennett, Jr. argued in November, 1953, that “economic 
development of Bolivia…is in fact now our primary policy objective,” which would require 
“large sums of foreign capital. It will not be possible to obtain all of this from private 
sources.”108 Other administration officials, including John Foster Dulles, also advocated 
substantial direct governmental assistance to Bolivia, even if it meant shoring up a statist 
economic development model.109 Dulles, Eisenhower and administration officials repeatedly 
emphasized that continued high levels of aid were desirable for “political” reasons. 110  They 
rejected the narrow use of Humphrey-style economic arguments, which would suggest that 
Bolivia was a poor investment given its dire economic situation, political instability and 
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declining mineral wealth. As John Foster Dulles pointed out, “it might be sound banking to put 
Latin America through the wringer, but if you do it might come out red.”111 
This thinking seems to have been behind Eisenhower's impassioned outburst at one NSC 
meeting in the summer of 1958; an outburst that also goes far towards undermining the idea that 
U.S. policy was designed to combat economic nationalism and foster Bolivian dependency: 
We want these Latin American republics to be sovereign associates of ourselves. In a sense 
we are ultra-nationalists, so why not preach the same doctrine to our neighbors? Under this 
umbrella we could attempt to deal with the concrete economic problems faced by Latin 
America, either by ameliorating these problems or at least by fuzzing up our own 
connection with these problems. In short we ought to exploit the ultra-national feelings in 
the neighboring republics along the line of the slogan that if you can’t beat them, join 
them... we must try the formula of ultra-nationalism. We must exploit this force in Latin 
America rather than try to fight it.112 
 
Austerity and Plan Eder  
 
Although under significant pressure to promise compensation for U.S. shareholders and 
attract private capital investment, the revolution had a relatively free hand from 1953-56 in 
formulating its own economic policy, guided by U.N. economic advisor Arthur Karasz. With 
inflation rapidly rising in 1955, the Bolivians decided to welcome in an economic advising team 
from the U.S., that swiftly did away with multiple exchange rates and championed a program of 
austerity to curb inflation.113 The arrival of the chief U.S. advisor, businessman George Eder of 
the International Telephone and Telegraph company, did mark a curtailing of Bolivian 
governmental spending and autonomy over economic decision making, especially in the 
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pulperias, but it did not fundamentally undermine the revolution. Universal suffrage remained, 
as did the nationalized mines, for which the Paz government had hired 10, 000 new workers in 
1952-53.114 The government managed to protect employment in the state- run mines, which U.S. 
policymakers continued to subsidise despite believing they were run on a “social[, rather than 
economic,] basis.”115 The pace of agrarian reform and land redistribution increased during the 
1950s, and the new government achieved a “drastic redistribution of wealth.”116 
The plan did inflict much economic hardship on one of the world’s poorest countries. It 
also did much to combat inflation where the Karasz period had failed, and inflation levels 
approaching two hundred percent represented a greater threat to the stability and achievements of 
the revolution than did the strictures of the Eder plan or reliance on U.S. aid.117 As Paz and 
Guevara realized, inflation had the potential to “destroy [its] social policies” and unravel its 
diversification drive.118 
The United Nation’s Economic Comission on Latin America and the Carribbean (ECLAC, 
or CEPAL in the more commonly used Spanish acronym), agreed with the MNR government’s 
assessment. Bolivia had to first tackle inflation to realise its necessary long-term plan to diversify 
                                                 
114 J. Wilkie. "Bolivia: Ironies in the National Revolutionary Process, 1952-86" (1987). During its most labor 
intensive period, tin mining employed a total of 50, 000 workers according to James Malloy. James Malloy, Bolivia: 
The Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1970), p. 26. 
115 René Ruiz González, La Administración Emperica de las Minas Nacionalizadas second edition (La Paz, Bolivia: 
1980), pp.  161, 181. Robles 
116 Heath et al, Land Reform in Bolivia, p. 384. See also Kelley and Klein, Revolution and the Rebirth of Inequality, 
pp. 182-3, 142. 
117 The cost of living between January and November 1956 rose by 167% according to UN figures. CEPAL, 
Economic Survey of Latin America (New York: United Nations, 1957), p. 10. 






exports and increase food production.119 Furthermore, the U.S. led stabilization plan had met 
with more success than the plan led by the UN’s Arthur Karaz that had preceded it. CEPAL’s 
economists argued that the stabilization fund of 25 million dollars, provided by the United States 
and IMF, helped Bolivia pursue policies to curb inflation and virtually eliminate the black 
market and speculation fueled by pre-1956 multiple exchange rates. The shift to a single 
exchange rate helped free up commodities and reduced the shortages that had plagued the 
Bolivian economy. Deprived of smuggling and speculation opportunities, many rural workers 
who had moved to the cities to take advantage of the multiple exchange-rate economy now 
returned to the land, a vital step necessary to boost domestic food production whilst also curbing 
inflation.120 
Despite some economic experimentation and structural shifts towards a more state-centered 
economy, and eventual successes in curbing inflation, the revolution was unable to transcend 
wider Bolivian macroeconomic problems during its tenure in power. Tin prices remained low, 
diversification projects were unable to significantly lessen the economy’s dependence on mineral 
exports, and petroleum exports were slow to get off the ground. The principal problem facing the 
Bolivian economy was inflation, which despite currency exchange reform continued to rise 
during the revolution's first years in power. An important contribution to this was the declining 
price of tin, the high cost of producing tin in Bolivian mines, manipulated foreign exchange rates 
that forced COMIBOL to sell its foreign reserves to the government at cheap rates, and the 
revolution's commitment to providing a wider social safety net and high levels of employment. 
Particularly significant in driving governmnet borrowing and printing of money was the cost of 
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maintaining the state-run mines suffered from absenteeism, and the rising cost of the pulperias 
which provided subsidized goods for employees of the State-owned mines.121 The effective 
salary for miners increased fivefold between 1950 and 1955 (not adjusted for inflation).122 
Productivity in the mining and agricultural sectors declined briefly in the 1950s, unsurprising in 
a period of revolutionary reorganization.123 
The revolution faced tough structural economic problems, but ultimately the 1950s were a 
“lost decade” in terms of economic growth, mostly as a result of inflation and the woes of the 
Bolivian tin industry.124 The painful process of curbing that inflation did involve significant 
sacrifices and provoked considerable political turmoil, shattering the cooperative relationship 
between the left and moderate wings of the MNR.125 But neither alienating the left nor securing 
Bolivian dependence on the Unitged States was the purpose of austerity: inflation was a problem 
that had to be solved, as Paz and his successor Siles recognized. Its solution was shaped by the 
continued slump in tin prices, and ideological and structural forces outside of the MNR’s control. 
In the mind of the solution’s key architect, the stabilization plan was a testing ground for the 
anti-Keynsian economic philosophies that would go on to transform global economic thought 
and policy in the 1970s and 80s.126 But its solution, however harsh and antithetical to the 
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principles of the MNR revolution, did also stabilize the economy, keep the MNR in power and 
protected its core achievements insuring that the mines remained nationalized, land titles in the 
hands of campesinos, education and health spending could remain a priority, and significant 





Descriptions of ill-thought through, “quick-fix” “crisis management” are perhaps 
persuasive as critiques of U.S. policy, but have more to do with the nature of the policymaking 
process itself than the conceptual limits of its policymakers. U.S. policymakers thought their aid 
to Bolivia was subsidizing economic diversification and thus tackling long term, structural 
problems, using policy instruments that existed and were politically acceptable. Bureaucratic 
competition and political differences between different arms of the policymaking apparatus 
hindered the prioritization of Latin American aid and led to an often poor record of follow-
through on commitments and periods of relative financial and diplomatic neglect. Yet there was 
a rationale for the significant support of the Bolivian revolution under Eisenhower: the support of 
“a radical, nationalistic reform government,” and one that had at least demonstrated for the wider 
region that it would make symbolic deference to U.S. concerns over the position of private 
capital.128 The Bolivian MNR, with its cooperative leadership able to elicit much sympathy from 
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US policymakers, presented American officials with a crisis they could sell to Congress whilst 
enacting their visions of benevolent hegemony for the wider region and, perhaps most 








U.S. officials, from Eisenhower himself down to embassy workers, imagined a world where they 
did not have to "fight" leftist and reformist nationalism, but rather would be able to foster and co-
opt it.1 To Eisenhower this possibility meant embracing and encouraging even Latin American 
“ultra-nationalism,” and bringing it into closer cooperation with what administration officials 
described as the “inter-American system,” and what many other observers have termed 
“hegemony” or “empire.”2 As Eisenhower insisted “we must exploit this force in Latin America 
rather than try to fight it.”3 To appeal to and channel these movements towards cooperation with 
the United States, they pursued ambitious aid packages in the face of Congressional opposition. 
 Cuba, Bolivia and Guatemala would all demonstrate the limits of this approach’s 
feasibility. In Bolivia the Time magazine riots demonstrated the depth of popular resentment at 
U.S. influence. Nationalists seethed over the comments of an unnamed U.S. official who claimed 
Bolivian problems to be so intractable it might be easier to “abolish” Bolivia altogether. This 
episode triggered riots which claimed the lives of two and caused 70,000 dollars’ worth of 
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damage, demonstrated that Bolivian nationalism, like much of the nationalistic sentiment in 
Latin America, still had a firm grounding in anti-American sentiment.4 The condescension so 
apparent in the comment of the Embassy official, and the apparently coercive use of U.S. 
economic influence to secure unpopular domestic austerity and compensation for former mine 
owners, sparked resentment over Washington’s influence on Bolivian domestic affairs.  
As Eisenhower left office, it was hard to avoid the conclusion that U.S. aid had reinforced 
Bolivian economic dependency on U.S. aid and tin contracts, albeit unintentionally. The 
administration’s policies had also contributed to the downfall of the revolutionary era it had such 
high hopes for. The United States, wary of the influence of armed Trotskyist and Marxist miners’ 
militias in Bolivia after the revolution, sought to rebuild the Bolivian army, which the 1952 
revolution had nearly abolished. U.S.  policy remained committed to rebuilding the institution, 
both as a counterbalance to the armed wing of the C.O.B., but also as an important vehicle to 
provide labor for infrastructure and development projects.5 The Bolivian army, built up with U.S. 
aid and shielded by President Paz from Lechín’s calls for its dissolution in 1952, would put an 
end to the twelve-year democratic era ushered in by the MNR in a 1964 coup. 
 Bolivian economic hardships during the 1950s coupled with growing resentment at the 
clear influence of the U.S. on Bolivian affairs manifested by the Eder stabilization plan and 
Washington’s refusal to grant longer-term tin contracts contributed to many Bolivian’s 
resentment of Washington’s influence over La Paz. But it was ultimately the relationship of the 
United States to other leftist nationalist movements that would determine the attitude of 
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observers on the left in Latin America towards the Northern Colossus as well as the feasibility of 
cooperative relationships between Washington and non-communist leftist movements in Latin 
America. Bolivia might have been an opportunity for U.S. policymakers to play the role of white 
knight, but such posturing was fatally undermined by the very logic of the regional hegemony it 
was designed to support. 
Castro was aware of these fundamental tensions within the U.S.’ hegemonic project, even 
as he also played a coy game with the United States. He hinted that cooperation might well be 
possible between Havana and Washington into 1959.6 In the end Castro knew he would need to 
confront U.S. power in order to secure domestic political support for the revolutionary 
restructuring of Cuba’s economy and society he desired. Furthermore, in accordance with his 
anti-imperialist ideology (further cemented by the U.S. complicity in the removal of Arbenz), 
there was in his mind little option but to completely reject the United States as a reactionary 
imperialist aggressor, not only domestically, but on the international stage also. It was the 
international implications of Castroism that provoked the hostility in Washington that would lead 
to the Bay of Pigs. According to retired U.S. diplomat Wayne Smith, who served in Havana from 
1957 through to the 1980s, it was not Castro’s radical domestic agenda or the ambiguous 
influence of communism and Marxism on domestic policy that determined the collapse of U.S.-
Cuban relations in 1959-60.7 This is not to blame Castro for the Bay of Pigs and the U.S. 
embargo, but to demonstrate how his vision of Cuban nationalism was specifically designed to 
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clash with the U.S.’ vision of the inter-American system. Castro’s vocal criticism of the OAS, 
influenced by the Caracas conference and the subsequent Guatemala coup, proved central to his 
fall from grace in U.S. policymakers’ eyes, and was an important political tool for him to cement 
political support for his reforms of the Cuban economy.8 
Castro’s calculation that the United States would never be a feasible partner was 
fundamentally shaped by his understanding of the Guatemala coup in 1954. To Castro and many 
other Third World nationalists, Washington could be clearly seen as responsible for the removal 
of Arbenz, the most prominent symbol of leftist nationalism in Latin America, and a 
democratically elected leader who advocated legalistic reform. The Castillo Armas coup did 
terrible damage to the prospect of U.S. cooperation with “Third Way” movements that, in the 
imaginations of U.S. officials, was still possible in Guatemala and elsewhere after 1954. 
Similar to Castro’s rejection of U.S. hegemony, Arbenz’s vision for Guatemala’s future 
included a program of massive redistribution of land which, he insisted, the United States had no 
right to influence or shape. His conception of reformist nationalism explicitly rejected U.S. 
hegemony. He withdrew from the Organization of Central American States, a move which 
Eisenhower later emphasized as critical in demonstrating his radical threat to the administration.9 
Arbenz would not compromise and assuage U.S. fears over the extent of influence communism 
held in Guatemala, holding a minute’s silence for the death of Stalin at a time of heightened 
tensions with the U.S. government and refusing to dismiss communists from his government. 
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These were perfectly legitimate actions for a sovereign leader to take, and redolent with powerful 
symbolism, but ones not best designed to placate observers in Washington.10 
In the end, U.S. interventionism helped to discredit the notion of U.S. support for leftist 
nationalism in a way that support for Bolivian revolutionaries could never hope to contend with. 
The Cuban gravitation towards the Soviet Union would mark the intensification of Latin 
America’s Cold War, leaving leftists drawn towards movements, from Castroism and Maoism to 
the non-aligned movement.11 In the 1960s, 70s and 80s, as the superpowers explored détente 
with the Soviets, the Cold War’s violence would rage throughout the continent. The violence was 
fuelled by the United States and Latin American anticommunist dictatorships eager to combat 
communist ideology and Cuban interventionism, however inflated or exaggerated.12 The 
symbolism of the U.S. intervention in Guatemala, and the radical path that Ché Guevara 
advocated in response to this intervention, was much more powerful than the sometimes 
ambivalent and ultimately ineffectual cooperation between Washington and La Paz in the 1950s. 
U.S. officials’ ideological assumptions about the nature and purpose of their foreign 
policy “distorted” their view of revolutionary and reformist movements- how could it be 
otherwise?13 The distortion, or shaping, of the administration’s perceptions in Latin America 
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went beyond narrow Cold War reasoning, according to Eisenhower’s perception of a bond “that 
will permanently endure” between the U.S. and Latin America.14 In the effort to promote U.S. 
hegemony in Latin America and “persuade Latin American Governments and peoples to adhere 
to our political and economic philosophies,” Eisenhower administration officials went as far as 
incorporating the nationalism and state-centered economic reforms of the Bolivian revolution. 15 
They proved flexible enough to tolerate and materially support ideologies and policies that, to 
contemporaries, seemed to threaten free market or anticommunist principles. Administration 
officials were not merely cynical practitioners of realpolitik, nor were they thoughtless, knee-jerk 
reactionaries. 
The lengths to which U.S. hegemony could be aligned with leftist nationalism, at least in 
the minds of its authors, have been underappreciated by scholars of U.S.-Latin American 
relations and even of U.S.-Bolivian relations. Most of these scholars tend to argue that U.S. 
power did much to thwart the ambitions of the Bolivian revolution rather than enable many of its 
achievements: substantial redistribution of land and wealth, the nationalization of the tin mines 
and the incorporation of indigenous Bolivians more completely into the body politic.  
In pursuit of these goals the MNR leadership and diplomatic corps demonstrated 
sophisticated understanding of their counterparts in the U.S. and demonstrated a symbolic 
willingness to work with Washington. Bolivian diplomats succeeded in presenting the aims of 
their revolution and the problems that it was trying to overcome. Their presentation was 
successful in garnering a sympathetic response, evident in the remarkably similar ways in which 
                                                 
14 Letter from Dwight Eisenhower to Milton Eisenhower, 1 December, 1954. DDEL, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 
Papers as President, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 8, December 1954 (2). 
15 Memorandum from Holland to Dulles, December 13, 1955, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-57, 





Bolivian and U.S. officials articulated their understandings of Bolivian problems and the aims of 
the MNR regime when speaking privately to colleagues. Although scholarly works tend to 
emphasize the coercive, all-powerful and reactionary nature of that hegemony in Latin America, 
the Bolivians managed to bend U.S. power towards the enthusiastic rhetorical and financial 
support for a leftist, statist revolution that profoundly transformed the country’s economic and 
social structures.  
The Bolivian example stands in sharp contrast to U.S. relations with other Third World 
nationalists and revolutionaries. MNR leaders demonstrated remarkable willingness to make 
both symbolic and substantive concessions to align themselves with the United States. This set 
them apart from so many other movements that faced the pressure to define their nationalism 
explicitly in opposition to U.S. power and interests. The path chosen by MNR leaders created its 
own set of problems, and did not diminish resentment at U.S. interference and the disparities of 
wealth, influence and power between Bolivia and the United States. But it did demonstrate that, 
given a cooperative supplicant and a ‘crisis’ situation that could be sold to Congress, there was 
sufficient desire within the ranks of the U.S. foreign policymaking bureaucracy to align 
Washington symbolically and substantively with transformative and even revolutionary change 
in Latin American economies and societies. This desire could be used to bolster nationalist 
movements on both left and right, provided they were willing to align themselves with the 
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